



## EU Cross-border Management Committee

### Building Peace and Reconciliation Post 2006

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Human beings suffer,  
They torture one another,  
They get hurt and get hard.  
No poem or play or song  
Can fully right a wrong  
Inflicted and endured.

The innocent in gaols  
Beat on their bars together.  
A hunger-striker's father  
Stands in the graveyard dumb.  
The police widow in veils  
Faints at the funeral home.

History says, *Don't hope*  
*On this side of the grave.*  
But then, once in a lifetime  
The longed-for tidal wave  
Of justice can rise up,  
And hope and history rhyme.

So hope for a great sea-change  
On the far side of revenge.  
Believe that a further shore  
Is reachable from here.  
Believe in miracles  
And cures and healing wells.

Call miracle self-healing:  
The utter, self-revealing  
Double-take of feeling.  
If there's fire on the mountain  
Or lightening and storm  
And a god speaks from the sky

That means someone is hearing  
The outcry and the birth-cry  
Of new life at its term.

From *The Cure at Troy*  
By Seamus Heaney, 1990

*Reproduced with kind permission of the author*



## Acknowledgements

As far as possible consultation has been a key feature of this study from two perspectives. Firstly six focus groups were held with project promoters of EU Cross Border Management Committee funded projects in Belfast, Dublin, Dundalk, Letterkenny, Monaghan and Sligo and were attended by over 70 promoters who generously gave up their time to contribute to this report and thus helped to ensure that its findings are grounded in the experience at local community level.

Secondly, in addition to consultation with project promoters, the following individuals were either interviewed in the course of the research, participated in workshops or otherwise provided useful information and guidance:

Philip Angus, Department of Finance and Personnel NI

Ciaran de Baroid, Community Foundation NI

Paul Beattie, Limavady Local Strategy Partnership

Stephen Bloomer, Community Foundation NI

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Tony Crooks, Area Development Management

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Tony Kennedy, Co-operation Ireland

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Felicity McCartney, Community Foundation NI

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## Foreword

*“Peace is not the absence of conflict but the presence of  
creative alternatives for responding to conflict.”*

**Dorothy Thompson**

This report seeks to build on peace-building work to date, particularly the two EU-funded PEACE Programmes, and to set out creative alternatives for continuing this work post 2006.

Since 1994, the partners in the Cross-Border Consortium — Area Development Management (ADM), Combat Poverty Agency (CPA), Co-operation Ireland (CI) and the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI, formerly Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust) have, separately, had responsibility for the implementation of a variety of measures of the European Union PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 Programmes in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland. Our organisations have also been working together in partnership to administer some of the cross-border measures of PEACE 1 and 2. The work of the Consortium and its constituent organisations is outlined further within the pages of this report

The rich experience of the separate organisations has been further developed through practical co-operation, the cross-fertilisation of ideas and sharing of the lessons learned from our own work, and from the work of the hundreds of projects which our organisations have supported — financially and developmentally — through PEACE 1 and 2.

Towards the end of 2002, ADM/CPA, CFNI and CI initiated a discussion on learning the lessons from the peace and reconciliation programmes. The Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) requested that we take the



discussion further and make proposals for addressing the funding and support needs of peace-building when the PEACE 2 Programme comes to an end after 2006. We appointed PSc Management Consultants to “produce a practical framework for peace-building in the context of island-wide relationships post 2006, drawing on the experience of both the PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 programmes.”

This report, ***Building Peace and Reconciliation Post 2006***, is the result of that research. Based as it is on the experience of thousands of active peace builders, it will be a valuable addition to the growing library of peace studies on this island. It will make an important contribution to the vitally important debates about peace building, not only on the island of Ireland, but in a wider international context.

As the report makes clear, we have much to share with, and much to learn, from our European neighbours and people further afield who have lived through civil and political conflicts. The report concludes that there is a need for a Europe-wide peace-building programme that addresses socio-ethnic divisions, while at the same time there is a need to mainstream peace and reconciliation work and for all institutions on the island to seek to improve their effectiveness through cross-border links. The study also found that there is a requirement to support innovation in peace-building and to focus on the important task of evaluating the effectiveness of peace-building activity at all levels.



The findings and other recommendations of the report provide a firm basis for shaping a strategic approach to achieving an agreed, peaceful and reconciled Ireland. We remain committed to playing our respective parts in that process.

**September 1st 2003**



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## 1. Executive Summary

The general discourse about conflict resolution and peace-building points to the need for a set of processes operating at different social levels. Thus, “top-table” negotiations have to be complemented by meso-level interventions from opinion formers and the grass roots activities of civil society organisations. Key debates focus on the failure to complement negotiations at the top with other interventions and processes working throughout the social structure, leading to political instability. In essence, both PEACE Programmes were designed to catalyse middle level and grass root activities in order to reinforce the climate for top-level negotiations, compensate for the costs of the conflict, and speed up the pace of overall development. In that sense, their function fitted perfectly with what we know about conflict resolution in general.

However, for a variety of reasons, political negotiation took place at an uneven level and was subject to substantial tensions. In part, this resulted from necessary ambiguity within the Belfast Agreement and in part from the fundamentally different conceptions of what the peace process was designed to achieve. Such difficulties have been exacerbated by internal conflicts within Unionism and the battle for hegemony of the Unionist population. In a curious sense, the Agreement became part of the problem rather than the solution to the Northern Ireland conflict. Accordingly, it would be unwise to assume that the PEACE Programmes could, in themselves, compensate for the growing tensions over the Agreement. It might thus appear that the PEACE Programmes faced an impossible challenge.

Nevertheless, it would be a grave mistake to underestimate either the political transformations that have occurred or the significance of contribution made by the PEACE Programmes. For most of the key actors, the politics of coercion have been replaced by the politics of persuasion. Other than on the fringes of





dissident Republicanism, there is general agreement that constitutional change in Northern Ireland requires the consent of the majority of its population. The British and Irish governments are in fundamental agreement about the way forward. While low level violence remains a constant feature for certain sections of the population, a political conflict that took over 100 lives per year and added around £1 billion annually to Exchequer costs is over.

If deaths resulting from political conflict are taken as the primary indicator of the distribution of the Troubles, then the most intense exposure to violence occurred within Belfast, followed by the south and west of Northern Ireland. Deaths in the Irish Republic were relatively low, but it was clearly affected by the concentration of deaths along its border with Northern Ireland. The Troubles thus had specific spatial effects. Moreover, there was a strong association between levels of deprivation and political violence in Belfast and in the border areas.

In addition, residential segregation has been both an effect and a contributor to further violence. This is most apparent in complex patterns of segregation concentrated in small areas like North Belfast. These findings suggest that in understanding the dynamics of violence, deprivation and residential segregation are important factors;

Evidence from the Police Service of Northern Ireland suggests that while violence resulting in fatalities has fallen since the peace process, other forms of violence have actually increased. Indeed, the tensions generated by the peace process seem to have catalysed widespread, low level violence. For many communities, the peace process has not been an experience of peace. Equally, there is substantial survey evidence to suggest that the suspicions and fears that each community has of the other have increased since 2000, pointing to a decline rather than enhancement of reconciliation.



In terms of social capital, community suspicions and lack of trust suggest significant deficits in the levels of social capital within Northern Ireland. There is a clear need to build “bridging” capital between the two communities and perhaps a need for greater integration within communities. All in all, it is difficult to find macro indicators of the impact of the PEACE Programmes on the overall attitudes and opinions of the Northern Ireland population

While there are good reasons to believe that the Troubles had a severe negative impact on the Northern Ireland economy, it is difficult to find data that point to specific effects. In part, this is because economic development has been influenced by many variables - the international environment including particular events like the oil shocks, specific policy measures and the long-term decline of Northern Ireland’s traditional industrial base. In part, it is because the British government increased public spending after Direct Rule thus creating many thousands of public sector jobs and helping to drive GDP growth. The economic trajectory of Northern Ireland was thus like that of weak UK regions (in particular, the North East of England).

Yet the regional economy, on a range of economic indicators, saw rapid improvement in the second half of the 1990s, coinciding with the period after the cease-fires. Unemployment fell rapidly, manufacturing production and productivity increased and employed increased by over 100,000. There may thus be some evidence of a “peace effect”. It should be acknowledged that the PEACE Programmes have injected substantial resources into a very small region that simultaneously benefited from Labour’s expansionary budget plans after 1999.

There remains evidence, however, that economic growth has not been distributed evenly, never mind areas of greatest need – a development feature that needs to be addressed. At the same time, comparison with the Republic of Ireland demonstrates that Northern Ireland’s growth fell far behind its island



neighbour and that patterns of uneven development may be even more pronounced in Northern Ireland compared to the Republic.

Coming into this context, PEACE 1 represented a substantial additional investment from the EU (€300 million in the first instance) with two strategic objectives: to promote the social inclusion of those at the margins of economic and social life, and; to exploit the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and stimulate social and economic regeneration. The strategic objectives were to be realised via six strategic themes: employment; urban regeneration; rural regeneration; social inclusion; cross-border development, and; productive investment and industrial development. In an additional measure, twenty six District Partnerships were created to develop area strategies for peace-building and reconciliation.

Over 50% of total funding was taken up by social inclusion, productive investment and partnership activity and a further 30% by employment and urban and rural regeneration. PEACE 1 also created new and innovative delivery bodies in both the district partnerships and the intermediary funding bodies.

Over 70% of project promoters claimed measurable economic impact from their activities, estimated by 1999 at 3,800 jobs and 185 new businesses. All claimed to have had a social inclusion effect. Three quarters claimed to operate as cross community projects although the evidence of the impact on community relations is unclear.

In 1999, the Council of Ministers' meeting in Berlin committed to a further Northern Ireland PEACE Programme to run from 2000 to 2004 with resources of €500 million. Following extensive consultation both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and with input from the new Northern Ireland Assembly, the following strategic objectives were set out: economic renewal; social integration, inclusion and reconciliation; locally-based regeneration and development



strategies; outward and forward looking region, and; cross-border co-operation. These represented different emphases from the PEACE 1 Programme with a clear strategic focus on economic development and greater integration amongst both parts of Ireland and the broader world.

In all, economic renewal and local regeneration and development have accounted for more than half the budget, social integration, inclusion and reconciliation less than a quarter. Arguably, such priorities reflected less attention to the process of peace-building. At the same time however, all projects were expected to operate with a set of cross-cutting themes – cross-community engagement, a focus on areas of disadvantage and support for those most affected by the Troubles.

Innovation in delivery continued with the creation of the Special European Union Programmes Body and the transformation of District Partnerships in Local Strategic Partnerships. In addition, the applications process was centralised and computerised.

By April 2003, almost 1,500 applications had been approved accounting for €300 million.

Engagement with project promoters and reflection on the PEACE Programmes indicates some disagreement about both peace-building and reconciliation. The Mid-term Review of PEACE 1 commented that while nearly everyone was positive about their contribution to both, few were able to specify the actual mechanisms or the identifiable effects. There was, however, agreement on the need for a stronger emphasis on cross-community work.

The PEACE Programmes created new structures for local governance in the shape of its delivery mechanisms and thus contributed to the overall debate about the appropriate governance mechanisms for Northern Ireland. One



dimension of the debate has focused on the 'over-governing' of the regions small population – the excess of district councils, health boards and trusts and education and library boards. This dimension has focused on the diseconomies of small-scale governance mechanisms and the need for rationalisation both on cost and effectiveness criteria.

While undoubtedly important, this dimension should be complemented by another about the contribution of active citizenship to effective local governance. The PEACE Programmes established institutions that realised partnership, brought civil society organisations into the delivery process and catalysed a much higher level of participation by ordinary citizens. These are important ingredients in the overall debate about how the region should be governed.

Importantly, the PEACE Programmes put cross-border co-operation at the heart of the policy debate. Indeed, rather than an abstract discourse, it focused on the practical ways to achieve greater co-operation in a series of demonstration projects. Both states in Ireland can benefit from cross-border synergies and the cross-border projects showed the potential and the problems of this challenge.

The diversity of work undertaken as a result of the PEACE Programmes can generate important learning on how to contribute to peace-building and reconciliation, how to involve citizens, how to create delivery mechanisms, perhaps more effective than mainstream complements.

In framing recommendations for a new Peace Programme, we have been mindful of the following considerations:

- The limitations of a single large programme framed within the requirements of ESF and ERDF. As the Brian Harvey's critique of PEACE 2 indicates, these put fixed parameters on what could be done by projects and how flexibly they



could operate. If there is no given recipe for peace and reconciliation, there is a clear imperative to foster creativity and innovation.

- Associated with the first, the requirement for distributed, decentralised processes so as to involve the maximum number of citizens in decisions about how Northern Ireland could move beyond its conflict;
- The recognition that Northern Ireland's is not a unique conflict and that division and sovereignty disputes exist within the EU and on its borders – a feature that may well increase with enlargement. Accordingly, there is a need to ensure that the learning of the PEACE Programmes is exported beyond the borders of a small island on the western European periphery;
- The imperative that peace-building, as well as reconciliation, permeates the mainstream in both Irish states. If nothing else, the time scales involved suggest that problems cannot be fully resolved by a series of time-bound special programmes. This is entirely in keeping with the primary purpose of EU initiatives – to demonstrate what is possible and to influence the policy of the nation state;
- Finally, we are fully convinced that political affiliation should be no obstacle to the desire to see joined-up development within Ireland. National borders within the EU are frequently places of synergy and accelerated development. The over-centralisation of decision-making and development in both states, coupled with historic antagonisms, has made the Irish border a space of under-development. An alternative vision suggests that a more balanced development is required.

This paper proposes a five level programme to build on the work of PEACE 1 and 2 as follows:

### **1. Healing socio-ethnic division across Europe**

The EU needs to recognise its responsibility in healing socio-ethnic divisions and the experience of Northern Ireland, not just as a specific example of socio-ethnic conflict, but as an arena where a variety of mainstream and EU strategies have



been implemented, could make an important contribution to this EU effort. It is impossible to prescribe for policies at the EU level, but there are strong arguments for a new EU initiative covering the whole of the territory and the areas that adjoin it and focused on socio-ethnic divisions. Such a programme might do a number of things:

- Raise the visibility of this growing problem and ensure that it is addressed in EU policy making;
- Create learning networks to look at various aspects of the problem – inward migration, sovereignty contests, racism etc. – in order to generate a better understanding of its dynamics and how to engage it;
- Fund innovative initiatives (perhaps utilising the Poverty 3 model) that can operate outside Structural Fund frameworks (like EQUAL) to experiment with new ways to address the problem;
- Create an archive of literature and other material (accessible on the web) relevant to those working in this area;
- Fund training for those working in the area; and
- Encourage the exchange of activists to cross-fertilise the learning from different situations.

## **2. Mainstreaming Peace and Reconciliation**

The strength of EU programmes has been their additionality (a contested concept in Northern Ireland) and innovative character, not their scale. In general, they are dwarfed by the scale and funding of mainstream programmes. Since fostering peace and reconciliation has to be long-term in Northern Ireland, it should be embedded in the mainstream. When a separate body, like the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland, is established with a relatively small funding base, there are definite limitations on what it can achieve. Indeed, its function may be to legitimate the main departments ignoring the issue. At the same time, it could perform a crucial function in acting as a think-tank and a commissioner of research on what does work and what needs to be done. The



idea here is to rationalise all that existing effort, by demanding that all statutory bodies have a clearly defined obligation to encourage peace and reconciliation.

The models for doing so are already in place. The first is Targeting Social Need (TSN). TSN responsibilities ensure that each statutory body has to publish a TSN strategy and therefore the precedent has been set for a similar construct to deal with the issue of peace and reconciliation. The gains from economies of scale and scope are potentially enormous.

The other model is Making Belfast Work/Belfast Regeneration Office. In this initiative of the Northern Ireland Department for Social Development, specific amounts are identified for particular purposes and departments and the community/voluntary sector make bids for projects that would deliver them. Moreover the opportunity for partnerships of statutory and community organisations to make bids would further develop the governance innovations introduced in the PEACE Programmes.

The experience of the National Anti-Poverty Strategy in the Republic is also relevant here, particularly in the setting of progress targets.

The key idea is to make reconciliation everybody's business and everybody's responsibility. The difficulties of engaging in this arena can no longer be accepted as an excuse.

### **3. Strengthening North South Co-operation**

Clearly there are political implications here since the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict is about sovereignty. Yet development continues to be concentrated around Dublin and Belfast producing underdevelopment in other sub-regions and increasing congestion and other costs in these two urban areas. A more balanced development perspective would focus on all-Ireland development.





While there are important initiatives in this respect (see, for example, the work of Inter-trade Ireland), there is at least a doubt that this potential is sufficiently recognised by the two governments. A number of ideas are around: an all-Ireland spatial development plan including transport and telecommunications infrastructure; an all Ireland Community Support Framework negotiated with the European Commission; a scoping study on the most effective use of major physical amenities like hospitals, colleges etc. that are close to the Border. None of these involve challenges to sovereignty, but instead are about maximising the synergies of common occupation of the same island and sharing a land border.

Another approach would be for a minimal top-slice from the two expenditure blocs to fund all-Ireland and cross-border initiatives to give long-term continuity to important projects.

#### **4. An Innovation Programme for Peace and Reconciliation**

One of the key problems of time-bound funding programmes is the possibility that the lessons of real innovation can be lost when the funding regime stops. While new thinking and innovative practices are much needed, there is no guarantee that these can be mainstreamed. Accordingly, in the aftermath of PEACE 2, it would make sense to gather and analyse all the evaluation undertaken to identify what were the distinctive progress that broke new ground and delivered new results. It may be that these were a minority of all funded projects, but it is important that their lessons are not lost.

For this reason, we propose a small innovation fund designed to secure the learning from such projects, the continuity of the most promising and the transfer of others to different locations to test their generic viability.

#### **5. Knowing What Works**

Whatever develops after PEACE 2, whether a new programme or a set of mainstream policy initiatives, we recommend that adequate attention be paid to



evaluating and testing what works. This is different from the ritualistic evaluations that frequently shed little light on the complexities of the problem. There is no point in throwing money at failed practices.

At the level of the project, the basic approach is to record what actually happened and to record what people have learned. On a macro level, attitudinal surveys remain the best way to measure sustained change to hearts and minds although these remain prey to many outside influences beyond the Programme. The concept of social capital, examining its development at a number of different levels, the individual, organisational, neighbourhood and the regional level appears to have good applicability to measure progress towards peace and reconciliation.

These proposals are congruent with Harvey's call for a smaller, more flexible PEACE programme. However, they are also designed to internationalise the learning from this form of engagement, to create synergies between mainstream practices and special initiatives and to offer a consistently all-Ireland focus. There are two core assumptions: there remains a long road ahead whatever progress has already been made and this should be recognised in the policy environment; and, whatever one's politics strengthening relationships across the island can only have beneficial consequences.



## 1. Introduction and Methodology

### Purpose and Structure

The aim of the research is to produce a practical framework for peace-building and reconciliation in the context of Northern Ireland and island-wide relationships post 2006, drawing upon the experience of both the PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 programmes.

It explores what still needs to be done in terms of addressing the legacies of the conflict (in spite of the existence of the PEACE programmes) and it looks at current difficulties such as increases in inter-communal strife, residential segregation and political polarisation and the specific needs that they pose for peace-building initiatives. It makes an important distinction between events at the macro level and events at the micro level and their different impact on progress in peace-building.

It provides a detailed commentary on how events at the macro level make it difficult to definitely establish the key impact of the PEACE programme (and in some ways have restricted progress in peace-building to date). Notwithstanding the difficulties with measuring the impact of the PEACE programmes to date, the report analyses the programmes and after an extensive consultation process, it concludes on some of the key benefits of the programmes, namely empowerment and capacity building at the community level and the building of new, inclusive structures of governance. It also discusses some of the drawbacks of the programmes, in particular with regard to the degree they have been able to contribute to peace-building and reconciliation (given the underlying assumption that socio economic regeneration will lead to this) and to the demands that logistical and bureaucratic requirements have made on project promoters (especially in PEACE 2).



This analysis, and the analysis of the current state of relations in Northern Ireland and on the island in general, helps to make the recommendations on how any future funding programme might be structured.

To provide both an appropriate narrative and relevant analysis of these issues, this report is structured as follows:

- Political context
- Charting of the passage of progress from war to peace which examines the conditions and impacts of the conflict in terms of death, residential and workplace segregation, attitudes pre-and post cease-fires and Programmes and the state of community relations. The potential of theories of social capital to unravel these issues is also considered.
- Analysis of the link between conflict and underdevelopment, pre and post- cease-fires
- Narrative sections on both PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 outlining genesis, consultation processes, delivery mechanisms, management together with appropriate case studies of implementing bodies to illustrate the mechanisms used to distribute funding, the challenges they face (and continue to face) and to give a sense of their distinctive achievements.
- An examination of what has been learned to date through PEACE programming in terms of its impact on reconciliation through the new structures it has either supported or directly created, the types of work with clear reconciliation foci supported and the lessons learned in the delivery of the Programmes at Programme Management, Implementing Body and Project Promoter level.
- On the basis of the foregoing analysis, an outline of the potential direction of a series of inter-linked programmes to succeed PEACE 2.



## Methodology

The foundation of the methodology which PSc Management Consultants pursued for this project was desk research based on the following sources:

- programme documentation, marketing and evaluation materials
- online data sets
- literature on Ireland and peace process

This documentary research was significantly enhanced through a consultative approach to the subject involving as many as possible of the key stakeholders of PEACE Programming to date within the confines of time and budgetary constraints.

Case studies were also included to add illustrative examples of the richness and depth, not merely of work funded (which has been discussed at length in many other publications) but in the structures and mechanisms which were employed to deliver that funding. Four brief case studies have been developed. For PEACE 1, the experience of ADM/CPA as an IFB working in the Southern Border Counties is discussed alongside the work and approach of Belfast European Partnership Board which functioned as the District Partnership for Belfast City Council area. To illustrate work in PEACE 2, the experience of Limavady Local Strategy Partnership is provided as an agency working in a largely rural area of Northern Ireland whilst the very different experience of the County Monaghan PEACE 2 Task Force working within County Development Board structures provides an interesting contrast. In terms of types of work funded we have sought to provide examples with a clear reconciliation focus. Good examples of what was able to be achieved within the Programme are provided by the work done by the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust with ex-prisoners, the programmes administered by Area Development Management/Combat Poverty and NIVT focusing on cross-border work and the micro projects in East Belfast funded through Co-operation Ireland.



The starting point of the project was a workshop convened by the EU Cross Border Management Committee which took place at the Fairways Hotel in Dundalk on 4th February 2003. The purpose of the workshop which was attended by 22 persons from a range of PEACE 2 funding bodies was to consider the key peace-building challenges which might exist following the PEACE 2 Programme scheduled to finish in 2006. This workshop, together with the Consortium's paper entitled "Building Peace and Reconciliation; Learning from the PEACE and Reconciliation Programme" framed the background to the research.

A project inception meeting took place with ADM/CPA Management on 7th February to confirm the methodology and outputs of the project.

A further session with a smaller group of Consortium members took place on 7th March to build on the Dundalk workshop and to bring a tighter focus to the subject area. This session examined the changes which took place from PEACE 1 to PEACE 2 in terms of policy objectives and delivery mechanisms, best practice at the level of implementing bodies and project promoters, and how reconciliation may be measures at a micro (project), meso (Northern Ireland and Border Counties) and macro (all-Ireland) level. These issues were further developed at the presentation of the research team's interim report in Monaghan at the meeting of the EU Cross Border Management Committee.

Consultation has been a key feature of this study from two perspectives. Firstly six focus groups were held with project promoters of EU Cross Border Management Committee funded projects. It was originally hoped to convene these groups on a thematic basis but it was realised that given the travelling distances involved, better results would be gained from allowing promoters to elect dates and venues according to their own convenience. Over 150 invitations



were sent out, and the response rate was high with 73 promoters attending the sessions in total. These were held as follows:

Date	Venue
Tues 6th May	Community Foundation Northern Ireland Offices, Belfast
Wed 7th May	ADM Offices, Dublin
Thurs 8th May	ADM/CPA Offices, Monaghan
Fri 9th May	ADM/CPA Offices, Sligo
Tues 13th May	Redeemer Family Centre, Ard Easmuinn, Dundalk
Thurs 15th May	Donegall County Council Offices, Letterkenny

In addition to group consultation, a number of personal interviews were conducted with key stakeholders of PEACE Programming to date (see acknowledgements above). This provided a good measure of detail and compensated in part for the dearth of analysis applied to PEACE Programming in published form.



## 2. Political Context

### 2.1 Some Definitions

At the outset, it is useful to set out clearly what is meant here by the terms “peace-building” and “reconciliation”. For the purposes of this report:

*Peace-building* is the term given to the processes and strategies which can be brought into play on the journey from conflict resolution to reconciliation between divided communities<sup>1</sup>. Peace-building is definitely not the soft option; as it attempts to address both causes and effects of conflict simultaneously. Professor Jean Paul Lederach has pointed out the dangers of what he calls the “justice gap” and notes that expectations for change on a variety of fronts are likely to be frustrated. Whilst peace-building takes place primarily in Northern Ireland as the seat of the conflict, it also has relevance throughout the island in spite of the unspoken nature of the impact of conflict on social and political attitudes.

*Reconciliation* is the term for the process whereby past trauma, injury and suffering is acknowledged and healing/restorative action is pursued; relationship breakdown is addressed and new sustainable relationships created; and where the culture and structures which gave rise to conflict and estrangement are transformed with a view to creating an equitable and interdependent community<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Paddy Logue (n.d.) *Towards a Conceptual Framework of Peace-building* (ADM/CPA unpublished)


<sup>2</sup> Annesley Report quoted in Paddy Logue, *ibid*.





## 2.2 Problems at the “Top Table”

Lederach’s contribution to the debate on the nature of peace-building and reconciliation provides a useful model for examining the peace and reconciliation impact of PEACE programming in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of the Republic. Lederach’s work seeks to identify the needs, patterns and dilemmas posed by a post-conflict situation, not least the need to maintain momentum in the long term. Lederach suggests the construction of a peace-building process within which reconciliation can be fostered.



**Fig 1: Lederach’s Model of Conflict Transformation**

Lederach’s model is well known. He advocates three separate levels to conflict resolution and suggests appropriate activities to be targeted at each level. The triangular construct to the model stresses the interdependence of the levels: no one level can achieve reconciliation on its own.

It might thus be argued that an important benefit of the PEACE Programming has been its capacity to activate ordinary citizens in a diverse range of projects, all of



which obliged them to think about peace-building. However, the Northern Ireland peace process has been characterised by a series of problems associated with the peace agreement itself – including disputes about its exact meaning and conflicting interpretations about its implementation. The political institutions created by the agreement have been suspended four times and the second Assembly elections indefinitely postponed and remain suspended at the time of publication. The political context is crucial for peace-building on the ground and, arguably, the uncertainties in that context limit the achievement of civil society projects.

The assessment of any programme requires both the identification of change and the capacity to attribute change to programme interventions. The volatility of the situation in Northern Ireland creates extreme difficulties in identifying the changes that can be attributed to the PEACE Programmes. The key issue here is whether this volatility was contingent (difficulties associated with the transition from violence to politics in any society) or structural (difficulties that the nature and form of the peace process were incapable of overcoming). In the case of the former, the problems of transition can moderate the impact of a peace programme, whereas, with the latter, a peace programme may be misconceived.

It would be churlish to deny the level and direction of political change in Ireland toward the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. The decline in extreme violence, a cross-border referendum and the appearance, at times, of cross-party intercession each testify to the development of quasi-constitutional politics. However, there is still a need to understand that the perpetual realities of political intransigence and cultural contest that surround job allocation, marching, decommissioning, flag-bearing and policing are ever present.

It could be argued that Northern Ireland is in a “pre-post”-conflict situation. Despite, and even because of, the Belfast Agreement, sectarian divisions remain,



as do tensions surrounding issues such as housing, employment, equality, decommissioning and policing.

Despite the reproduction of sectarian tension, it is obvious that cross-community dialogue between certain political opponents has grown. The establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the preceding paramilitary cease-fires have each created some potential for positive political change. However, it should be noted that cross-community political parties, such as the Alliance Party, have seen a significant decline in their political fortunes whereas the growth in electoral support among the most nationalistic parties (Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party) has continued to grow in a very significant manner. As a result, devolution has not aided the development of a centrist middle-ground but has fortified the political power of those committed to the strongest and most vociferous notions of cultural identity and political victory. If anything, an accommodating middle ground has been diminished in a period of political transformation that aimed to support its very development.

The repeated suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the continual debacle over decommissioning illustrates how certain issues dominate the contemporary political landscape in Northern Ireland. In effect, social and economic development and the building of accountable democratic structures are undermined by the politics of asperity and ideological tradition. If political stability is to be achieved, both governance and policy making needs to turn from “consociationalism” and crisis-management and towards the development of meaningful integration and a more defined commitment to the building of a civil society.

In relation to political change and devolution, the interpretation and meaning of constitutional change is varied. For those Unionists and Loyalists<sup>3</sup> who support

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<sup>3</sup>. The distinction between Unionism and Loyalism is somewhat blurred. Loyalism usually refers to those linked to paramilitary organisations. However, the Progressive Unionist Party (political wing of the Ulster Volunteer Force) is a strong supporter of the Agreement and has a well-developed approach to cross-community dialogue. The DUP, which is anti-agreement, could be



the new devolved assembly, the legitimacy and integrity of Northern Ireland has been underlined by devolution and the endorsement of the principle of consent, which upholds the majority's desire to remain within the United Kingdom. Whilst among many Nationalists and Republicans<sup>4</sup> the creation of a power sharing executive and cross-border bodies is seen as a short-term political programme leading inevitably towards Irish re-unification.

Within the Northern Irish context, it is evident that devolution in the short term cannot resolve political antagonisms which are rooted in the perpetuation of partition, armed paramilitary groups, the experience of state violence and the territoriality of cultural and economic claims. We contend that the Northern Ireland conflict differs markedly from oft-used comparators such as South Africa and has more in common with the Israel-Palestine or Balkan conflicts in that it is essentially as much about existence as it is about whether the state is fairly governed or not (see Section 3.5 below).

The Agreement is a peculiar form of devolution within the UK context. Firstly, it is, in reality, a treaty between the UK and the Irish Republic. This treaty aims to endorse Irish national self-determination and the British constitutional convention. Secondly, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland can only be altered if the majority of people in Ireland, both North and South, wish to effect change. Thirdly, the Agreement is based upon the creation of a federal relationship within which Westminster cannot exercise power in Northern Ireland if the execution of that power contradicts the Agreement. Fourthly, Northern Ireland, unlike Wales and Scotland, can, via the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, expand upon its federal status within the UK or even leave the UK if so desired. Fifthly, the Republic of Ireland now recognises Northern Ireland as a legitimate political and constitutional entity.

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considered loyalist as it promotes populist Protestant politics as opposed to constitutionally designed forms of Unionism.

<sup>4</sup> Nationalism usually refers to the Social Democratic and Labour Party. Republicanism is attached to Sinn Féin. The main difference between the parties is extent to which they mobilise nationalism within their respective discourses.



The aim of the Agreement is to draw together diametrically political groups in order to promote a consociational accord, which endorses Northern Ireland's place in the UK and at the same time upholds minority rights and cultural demands. Despite continuing violence and political discord, the Agreement is as yet the most enduring settlement within Northern Ireland's contemporary history. However, it is important to understand that disagreements between the pro-British and pro-Irish populations remain and that devolution has a multiplicity of political and cultural meanings.

It is evident that the return of a devolved administration has not resolved the long-term future of Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom. However, it is apparent that for the British and Irish States that the onset of devolution and the decline in political violence has created a political arena which is easier, although not easy, to govern and supervise. Devolution is a first, although as yet unclear, step toward a range of future constitutional changes. As Nairn argues;

*"A holding operation may have been undertaken in Northern Ireland; but although this is working for the moment, it is unlikely to last."*<sup>5</sup>

This process of political confection overlooks the actuality that the elimination of the causes of conflict is crucial in the process of agreed political change. If anything, what the conflict/war was about is still highly contested and subjective.

Furthermore, the inability of devolution to reverse perceptions of religious discrimination, and the sense that communities are being socially and culturally marginalised due to political factors, as opposed to economic ones, has serious consequences in terms of creating faith and support for political reconciliation. The general point is that the overall situation remains fraught with tension and conflict. In such circumstances, there has to be realism about what expectations

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<sup>5</sup> T. Nairn (2001) *Farewell Britannia*, New Left Review, 7, 55-74.



can be placed on programmes like PEACE 1 and 2 to effect substantial peace and reconciliation outcomes.

The central goal of the British and Irish States is to be seen to sponsor “parity of esteem” and “mutual consent” via the sponsorship of political structures that underline pluralism and the eradication of economic and cultural sectarianism. A central feature of political transformation is the pluralist notion, promoted by both States, that the right to promote Irish and British cultural traditions has been endorsed constitutionally.

The Agreement is based around a series of political arrangements, which endorse a cross-community power-sharing Executive, which administers government departments via principles of proportionality. The aim of the Executive is not only to administer relevant government departments but to also promote cultural and political equality. Voting within the Assembly, unlike other parts of the UK and Ireland, is not determined by weighted or simple majorities, but by parallel procedures of cross-community consent. Parallel procedures of cross-community consent mean that key issues are only passed, if there is an overall majority and a majority of both Unionists and Nationalists present at the time of voting. In order to uphold the cross-community dimension each elected member of the Northern Ireland Assembly must designate themselves as “Nationalist”, “Unionist” or “other”. It is possible to change designation as was shown when the Alliance Party members re-designated themselves as “Unionists” in order to re-elect David Trimble as the First Minister in October 2001. The bi-national nature of the Agreement is also endorsed in that Northern Ireland Assembly members are not required to undertake an “Oath of Allegiance” to the Crown and the British Union. Instead a “Pledge of Office” requires support for exclusively peaceful means, democratic politics and support for the Northern Ireland Assembly and its Executive. The Northern Ireland Office, which is the Office of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, retains responsibility for constitutional and security issues as they relate to Northern Ireland.



At the centre of this consociational arrangement is Executive power-sharing. The 108 seat Assembly has a dualistic leadership based upon a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. At the time of suspension of the Assembly, these posts were held by David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and (Mark Durkan, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) respectively. Election to each of these premierships positions was only feasible when each received at least 50% support from registered Unionists and Nationalists. With the removal of direct rule from Westminster, the Assembly and its Executive possess a high level of governmental competency for education, health, the economy, social services, environment and finance. In sum the principal goals of the Agreement are as follows:

- the creation of a devolved government in Northern Ireland in which power is shared by all political parties;
- decommissioning of paramilitary weapons and the de-militarisation of Northern Ireland;
- the formation of the Police Service for Northern Ireland capable of winning the support and trust of all communities in Northern Ireland;
- The creation of north-south as well as east-west institutions
- equality provision and the endorsement of British and Irish cultural rights; and
- ensuring that the principle of consent and the ruling that Northern Ireland's constitutional status within the UK cannot be altered without majority support within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The Agreement is also unique within both an UK and world context in that it was endorsed, in May 1998, by international referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Around 71% of voters in Northern Ireland and 94% in the Republic supported the Agreement. Somewhat peculiarly, the vote was not broken down by electoral ward, as is commonplace in elections.



The recognition of an Irish context was also based upon a repeal of the UK 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which had created partition. In addition, the Republic of Ireland's constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, contained in Articles Two and Three of its constitution, was reworded in order to endorse the principle of consent and re-unification as an aspiration as opposed to a political demand. The hosting of dual referenda recognised the contested nature of Irish and British sovereignty and permitted the creation of a theoretical form of joint-sovereignty, a North-South ministerial council and limited forms of cross-border co-operation, particularly in the areas of fishing, trade, tourism and hospital care.

In economic and cultural terms, the endorsement of equalisation between Nationalist and Unionist communities is portrayed as a rational force in the dilution of ethnically defined labour markets and issues concerning cultural disempowerment. In terms of conflict resolution, the intended aim of devolution is to democratise a society, in which conflicts over sovereignty have destabilised the materialisation of cross-community consensus. Furthermore the Agreement included apparently contradictory commitments which were designed to obscure the issue of sovereignty and thus secure the support of both Nationalist and Unionist communities. On the one hand, the Agreement safeguarded the Union via the principle of consent; on the other, it formalised the association of the Irish state in Northern Ireland affairs.

To a certain extent globalisation and a more unified Europe has meant that increased inter-state harmonisation of social and economic policy between the two States appears less politically sensitive. There is nevertheless a critical problem in the idea of the creeping porosity of the Border since it assumes a collective amnesia regarding the meaning of a cultural and political construct which has been the basis of armed conflict. The intended outcome is that the newly established cross-border institutions will operate in such a way as to make the pro-British population less insecure, given these institutions' limitations, and pro-Irish sections less impulsive for radical constitutional reformation. Of course





in social class terms it is expected that the “Protestant” middle and business classes, in particular, will distinguish benefits in trading and co-operating with an Irish State, which now fits the model of a pluralist and progressive society.





## 2.3 The Disagreements

In a broader sense the Agreement is, in fact, part of a programme of promoting a post-nationalist interpretation of places of identity on the island of Ireland. The Irish and British States are convinced that the genius of conflict resolution lies in the competence of both States to fashion institutions that resolve order with personal, spatial and communal liberty. On the down side, the acceptance of mutual consent, cross-border co-operation and the totemic institutionalisation of communal rights is problematic for certain groups whose political culture is tied to an unswerving commitment to an ethnically defined conception of territorial sovereignty.

For Irish Republican groups, such as the Continuity Irish Republican Army, the Real Irish Republican Army, the 32 County Sovereignty Committee and Republican Sinn Féin, the onset of a settlement which upholds closer inter-state co-operation and cross-community dialogue is tokenistic and severely limited. For such groups anything short of a sovereign, thirty two county, unitary Irish state is politically unacceptable. In each case the yearning for the unification of Ireland is attached to a desire to prohibit British State involvement in Ireland. Similarly, for certain loyalist organisations and the Democratic Unionist Party<sup>6</sup> any conception of Irish State influence over the affairs of Northern Ireland is viewed as a serious breach of British sovereignty and territorial consistency. A problem has also arisen in that some members of the UUP now believe that the Agreement favours the political goals of non-Unionists and that militant Republicans have done little to reduce their capacity to return to war.

The indicator of political conflict which has been the focus of most public attention is that of decommissioning. For Sinn Féin, a reading of the Agreement means

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<sup>6</sup> The DUP are the main anti-agreement group. Other loyalist groups opposed to the Agreement include the Loyalist Volunteer Force, Red Hand Defenders, Orange Volunteer Force and sections of the UVF and UDA.



that there is no clause, subordinate or otherwise, linking IRA weapons decommissioning to the party's participation in the Executive. Of course the conflict over decommissioning is based not only on political interpretation but also on the vagueness of the section on decommissioning within the Agreement. The Agreement commits parties to;

*“Continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons...”<sup>7</sup>*

The words “constructively” and in “good faith” are formless enough as to allow Sinn Fein off the hook but clear enough for Unionists to argue that Sinn Fein must persuade the IRA to hand in weapons. Despite the inspection of certain IRA arms dumps in 2000 by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) and its verification of some decommissioning in October 2001 and April 2002, this has still not satisfied the demands of Unionist politicians that IRA weapons be put beyond verifiable use.

There are several more daunting issues for the long-term success of the Agreement. The growth in dissident loyalist and Republican violence has the capacity to embroil other paramilitary groups in future violence, especially given that communities have well-defined goals which need to be acknowledged and supported. Furthermore, it is clear that the UUP has been losing electoral support to anti-agreement Unionists. If, for example, the anti-agreement Unionist parties (DUP, Northern Ireland Unionist Party and the UK Unionists) gain more seats than the UUP in the next Assembly election, then the collapse of the Assembly will be achievable. However, it is not certain that anti-agreement elements would necessarily choose to collapse the Assembly. At present, for example, the DUP aims for re-negotiation of the Belfast Agreement. This will happen at the end of 2003 during the pre-planned review of the Agreement.

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<sup>7</sup> *Belfast Agreement*, 1998, Section 7



The fragility of the political institutions, suspended four times in five years has provided the backdrop to the design and delivery of both PEACE 1 and PEACE 2. In May 2003, there remains little prospect an immediate return to operation of the devolved institutions. Accordingly, for all of PEACE 1 and much of PEACE 2 to date, the basic conditions of political stability have not been present.





## 2.4 Chapter Summary

- The general discourse about conflict resolution and peace-building points to the need for a set of processes operating at different social levels. Thus, 'top-table' negotiations have to be complemented by meso-level interventions from opinion formers and the grass roots activities of civil society organisations. Key debates focus on the failure to complement negotiations at the top with other interventions and processes working throughout the social structure, leading to political instability. In essence, both PEACE Programmes were designed to catalyse middle and grass root activities in order to reinforce the climate for top-level negotiations, compensate for the costs of the conflict, and speed up the pace of overall development. In that sense, their function fitted perfectly with what we know about conflict resolution in general;
- However, for a variety of reasons, political negotiation took place at an uneven level and was subject to substantial tensions. In part, this resulted from necessary ambiguity within the Belfast Agreement and in part from the fundamentally different conceptions of what the peace process was designed to achieve. Such difficulties have been exacerbated by internal conflicts within Unionism and the battle for hegemony of the Unionist population. In a curious sense, the Agreement became part of the problem rather than the solution to the Northern Ireland conflict. Accordingly, it would be unwise to assume that the PEACE Programmes could, in themselves, compensate for the growing tensions over the Agreement. It might thus appear that the PEACE Programmes faced an impossible challenge.
- Nevertheless, it would be a grave mistake to underestimate either the political transformations that have occurred or the significance of contribution made by the PEACE Programmes. For most of the key actors, the politics of coercion have been replaced by the politics of persuasion. Other than on the fringes of dissident republicanism, there is general agreement that constitutional change in Northern Ireland requires the consent of the majority of its population. The British and Irish governments are in fundamental agreement about the way



forward. While low level violence remains a constant feature for certain sections of the population, a political conflict that took over 100 lives per year and added around £1 billion annually to Exchequer costs is over.





### 3. From War to Peace: Political Violence and Reconciliation

#### 3.1 Introduction

Since the late 1960s, out of a population of 1.5 million in Northern Ireland, 3,500 persons have been killed in the political upheavals locally referred to as “the Troubles”. Official records show that over 40,000 people have been injured in the same period, and by March 1995, the British government had paid over £814 million in personal injuries compensation, with a further £300 million paid for damages to property<sup>8</sup>.

In comparison to other conflicts, Northern Ireland’s Troubles are described as “low intensity” with an overall death rate of 2.25 per thousand population, comparable with the Middle East or South Africa, worse than Turkey (0.57) and Argentina (0.32). On the other hand, El Salvador (20.25) had almost ten times the death rate, and Cambodia, (237.02) where about a quarter of the population died, had a death rate almost a hundred times that of Northern Ireland<sup>9</sup>.

The distribution of death due to the Northern Ireland conflict has been used as an indicator to provide an assessment of the impact of the conflict. It is a relatively unequivocal measure, although there are some definitional issues<sup>10</sup>, and death appears to be the least problematic concept in definitional terms. It also serves as a reasonably good surrogate for other effects of the conflict, such as injury<sup>11</sup>, and the death rate of specific geographical locations is correlated with other

<sup>8</sup> K. Bloomfield *We Will Remember Them: Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner*, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield. Belfast: HMSO: The Stationery Office. (1998) p4.

<sup>9</sup> See M.T. Fay, M. Morrissey and M. Smyth, *Mapping Troubles Related Deaths in Northern Ireland 1969-1999*. Derry Londonderry: INCORE/United Nations University/ University of Ulster. (1998) p 44.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid* p 136

<sup>11</sup> see M.T. Fay, M. Morrissey, M. Smyth, and T. Wong, *Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: the experience and impact of the Troubles. The Cost of the Troubles Study*. Derry Londonderry: INCORE United Nations University /University of Ulster. (1999) pp 67-79.



conflict related factors, such as reported exposure to Troubles-related violence and its psycho-social consequences<sup>12</sup>. Annual deaths figures show a correlation coefficient of 0.93 when compared with the annual number of injuries associated with the Troubles. Deaths and injuries can be seen as the primary human cost of the Troubles, and although injuries outnumber deaths by approximately ten to one, they follow the same patterns of distribution in the population. Therefore, the distribution of deaths can be used as an indicator for targeting intervention and associated resources.



<sup>12</sup> see M.T. Fay, M. Morrissey, M. Smyth, and T. Wong, *Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: the experience and impact of the Troubles. The Cost of the Troubles Study*. Derry Londonderry: INCORE United Nations University /University of Ulster. (1999) pp 67-79.





### 3.2 Mapping Troubles Related Deaths

The maps which follow show the distribution of conflict-related deaths by government districts in Northern Ireland and by Border Counties in the Republic of Ireland.





Fig. 2: Conflict related deaths in Northern Ireland since 1967

Conflict-related deaths are all deaths that can be directly attributable to the Troubles since 1967. The map at Figure 2 above shows the distribution of conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland and the border areas of the Republic.



The striking feature of the map is how the great majority of deaths seem to occur exclusively in the south-western half of Northern Ireland. If a line was to be drawn from Lough Foyle to Belfast Lough, then over 80% of the deaths would have occurred south of the line within Northern Ireland. The exception to the rule is the district of Banbridge which has more in common with districts north of the line namely eastern portions of County Derry/Londonderry, the majority of County Antrim, north County Down, and all of the counties in the Republic. In all of these relatively “peaceful” areas, deaths attributable to the Troubles are all less than 50 per district (for Northern Ireland) or county (for the Republic). This is in comparison with between 50 and 168 deaths in Fermanagh, and the districts of Strabane, Omagh, Cookstown, Dungannon, Armagh, Craigavon, Lisburn, Newtownabbey and Down. The districts of Derry/Londonderry and Newry and Mourne contain between 169 and 330 deaths; whilst the city of Belfast has the highest number of deaths at 1,599.

In fact there have been almost as many conflict-related deaths in the city of Belfast as in the rest of Ireland (both north and south) put together.



**Fig 3: Conflict related deaths by population in Northern Ireland and border countries**

The first map at Figure 2 showed in absolute numbers, the places where conflict-related deaths have occurred over the last 36 years. However, the map does not take into account the numbers of people who live in various parts of Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of the Republic. What is needed is some indication of the proportion of conflict-related deaths with respect to the local population. The second map above at Figure 3 shows the results of calculating the number of people in each district/county per conflict-related death. In other words, how frequent (low population per death) or infrequent (high population per death) conflict-related deaths are by district or county. It could be argued that this map is more realistic than the previous one. For example, the city of Belfast has almost half the number of deaths but it has nearly a third of the population so



its ratio of population to deaths is not that much higher than the districts of Derry/Londonderry, Cookstown, Dungannon, Armagh, Newry and Mourne, and Co. Fermanagh. In all of these places the ratio is one death per fewer than 500 people. The distinction between south-western and north-eastern Northern Ireland is now no longer as clear-cut. Although all of the districts with the highest proportion of deaths per population are still southwest of the Lough Foyle/ Belfast Lough line, they now, with the exception of Strabane, tend to be along the border. The districts of Omagh, Craigavon, Lisburn and Down are not in the highest deaths per population category and are now in the group of one death per 500 to 4,999 population, along with the rest of the Northern Ireland districts, other than Ballymena and Ards. Indeed, Ballymena and Ards have only one conflict-related death per 50,000 to 411,369 people which puts them on a par with most of the counties of the Republic along the border (Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim, Cavan, Longford and Louth). This rate signifies a very low and infrequent occurrence of conflict-related deaths within the available population. An even lower rate is found in counties of the Republic further away from the border. Counties such as Roscommon, Westmeath and Meath have rates of one conflict-related death per 50,000 to the highest of 411,369 people – an almost insignificant occurrence. The only exception to these trends in the Republic is Co. Monaghan, which has a moderately high death to population rate but also lies very close to the border.

So far it is plainly obvious that conflict-related deaths are generally higher in places along the border as well as the Belfast “hotspot”.

To highlight the human perspective it is worth examining the extent to which quality of life is also an indication of conflict. The level of deprivation normally measures a society's quality of life. The map below shows the distribution of deprivation as calculated by the Townsend index<sup>13</sup>. Lighter areas (pink)

<sup>13</sup> The Townsend index is a common deprivation measurement based on quality of life indicators from the decennial national Population of Census. The indicators used for the Townsend deprivation index are typically overcrowding, the absence of basic domestic facilities, low car ownership, unemployment, low education qualifications, etc. Values for each indicator are



represent the lowest levels of deprivation, i.e. substantial affluence, and have the highest negative values. Darker areas (burgundy) represent the highest concentrations of deprivation and have the highest positive values. The two shades in between (light and dark red) represent areas with values close to the average; moderate affluence and moderate deprivation.



averaged out and compiled into a convenient index score either side of the average; with scores lower than average representing affluence and scores above average representing deprivation.




Fig. 4: Deprivation by Townsend in Northern Ireland and Border Counties

Severe deprivation within large towns are less apparent on the map because they frequently represent dense populations – therefore are very small on the map<sup>14</sup>. In direct comparison, there are larger areas of affluence in Northern

<sup>14</sup> The deprivation values are averages of groups of households – groups of around 150 to 300 households within enumeration districts (ED). These EDs are designed by the Office of National Statistics (in the UK) to contain roughly the same number of households during the collection of



Ireland than the Republic just south of the border. However, other than Donegal and parts of Leitrim and Sligo there are more pockets of severe deprivation in Northern Ireland.

All in all, what these maps show is an overwhelming tendency for conflict-related deaths and deprivation to be highest in places along the border and in Belfast. The border is clearly a powerful factor in the spatial distribution of conflict-related deaths since 1967.



census returns. In areas of high population density (such as Belfast and Derry), EDs are geographically small but in areas of sparse population density (such as the Sperrins and Donegal), EDs are very large. Both extremes roughly represent the same number of households. In the deprivation map, the general distribution of severe deprivation is in most of the county of Donegal, many parts of west Co. Londonderry, the western banks of Lough Neagh, the Antrim Glens, and along the border both north and south, as well as within many of the cities and towns such as Belfast, Derry, Omagh, Armagh, etc.



### 3.3 Political Violence and Residential Segregation

A fundamental problem within Northern Ireland is the ongoing reproduction of ethno-sectarian segregation. Segregation provides a rationale for separation and the dilution of inter-community contact. There are over thirty official interfaces in Northern Ireland, the majority of which are located in Belfast. In Belfast alone over 60% of the population live in areas that are at least 90% Catholic or Protestant. Figure 5 below lists interfaces between predominantly Catholic and Protestant areas within Belfast separated by physical walls.

<b>Belfast Interfaces</b>	
1.	Cluan Place
2.	Bryson Street
3.	Lower Newtownards Road
4.	Mountpottinger Road – Woodstock Link
5.	Duncairn Gardens
6.	Henry Street – West Link
7.	Manor Street – Roe Street
8.	Crumlin Road
9.	Alliance – Glenbryn
10.	Elmgrove Street
11.	Alexander Park
12.	Hallidays Road – Newington
13.	Mountcollyer
14.	White City
15.	Longlands
16.	Mountainview
17.	Squires Hill – Hazelbrook
18.	Northumberland – Ardmoulin
19.	Cupar Way
20.	Ainsworth
21.	Springmartin
22.	Springhill
23.	Suffolk
24.	Roden Street
25.	Carrick Hill – Peters Hill

Fig. 5: Belfast interfaces

The table below provides evidence on the distance from an interface (measured as places that are at least 90% Catholic and Protestant) and the location of all deaths. Over 84% of all deaths occurred within one kilometre radius of an interface and over 66% occurred within 500 metres.





Evidently, the majority of deaths were closely linked to short distances from interface boundaries. Interfaces were and remain the arenas within which politically motivated deaths are most likely to occur.

The table below shows the spatial relationship between politically motivated deaths and interfaces.

Distance from Interface	% share of all deaths within Belfast Urban Area
Less than 100 metres	13.47%
Less than 200 metres	28.89%
Less than 300 metres	44.25%
Less than 400 metres	57.28%
Less than 500 metres	66.53%
Less than 600 metres	71.88%
Less than 700 metres	75.91%
Less than 800 metres	79.39%
Less than 900 metres	81.53%
Less than 1000 metres	84.25%
Over 1000 metres	15.74%

Fig. 6: Percentage of deaths occurring in proximity to interfaces: Source: newspapers and information supplied by commemorative organisations and community groups.

Residential segregation, in Northern Ireland, while well researched, is only one spatial response to violence, and other spatial arenas, including places of consumption and production such as shops and workplaces, and their connections with residence, have been relatively neglected. Over-generalisations about Belfast as a whole omit variations and spatial setting as determinants of violence.

More importantly, it is evident that relationships between communities can change as a result of wider political and social processes.

Some interface areas have, in recent years, been relatively “quiet” whilst others that have had comparatively stable inter-community relationships have witnessed a process within which segregation has increased.

Many analyses have treated hostility between communities as a reflection of sectarianism and/or “tribalism”. Such analyses undermine certain realities.



Firstly, media driven reports fail to pinpoint that many people living in interface areas are not sectarian. Secondly, the reality that fear is a prevalent factor in the choice of workplaces, shops and other services has rarely been explored.

Fear of the other ethno-sectarian community does not necessarily mean that residents of communities who hold such fears are automatically sectarian.

Fear is undoubtedly linked to a rational understanding of threat but this does not mean that residents who refuse to enter areas dominated by the other ethno-religious group interpret all people who live in such places as committed to harming them. It is also the case that many individuals regret that violence and residential separation produces greater polarisation between communities.

Due to interfacing, some people forgo employment, facilities and services that are located in places dominated by the other ethno-religious group. In some instances people forgo basic social services as they will not position themselves in sites that are located in areas dominated by the “other” group. Investors have also moved out of interface areas as a result of conflict related violence.

Given the perpetuating effect of “political violence” and the recent growth in civil disorder, critical questions have to be asked about the potential for socio-economic and cultural reconstruction of those communities affected by violence in a period of tentative “peace”.

The costs of violence can be felt in complex ways. Firstly, there are both individual and group costs. Secondly, there are socio-economic, cultural, political and psychological costs.

More critically motivated analyses should acknowledge the complex effects of different forms of interfacing. They therefore ought to include group costs relating to consumption patterns, service provision, investment decisions and



deprivation. The group social effects of violence are likely to be particularly important in a number of ways. The most fundamental of these is that the sundering of communities (and the creation of marginalised areas) has implications for the provision of services and public goods in disadvantaged areas in particular. As the evidence below indicates there is a very distinct sense of localised forms of territorial control, avoidance and enhanced segregation.

Each of these areas contains high levels of deprivation and underdeveloped inter-community relations. The evidence presented below indicates that the majority of residents in each area rarely enter or use facilities which are located within the “other” community’s territory. In determining these issues a quantitative survey on the integration and mobility of communities in relation to the production, consumption and observable social arenas was undertaken<sup>15</sup>. Respondents were asked to determine if economic and social conditions had changed since the paramilitary cease-fires of 1994. The following was observed:

- 52% of those living in predominantly Protestant areas and 47.9% in predominantly Catholic areas concluded that these relationships had worsened;
- a mere 14.5% of those in Catholic places and 11.5% in Protestant places indicated that social and economic conditions had improved; and
- just over a third indicated that conditions were similar or unchanged.

Employment and allegations concerning equality of opportunity remain defining factors in the reproduction of ethno-sectarian contestation.

The Equality Commission provided evidence in 2000 which showed that there was continued and high levels of workplace segregation among private sector businesses across Northern Ireland.<sup>16</sup> Among the businesses surveyed which

<sup>15</sup> *Spaces of Fear*, P. Shirlow in *Peace Review*, 12:1 pp.639-679

<sup>16</sup> *The Equality Commission Monitoring Report No. 11*, 2000



employed more than ten Catholics or Protestants, around two thirds of employees worked in places that were over 60% Catholic or Protestant. In addition, nearly 40% worked in places that were over 70% Catholic or Protestant. It is difficult, given the presentation of data for 2000, to determine the overall level of segregation among those companies who employed over twenty five people and less than ten Catholics or Protestants. However, if each of these companies employed at least nine Catholics or Protestants it could be the case that over 75% of employees within this sub-sector work in places that are over 70% Catholic or Protestant.

In merging these two data sets it could be estimated that at least 45% of those who were employed in private sector concerns at that time were working in places that were more than 70% Catholic or Protestant.

A problem in terms of workforce monitoring is that many multi-sited companies appear to have work forces that are relatively mixed. It could be that the level of religious mixing within such companies varies by location. A company, which has, for example, a site in East Belfast (predominantly Protestant) and a location in West Belfast (predominantly Catholic) may have work forces at these sites which are dominated by one particular religious/political group. In overall terms, the company may appear in the Equality Commission's monitoring reports to be mixed but in reality the sites that it operates may be more segregated than the data collected suggests. If this were the case then it would follow that levels of workplace segregation are higher than reported.

Within Northern Ireland, the official term "chill factors" generally denotes context fears and avoidance tactics. Chill factors refer to the refusal and or reluctance of individuals to enter areas dominated by the other community. It is accepted that violence and the threat of intimidation have created psychological burdens that are associated with restricted mobility between politically diverse communities. An extensive body of work undertaken by Bradley and Hamilton, Michie and



Sheehan, and Shirlow and Shuttleworth<sup>17</sup> has indicated that chill factors are affiliated with experiences and perceptions of both fear and risk. In particular, survey work conducted in highly segregated areas in Belfast showed that around a third of identified respondents have stated that they have experienced physical violence at work because of their religion and/or political opinion. These surveys have also showed that at least 60% of respondents were not prepared to work in places that were dominated by the “other” community. Other factors such as the identification/ perception of companies that discriminate against a particular community, the availability of suitable work in terms of wage levels and skill and educational requirements are also of concern.

The issue of fear, avoidance and workplace choice is contingent upon the location of employment. Evidently, crossing ethno-sectarian boundaries is linked to distinct cultural interpretations. The location of employment in highly segregated communities is highly conditioned by distinct ethno-sectarian relationships.

Understandings of threat from intimidation within the workplace are tied to behavioural responses that are linked to perceived hazards, dangers and other environmental stimuli. In this sense, fear and avoidance of the “other” community connects with debates concerning the rationality and irrationality of decision-making behaviour.

However, workplaces located in what may be determined to be shared or neutral environments create workplace structures that are more mixed.

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<sup>17</sup> J. Michie, and M. Sheehan, (1998) *The Political Economy of a Divided Island*, Cambridge Journal of Economics 22, 243-259; P. Shirlow, and I. Shuttleworth, (1999) *Who is going to toss the burgers? Social Class and the Reconstruction of the Northern Irish Economy*, Capital and Class 69, 27-46; and J. Bradley, and D. Hamilton, (1999) *Strategy 2010: Planning Economic Development in Northern Ireland*, Regional Studies, 33, 885-890.



It is obvious that sites of employment located outside of identified ethno-sectarian enclaves stimulates, in terms of ethno-sectarian background, a more homogenous form of labour market mobility.

At the level of interfaces in Belfast, an analysis of respondents of working age revealed the following:

- 63.2% stated that that their job seeking efforts had at some time been influenced by fear;
- 68% of those from Catholic areas compared to 57.8% of respondents from Protestant places stated that fear had been a factor in job selection; and
- 43.7% of all respondents who were in work stated that they presently worked in a place dominated by the other ethno-sectarian group.

The issue of ethno-religious choices of areas within which to work is also prevalent in terms of travelling to work through areas dominated by the other ethno-religious group. 46.8% would not take a job, even if it was located in an area predominantly populated by their own ethno-religious group, if they had to travel to that job via entering areas that are dominated by the other community. It is not surprising given the issue of safe workplaces and travel that 73.1% of all respondents argued that their community is discriminated against when seeking work. The rate among those in predominantly Catholic areas was 80.2% compared to 67.2% among Protestants.

The impact of high levels of violence has had an enduring impact upon the mobility of people within interface areas. As shown in table the vast majority of people (84.3%) feel safe when moving within there own area during the day. As expected the share that feels safe drops in relation to night-time (84.3% to 52.0%). This fall is largely associated with more women than men stating that they would feel scared or would not go out at night within their own community. However, when asked if they would feel safe walking through an areas dominated by the “other” ethno-religious group during the day, only 18.8% of



respondents argued that they would feel safe or quite safe doing so. This share again falls (18.8% to 6%) when respondents were questioned on walking though such places at night-time. However, unlike the anxieties concerning movement within their own community the share of men and women who would feel unsafe, scared or would not go into areas dominated by the “other” was near equal.

	<b>Local areas during day</b>	<b>Local area at night</b>	<b>Other area during day</b>	<b>Other area at night</b>
Safe	84.3%	52.0%	9.8%	2.1%
Quite Safe	11.8%	9.1%	9.0%	3.9%
Unsafe	3.9%	18.0%	26.1%	5.9%
Scared	0.0%	10.9%	20.1%	10.1%
Wouldn't go	0.0%	10.0%	44.0%	78.0%

Fig. 7: Perceptions of safety within local areas and areas dominated by the other ethno-religious group.

Respondents were also asked whether or not they felt that violence and anti-social activity has either decreased, increased or remained the same. Around 3 in 10 felt that crime and drug use had increased. This low level seems peculiar in that recorded information for the RUC/PSNI has concluded that both have increased during the period.

Respondents were unlikely to state that crime within their own community had increased at the hands of people who live within their own community. A mere one in five compared to 53.6% stated that violence within their own area that had been conducted by residents of that area had increased compared to violence that had been undertaken by people from outside of the area. Similarly, only 18.1% stated that violence within their own community by youth from that community had increased. Yet 58.6% believed that violence within the area by youth from the other community had increased since 1994. In sum 63.6% perceived that violence against their area by the “other” community had increased since the first paramilitary cease-fires. Just over half (52%) argued that violence acts conducted by the police and/or army had also increased. The



evidence contained in Figure 8 below suggests that respondents may be more conscious of violence that is directed against their community. It could also be the case that they see violence that emerges from within their own community as a form of defence as such less problematic.

Type of violence/anti-social activity	Increased	Decreased	Same
Crime	30.8%	29.0%	40.2%
Drug use	30.0%	31.6%	38.4%
Violence within area by own community	20.1%	48.1%	31.1%
Violence within area by other community	53.6%	32.7%	13.7%
Violence within area by youth from own community	18.1%	44.1%	37.8%
Violence within area by youth from other community	58.6%	27.9%	13.5%
Violence against area by other community	63.6%	13.1%	23.9%
Police/Army	52.5%	13.0%	34.5%

Fig. 8: Perceptions of changes in volume of violence and anti-social behaviour since 1994

Respondents were asked to identify the places in which they undertook shopping, leisure and access to public facilities. This was measured in two ways. Firstly, the location of chosen facilities in terms of ethno-religious background and secondly in relation to distance. In overall terms 78.9% of respondents undertook their main consumption activities in places dominated by their own ethno-religious group. Given this high level of segregation the measuring of distance was important in that it permits an analysis of the journeys that are undertaken in order to locate safe places.





### 3.4 Political Violence Since the Ceasefires

If the war in Northern Ireland is over, violence is far from finished. Indeed, the process of moving from a conflict to post-conflict seems to involve a messy period of low-level violence. Attempts to burn Catholic churches and Orange halls, the intimidation of individuals from where they live and the continuing disputes over space – along interfaces or contested marching routes – have all contributed to a continuing sense of fear and suspicion in those areas that suffered most from political violence.

Different kinds of forces contributed to this uncertainty. First, as outlined in Chapter 1, there have been ongoing problems about implementing the Belfast Agreement. Many Unionists are convinced that Republican difficulties over arms decommissioning represent no more than the continuity of the “ballot box and armalite” strategy for Irish unity – the IRA would maintain its arms in order to continue the military struggle if the political strategy failed. Other Unionists were, and remain, opposed in principle to sharing power with Republicans who, in their view, had been engaged in a violent paramilitary conspiracy against the Northern Ireland state for over thirty years. Even the Ulster Unionist Party, which signed up to the Belfast Agreement, vacillates between power sharing and boycott of the new political institutions.

While Republicans condemned this “prevarication” as a simple inability to countenance militant Nationalists in any power sharing arrangement, it was certainly more complex. The referendum endorsing the Agreement was only won through providing Unionists with assurances that decommissioning of paramilitary arms would take place. Opinion polls taken later indicated a fall-off in Unionist support of the Agreement when it became clear that the IRA was either incapable of, or unwilling to, hand over arms. The fear within the Republican movement of a serious split if the leadership consented to decommissioning was real, but hardly consoling to Unionists asked to allow their



historic enemy into government. Uncertainty within the political process contributed to ongoing tensions within civil society.

Just as the Troubles had distinctive effects on the Irish Republic (the Dublin-Monaghan bombs, the increased costs of security, the costs of relocating people in the 1970s etc.), so the peace process has had major implications for public policy there. Notably, since the Downing Street Declaration, Dublin has been a major player in the establishment of, and attempts to maintain, the devolved political institutions. While Unionists frequently charge this as unwarranted interference, it has undeniably created a permanent role for the Irish Government in Northern Ireland affairs despite the constitutional amendments. Moreover, the explicit cross-border features of the Belfast Agreement had created a set of institutional links at less than cabinet level. This means that the Irish government has now a responsibility to further peace-building and reconciliation, not only within Northern Ireland, but between that and the Irish Republic. Interestingly, this reinforces its security role. In terms of arrests, charges and arms seizures, it could be argued that the Irish government has taken the primary responsibility in policing the activities of Republican dissidents.

One of the problems in respect to the peace process is that it has been essentially driven by elites, while the process of reconciliation has to involve the wider civil society. The Hume-Adams initiative, regarded by some as the opening initiative in the peace process, was attributed to only two individuals. All those engaged in political negotiations (political parties, paramilitary organisations and the British and Irish governments) added up to a tiny fraction of the population. Outside of the political arena was the mass of the population, nervous and fearful of the signals emerging from within, with many predisposed to settle scores or cleanse territory while there remained a political vacuum. The fact that devolved administration in Northern Ireland, in its first phase, lasted only eight weeks was a reflection of the contradictions of the period.



In addition, paramilitary rivalry exacerbated political difficulty. As political prisoners were released, new antagonisms emerged amongst loyalist paramilitaries. The starting point was the resumption of hostility between the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) from which the former had split. This was first seen in Portadown, but soon spread to Belfast complicated by the support given to the LVF by sections of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Several were injured in the ensuing clashes in 2000 and three died. Moreover, the UFF threatened to break its cease-fire because of what it termed the “ethnic cleansing” of Protestants in North Belfast.

Meanwhile, splinter Republican organisations attempted to undermine the peace process and recruit the disaffected from the IRA with a fresh series of incidents during 2000 and 2001 including an attempt to bomb Hammersmith Bridge. Their belief was that Sinn Féin and the IRA had “sold out” the core, historic mission of the Republican Movement – the war to drive the British out of Ireland.

Moreover, there remained unending disputes over marching routes with the unresolved Drumcree dispute entering its sixth year without resolution. It was merely the most visible signal of spatial contests between communities right across the region. Mediators brought in from Britain and even South Africa ran into the brick wall of the Orange Order’s absolute determination to march and the equally absolute resolution of the Garvaghy Road residents to prevent them. All across Northern Ireland, similar kinds of dispute left grievance, distrust and hatred. For the most part, attempts by the Parades Commission to arbitrate were accepted only to the degree to which they endorsed one or other communities’ position on the matter. The Orange Order had decided not to negotiate with the Parades’ Commission while the Portadown Lodge campaigned for its dissolution.

There was, however, another factor underlying these dimensions of the problem. People’s views were at least partially determined by their experiences and memories of more than thirty years of political violence. By the year 2000, only



those in their fifties or older had any mature experience of a Northern Ireland without political violence. For many, living with political conflict was the totality of their experience. Nevertheless, there was no single, defining experience of the Troubles. Different places were subjected to very different kinds of violence. Accordingly, the accumulation of experiences and memories was radically different for people living in such different places. While it would be reductionist to suggest that political attitudes are entirely the result of such experience, it would be equally inaccurate to suggest that what happened to individuals, their family, friends and neighbours played no part in their formation of their viewpoint.

The fundamental truth of Northern Irish society is that political motivation has and continues to play a significant role in the performance of violent acts. Although violence is at a much lower level than in the early 1970s the number of recorded violent incidents has been rising after the early decline that followed the paramilitary cease-fires of 1994. See Figure 9 below:




Fig. 9: Security incidents, 1980 to 2001. Source: Wilson and Wilford: Northern Ireland: A route to stability?

The PSNI website contains data on politically motivated deaths and injuries over the entire Period of the Troubles. The table below simply looks at the six years up to 1996 (the effective launch year of PEACE 1) and the six years thereafter.



Deaths	Police	Army	UDR/RIR	Civilian	Total
<b>1991-1996</b>	19	17	14	299	<b>349</b>
<b>1997-2002</b>	6	2	0	125	<b>132</b>
<b>Injuries</b>					
<b>1991-1996</b>	1,433	826	114	3,660	<b>6,033</b>
<b>1997-2002</b>	2,965	334	98	4,298	<b>7,695</b>

Fig 10: Deaths and Injuries in Northern Ireland's Troubles 1991-2002 Source: PSNI

Certainly, there is a contrast in the number of deaths over the two periods – deaths declined by more than half. However, the number of personal injuries actually increased, indicating, perhaps, the reconfiguration of violence into predominantly inter-communal forms. Injuries for police and civilians both increased in the latter period.




Fig. 11: Punishment attacks 1991-2002 Source: PSNI



There was greater variation in the incidence of paramilitary punishment attacks. For both Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, punishment attacks increased up to 1997 and thereafter declined for Republicans, rising again in 2000 and 2001 but levelling off in 2002.

The significance of the violence data is that for many people living in Northern Ireland, the period after 1996 did not appear very peaceful. For those not directly involved, the nightly media reports simply fuelled pre-existing suspicions and fears. The evidence presented above indicates that as stated by Wilson and Wilford:

*“A ‘blip’ of polarisation after the Belfast agreement might have been dismissed as a case of the shock of the new. But, five years, four suspensions and three very polarised elections on, the sobering conclusion must be that at best the agreement has had a neutral effect on communal division—and, at worst, that perversely it has exacerbated it. How could this be?”<sup>18</sup>*

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<sup>18</sup> R. Wilson and R. Wilford (2003) *Northern Ireland: A route to stability?*, Belfast, Democratic Dialogue.



### 3.5 Peace and Reconciliation

There are a number of differing interpretations about what a peace and reconciliation programme should be. Some emphasise a preparatory process of investment in community capacity to create the confidence and flexibility to engage with the “other” community. Others argue that tackling social exclusion removes the basis for inter-community conflict and yet others demand a clear and direct focus on conflict resolution (or, indeed, affirmation of diversity) practices. Equally, there has been a certain degree of disenchantment with community relations practices over the past two decades in spite of considerable investment in this field. While individual projects have been promising, there is little evidence that the two traditions in Northern Ireland have made substantial accommodation. Evidence from the 2001 *Life and Times Survey* points to the ways in which the two religions regard each other after five years of PEACE 1 operations.

<b>Catholics</b>			
	<b>%</b>		
	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>No religion</b>
Treated better than 5 years ago	40	64	36
Treated worse than 5 years ago	4	0	2
Treated the same as 5 years ago	53	30	53
Don't know	3	5	10
<b>Protestants</b>			
	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>No religion</b>
Treated better than 5 years ago	16	8	11
Treated worse than 5 years ago	2	39	11
Treated the same as 5 years ago	77	48	69
Don't know	5	6	10

Fig 12: Catholic and Protestant Views on how things have changed (1996-2001)





Over half of Catholics surveyed felt that their treatment had not improved in the previous five years. Yet almost two thirds of Protestants believed that the position of Catholics had improved. At the same time, remarkably small percentages of both religions felt that Protestants were better treated than five years previously. Interestingly, those with no religion expressed a similar disposition. Just under two fifths of Protestants believed that they were treated worse than five years previously. The two religions have very different perceptions of their changing status over the period, although with a measure of agreement that the position of Protestants has not improved.

Similarly, there were key differences in how each religion perceived changes in community relations. A third of Catholics and a quarter of Protestants agreed that the relations between the two religions had improved over the five-year period. Yet 61% of Catholics and 71% of Protestants declared that community relations were no better or worse than five years previously. While greater optimism was expressed for the future period, almost half of Catholics and over half of Protestants did not believe that things would improve.

<b>Relations between Protestants and Catholics over the past 5 Years</b>			
	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>No religion</b>
Better	33	25	30
Worse	13	22	20
About the same	48	49	46
Other (specify)	2	1	1
Don't know	3	4	4
<b>Relations between Protestants &amp; Catholics in next 5 years</b>			
	<b>Catholic</b>	<b>Protestant</b>	<b>No religion</b>
Better	40	27	33
Worse	5	15	7
About the same	44	45	46
Other (specify)	1	1	0
Don't know	11	13	14

Fig 13: Relations Between Catholics and Protestants 1996-2001



Without doubt, devolution and the creation of a power-sharing executive have not diminished inter-communal tensions. Evidence from the annual *Life and Times Survey* on public attitudes shows a clear sense that inter-community relationships have deteriorated in recent years and that there has also been a decline in optimism about future inter-community relationships. As shown in the table below, the proportion of respondents who think that relations between the two main traditions are better than five years ago has declined from 58% in 1995 to 28% in 2001.




Fig. 14: Proportion of respondents who think that relations between Protestants and Catholics are better now than 5 years ago

The share that believed that inter-community relationships will be better in five years time has fallen from around 60% in 1995 to around 30%.




Fig. 15: Proportion of respondents who think that relations between Protestants and Catholics will be better in 5 years time

In a more detailed analysis of *Life and Times* data, Hughes et al (2003) conclude:

*“The indicators reported here suggest a marked deterioration in community relations and a distinct retreat towards single-identity environments among both communities since 1996. Moreover the survey evidence also indicates that, since 1996, the Catholic and Protestant communities have developed notably different attitudes on a range of issues. In general, Catholics seem more amenable to efforts to promote cross-community contact as demonstrated by their greater willingness to integrate. The general optimism inherent in Catholic responses is, however, tempered by a growing sense of distrust and unease within the Protestant community. Protestants expressed less enthusiasm for inter-religious mixing, a pattern which becomes more pronounced after 1996. Taken together with evidence from the 1999 survey (Hughes et al, 2000), where Protestant respondents were less confident than Catholics that their rights and cultural traditions will be protected, it is reasonable to assume that Protestants are experiencing greater difficulty than Catholics with the changes at the macro-political and the meso-institutional levels. Hence, although the intention of the Good Friday Agreement is to create an inclusive society, the survey findings provide little evidence to suggest*



*that this is the type of environment, which is currently perceived by most Protestants.”*<sup>19</sup>

Certainly, there has been substantial investment in reconciliation activity. However, key aspects of the peace process itself seem to promote division – particularly in terms of Protestant understanding of political change. Indeed, some fear that the concept of reconciliation may represent no more than a diversion from the realities of the Northern Ireland situation. In this respect, we should be clear that the contest in Northern Ireland is as much about its existence as it is about whether the state is fairly governed or adequately provides equal treatment for its citizens. Thus, the issues and problems are qualitatively different from, say, race relations in Britain. One commentator suggests that we should view what is happening here as the condensation of all the problems manifest in the historical relationship between Britain and Ireland.<sup>20</sup>

The retreat of the metropolitan power from the majority of the island left an “ethnic frontier” in the North East in which a minority of the population wants to “finish the revolution” by unification and, in doing so, creates for the majority a powerful sense of being under siege. The sense of siege militates against compromise which is regarded simply as retreat on the eventual road to the dissolution of the state. This should not be regarded as irrational but as the product of how one community makes sense of historical change that has been largely to its detriment.

Reconciliation may thus be as much about how individuals and communities relate to a change process (even when seen as damaging) as about making contact across the sectarian divide.

<sup>19</sup> Hughes et al (2003)p.11

<sup>20</sup> Wright F. (1992), *Northern Ireland: a comparative analysis*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin.



The Northern Ireland situation is thus more like Israel or Bosnia than South Africa although the dangers of a post-Mandela situation should not be underestimated there. In the former two, the sense of national identity is inextricably bound up with the sovereignty of different states. In South Africa, the issues concern control, citizenship and the distribution of resources within one state. However, Palestinians do not simply want fairer treatment from the Israelis but a homeland. Similarly, Irish identity is tied to the idea of the Irish State just as Unionism requires membership of the British State. Liberals on each side want to treat the other as a religious/ethnic minority by reference to respect for diversity and different tradition but cannot confront the contradictory political objectives arising out of these identities.

It would be unrealistic to expect a specific programme, no matter how well funded, to transform this situation. Nevertheless, it should be possible to define what could reasonably be achieved within time and resource parameters and to set that out as a series of precisely defined targets.



### 3.6 Social Capital and Reconciliation

Social capital has become an important concept where it is argued that societies characterised by high levels of social capital have higher quality of life, and, indeed, are more economically competitive. It has been used extensively in research into education and health. There is a substantial debate about the meaning of social capital and its explanatory power in understanding the relationship between social dialogue/social cohesion and economic growth. A seminal influence was Putnam's (1993) study of the role of the civic community ("civic involvement and social solidarity") in modern Italy in modernisation, institutional performance and economic development<sup>21</sup>. His contrast between the development benefits of the civic community of the north and the development barriers constituted by the familial/ethnic community of the south makes a powerful point to those living and working in the divided, and largely residentially segregated, society of Northern Ireland. The Whitehall Performance and Innovation Unit (2002, p.18) summarises their findings as:

*"Helliwell and Putnam (2000) have modelled the growth rates of the Italian regions before and after the reform of Italian regional government in the 1970s. Before the reforms, the higher social capital regions of the North were much wealthier and more productive than the low social capital regions of the South. But the Southern regions were gradually catching up. However, following the reforms, which involved creating a powerful new regional tier of government across Italy's twenty regions, the growth rates of the high social capital Northern regions again surged ahead. It would seem that the high social capital of the Northern regions in some way facilitated these regions' ability to utilise the new government to achieve higher growth."*<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Putnam, R. D. (1993). "The Prosperous Community — Social Capital and Public Life". *American Prospect* (13): p. 36

<sup>22</sup> Putnam, R. D. (1994), *Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.



Putnam's later work<sup>23</sup> focused the analysis on the United States, the global icon of modernity, and even here he argued that the decline of civic involvement was having drastic consequences for overall development. Hutton echoes this critique of civic decay, describing the US as "a land of individual strangers questing for their inner happiness because the public realm is so corrupted and depleted".<sup>24</sup> In this analysis, the economic gains of aggressive individualism have been much exaggerated and the social costs concealed. Putnam contends that social capital consists of:

*"features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."*<sup>25</sup>

In other words, societies where people trust each other, engage in informal networking and work cooperatively with each other are more socially healthy and economically competitive. Conversely, the barriers to reconciliation in Northern Ireland, fear, suspicion and hatred, create conditions where there may be high internal solidarity within communities, but low engagement across communities may be said to be deficient in this form of "bridging" social capital.

For two key reasons, social capital has utility in charting the progress towards a more reconciled society:

- By definition, it refocuses analysis away from individual behaviour to the matrix of relations amongst "agents, social units and institutions" – social capital focuses on relationships and their influence on human behaviour;
- It represents a conceptual framework that links the micro, meso and macro dimensions of society. The World Bank (2001) essay<sup>26</sup> on social capital

<sup>23</sup> Putnam, R.D. (1993) *Bowling Alone: the collapse and renewal of American democracy*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

<sup>24</sup> Hutton, W (2002), *The World We're In*, Little Brown, London.

<sup>25</sup> Putnam (1993), *Op. Cit.*, p. 36

<sup>26</sup> World Bank (2002), *Social Capital for Development*, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)



distinguishes, on the one hand, between its structural and cognitive manifestations and, on the other, between the micro and macro levels at which it operates to generate the following explanatory diagram:




Fig. 16: Levels of operation of social capital. Source World Bank 2001

In this formulation, the basic building blocks of social capital are the individual's values and relationships that translate into sets of local institutions. In turn, these act as the basis of the political order in terms of specific macro institutions and the overall framework of governance. While this might be an example of "over-versatility", part of the excitement of the social capital debate lies in the ways it spans such different dimensions.

- It enforces a multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary focus on social phenomena thereby acknowledging that the perspectives of a single social science discipline are frequently uni-dimensional. This also allows for the co-production of knowledge by both professionals and local people in the quest for a fuller understanding of social processes;





- Finally, it asserts the notion that collective values are important in challenging the individualist assumptions of both economics and key areas of public policy.

Together, they make a persuasive case for the utility of social capital.

Central to many definitions of social capital is the idea that co-operation requires trust in others – this varies between, and within, different societies.

OECD Members			
Norway	65.3	Italy*	35.3
Sweden	59.7	Belgium*	33.2
Denmark*	57.7	Austria*	31.8
Netherlands*	55.8	United Kingdom	31.0
Canada*	52.4	Korea	30.3
Finland	47.6	Czech Republic*	30.3
Ireland*	47.4	Spain	29.8
Japan	46.0	Mexico	28.1
Iceland*	43.6	Hungary*	24.6
Germany	41.8	France*	22.8
Switzerland	41.0	Portugal*	21.4
Australia	39.9	Turkey	6.5
United States	35.6		
Non-OECD Members			
India	37.9	South Africa	18.2
Chile	21.9	Argentina	17.5
Nigeria	19.2	Brazil	2.8

\* 1990-91 data

*Note* : The question posed in the survey was: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

Source: World Values Study and Knack and Keefer (1997).

Fig. 17: Percentage of People Saying that "Most people can be trusted", Selected Countries, 1995-96

The contrasts are interesting. Scandinavian countries with high levels of social solidarity recorded the highest levels of trust and these are countries with economically and politically stable with extensive forms of social provision. Less developed, less stable countries recorded dramatically lower levels of trust, with



the UK somewhere in the middle. However, it is not clear whether trust is a contributory factor to political and economic stability or whether it is an outcome thereof.

The Performance and Innovation Unit in Whitehall suggested that the trend of social capital in Britain was downward (2002):

- social trust, a key indicator, has declined from around 50-60 percent in the 1950s down to around 30 percent in 1997;
- the number of people living in single person households has risen dramatically across age groups, a useful structural network measure;
- the General Election in 2001 showed a marked fall in turnout, arguably bringing the UK back into line with the more general cross-national trend of falling voting levels, with disengagement being particularly strong in the youngest age groups; and
- closer analysis of the membership figures suggest that the overall figures conceal a movement from full involvement in multi-faceted communities (such as the church) to low effort, single issue, “cheque-book” membership.

The *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey* (2001) contained sets of questions about community relations and social networks. Together these represent a regional baseline on how people relate to family and friends, who they trust, what they think of the other religion and their degree of involvement in social institutions. Some of the results for individual questions are interesting: 74% either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “There are only a few people I can trust completely”; 64% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “If you are not careful other people will take advantage of you”; 75% of respondents did not belong to a trade union or professional association; almost 50% did not belong to a church or religious organisation; 83% never participated in a neighbourhood association; almost 60% did not belong to a sports, hobby or leisure group; and finally, 70% did not belong to any kind of charitable organisation.



Despite Northern Ireland's frequent, violent expressions of ethnic solidarity, there is evidence of a growing society of "individual strangers".





### 3.7 Conclusion

The widespread preoccupation with the past in Northern Ireland, due to an equally widespread sense of grievance and hurt, underpins the importance of understanding the insight articulated by Santayana, that

*“Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness ...  
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”<sup>27</sup>*

The past is often experienced as unmanageable. Individual and collective memories surface unbidden. A desire to suppress the past can be motivated not only by the desire to avoid pain, or to achieve reconciliation or accommodation with former enemies, but also by a desire to avoid responsibility, shame and guilt. Whatever the motivation, burying the past is not a reliable strategy, as many elderly war criminals have discovered late in life. Things that lie buried do not necessarily decompose. Some take root and grow, only to resurface or be unearthed by former enemies, often when least expected.

In the light of such widespread senses of victim-hood, can reconciliation be achieved? Is reconciliation even necessary in order to achieve a long-lasting peace? Can people forgive even if they cannot forget? Is it fair to ask people to forgive when regret and remorse have seldom been expressed? And, in the long run, will a failure to attend to some of these issues in the present and immediate future store up problems for the future? No one in Northern Ireland is yet in a position to answer these questions. The lessons from other societies, although often not easy to draw, are available to profit from.

Ugresic comments on the former Yugoslavia:

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<sup>27</sup> G. Santayana, *Life of Reason* (1905) vol 1; ch 12.



*“In the fragmented country both real and psychological wars were waged simultaneously. Mortar shells, psychological and real, wiped out people, houses, cities, children, bridges, memory. In the name of the present, a war was waged for the past; in the name of the future, a war against the present. In the name of a new future, the war devoured the future. Warriors, the masters of oblivion, the destroyers of the old state and builders of new ones, used every possible strategic method to impose a collective amnesia. The self-proclaimed masters of life and death set up the co-ordinates of right and wrong, black and white, true and false.”<sup>28</sup>*

The majority in Northern Ireland have recognised the brink of war, and have wished to turn back. In that sense, the past and its losses are remembered painfully and well. Perhaps respect for the diverse versions of the past are the best that can be achieved for now.

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<sup>28</sup> Dubravka Ugresic, *The Culture of Lies*. London: Phoenix. (1998) p 6.



### 3.8 Chapter Summary

- If deaths resulting from political conflict are taken as the primary indicator of the distribution of the Troubles, then the most intense exposure to violence occurred within Belfast, followed by the south and west of Northern Ireland. Deaths in the Irish Republic were relatively low, but it was clearly affected by the concentration of deaths along its border with Northern Ireland. The Troubles thus had specific spatial effects.
- Moreover, there was a strong association between levels of deprivation and political violence in Belfast and in the border areas;
- In addition, residential segregation has been both an effect and a contributor to further violence. This is most apparent in complex patterns of segregation concentrated in small areas like North Belfast. These findings suggest that in understanding the dynamics of violence, deprivation and residential segregation are important factors;
- Evidence from PSNI suggests that while violence resulting in fatalities has fallen since the peace process, other forms of violence have actually increased. Indeed, the tensions generated by the peace process seem to have catalysed widespread, low level violence. For many communities, the peace, process has not been an experience of peace;
- Equally, there is substantial survey evidence to suggest that the suspicions and fears that each community has of the other have increased since 2000, pointing to a decline rather than enhancement of reconciliation;
- Community suspicions and lack of trust suggest significant deficits in the levels of social capital within Northern Ireland. There is a clear need to build “bridging” capital between the two communities and perhaps a need for greater integration within communities;
- All in all, it is difficult to find macro indicators of the impact of the PEACE Programmes on the overall attitudes and opinions of the Northern Ireland population.



## 4. The Peace Process and Development

### 4.1 Introduction

There have been frequent discussions in Northern Ireland about the relationship between the violence and other developments in the region. Of some concern has been the impact on the economy. The general political environment is a key determinant of how an economy functions. It has been argued that a major obstacle to economic progress is the *political uncertainty* that inhibits the ability of firms to plan for the longer term and set down long-lasting roots in any particular place:

*“Political risk can be expected to have a particular influence on the size of the tradable goods sector. This sector has an alternative to invest elsewhere, and, for a given rate of return, will seek out a lower risk environment.”*<sup>29</sup>

Equally, it has also been alleged that violence is a major obstacle to inward investment, and surveys of US corporations indicate that a majority of firms do consider the political environment before investing in a particular location. There is also the issue of the general functioning of an economy faced by a high degree of violence. This is reflected in greater than normal costs associated with transport disruption, the physical destruction of property and the need to employ security procedures. In addition, there are, what may be called the “diseconomies of division” that affect the optimal functioning of labour and capital markets. Indeed, the Rowthorn/Wayne description of Northern Ireland as a “workhouse economy” refers to the extraordinarily high levels of public subvention required to make it function, including the proportion of the working population located in the public sector (both in security and non-security

<sup>29</sup> Barnett, R. (April 1995), 'Comment' in Northern Ireland Economic Council, *Through Peace to Prosperity*, Belfast, p.49.



positions), the high rate of subsidy to private sector activity and the level of benefits dependence within the population generally.<sup>30</sup>



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<sup>30</sup> Rowthorn, B. and Wayne, N. (1987), *The Political Economy of Northern Ireland*, Lawrence and Wishart, London.





## 4.2 The Evidence

One of the difficulties in finding evidence of the impact of violence on the economy lies in finding a consistent data series that covers the entire period between 1969 and the cease-fires.

There are special problems with official unemployment figures owing to the frequent changes in its definition and measurement over the period. Even data series which attempt to retrospectively count unemployment on a consistent basis, e.g. the backward application of the claimant count method, fail to produce wholly consistent figures (see, for example, unemployment tables in the *Northern Ireland Annual Abstracts of Statistics*). The same is true for GDP figures.

Nevertheless the statistics branch of DETI provided a consistent series on unemployment and GDP per head for the period 1971-94.

The percentage change in the number of deaths, year on year, was correlated with similar changes in GDP per head and the numbers unemployed. No significant correlation was found.

Interestingly, a simple correlation between the annual number of deaths and GDP per head revealed a coefficient of  $-.64$  hinting that high numbers of deaths were associated with low figures for GDP per head. However, a similar coefficient emerged for deaths and GDP per head in Great Britain, suggesting that the Northern Ireland relationship was spurious. Indeed, the most significant association with Northern Ireland's GDP figures was with GDP in the North of England where the coefficient was  $.99$ . The correlation coefficient between Northern Ireland unemployment rates and Troubles-related deaths was  $-.71$ . However, this was associated with the fact that unemployment grew massively in the 1980s - the period that saw a relative decline in Troubles-related deaths. The rise in unemployment corresponded with general increases in the UK associated



with economic restructuring and the impact of the monetarist experiment in the early 1980s.

Historically, the performance of the Northern Ireland economy has been poor. On indicators like unemployment, Northern Ireland's record over the past 30 years has been amongst the worst of the UK standard regions. In 1986, GDP per head was 80% of that in the UK. By 1998-2000 it was only around 75%.<sup>31</sup> The region has seen greater concentrations of low household income and low earnings than any other UK region and scores badly on almost any measure of deprivation. In describing the condition of the economy in the early 1990s, Gudgin was scathing:<sup>32</sup>

*"Its industrial base is small with little local competition in most sectors. Local suppliers or industrial services are limited in number and in the scope of products or services on offer. Like most of the northern regions of the UK, Northern Ireland's clusters (in linen and standard clothing) were established long ago and in most cases face intense competition from competitors with much lower labour costs. Local consumer and industrial markets in Northern Ireland are at the low income end of the UK spectrum and are not in general either sophisticated or fast changing. Although the upper third of the secondary education system is the best in the UK, the low level of local demand for highly educated manpower means that many well educated young people leave the region. This results in a labour force which is not particularly well educated even by the UK's low standard."*

<sup>31</sup> Northern Ireland Economic Council (2000), *Statement on the Capabilities and Innovation Perspective: the Way Ahead*, Belfast.

<sup>32</sup> Gudgin, G. (May 1996), *"Prosperity and growth in UK Regions"*, Local Economy, Pitman Publishing, p.9



And yet, since the cease-fires, the economy has been a relative success story. Between 1990 and 1995 Gross Domestic Product per head increased from 78.2% to 81.5% of the UK average.<sup>33</sup>

Manufacturing output rose by 16.6% between 1990 and the final quarter of 1996 compared to a 3.3% increase in the UK.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, manufacturing productivity increased by 2.5% each year between 1993 and 1996 compared to 2% in Britain.<sup>35</sup> Finally, the number of employees in employment increased by 6.6% between 1990 and 1995 compared to a fall of 3.1% in the UK as a whole.<sup>36</sup> Provisional figures indicate that male employees increased by 12,450 between 1991 and 1997 and female employees by 30,770.<sup>37</sup> By 1995, women had become the majority of employees in Northern Ireland albeit with substantial numbers in part-time employment. Indeed for both genders in both economies, part-time working and short-term contracts grew as a proportion of all employment. In 1996, 5.3% of men and 40.5% of women were engaged in part-time work in Northern Ireland.<sup>38</sup>

Unemployment also fell dramatically from the heights reached in the mid-1980s. In January 2000, the claimant count unemployment rate stood at 5.7% compared to a UK figure of 4%. While the ILO unemployment rate was higher (6.6%), this was also true for the UK (5.9%). Between 1986 and 2000, the numbers recorded as unemployed fell by almost 80,000 – notwithstanding the discontinuities in the data series occasioned by the introduction of Job Seeker's Allowance in 1996. In 1996, the short-term unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was only 1% higher than in Britain (5.9% compared to 4.9%) while overall unemployment was at the

<sup>33</sup> Coopers & Lybrand (Jan, 1998), *Northern Ireland Economy Review & Prospects*, Belfast, Table A1.

<sup>34</sup>[20] *Ibid*, Table A5.

<sup>35</sup> Coopers & Lybrand, (Jan. 1997), *The Northern Ireland Economy: review and Prospects*, Belfast, p.5.

<sup>36</sup> Figures provided by NISRA.

<sup>37</sup> Coopers & Lybrand (1998) *Op. Cit*, Table D12.

<sup>38</sup> Government Statistical Service (1997) *Regional Trends*, London, The Stationery Office, Table 5.6.



European average. Moreover, the female unemployment rate was one of the lowest in Europe.

There may, however, be substantial problems in sustaining this rate of improvement within a slowing global economy. In 1999, the *First Trust Economic Outlook and Business Review* pointed to some immediate problems: the serious decline in farm incomes, the relative strength of Sterling against the Punt that inhibited exports to the Republic of Ireland and the differences in corporation and indirect tax between Northern Ireland and the Republic.<sup>39</sup> While generally optimistic, the *PWC Economic Review* pointed to strong growth in the first half of 2000 and a slowdown thereafter. It also expressed concern about the high proportion of long-term unemployed in the claimant count figure (30.3%), “a full 7% points higher than the next highest region”<sup>40</sup> (p.17). Finally, it noted the 285,000 economically inactive people of working age, so that the regional activity rate is over seven percentage points lower than the UK average. In the longer term, work commissioned by the Northern Ireland Economic Council suggests that GDP per head will fall again, to 74% of the UK’s by 2010.<sup>41</sup>

Summary indicators as follows are presented below:

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<sup>39</sup> First Trust Bank, (December 1999), *Economic Outlook and Business Review*, Belfast.

<sup>40</sup> PWC (July 2001) *Economic Review*, , p.17

<sup>41</sup> Northern Ireland Economic Council (1999), *A Step-Change in Economic Performance? A Response to Strategy 2010*, Belfast.



Summary Indicators for the Northern Ireland Economy					
	1991	1993	1995	1997	1999
GDP per Head as % of UK	76.4	78.7	81.5	80.1	77.5
Index of Manufacturing Productivity					
NI		94.1	100	104.4	117.8
UK		99.1	100	100.1	105.7
Foreign owned Companies in NI				368	427
Disposable Household Income per head	£83.00	£84.20	£88.00	£86.70	£85.90

Fig. 18: Summary indicators for the 1990s (Source: Regional Trends 2001 and Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics 2001)

Although there was a substantial increase in GDP over the period, GDP per head as a percentage of the UK in 1999 was just over one percentage point greater than in 1991. This was despite a 29% rise in manufacturing productivity between 1995 and 1999. With manufacturing contributing only about 20% of GDP, its strong performance in the 1990s was insufficient to affect the GDP per head ratio. There were, however, other indicators of success. The growth in the number of externally owned firms was over 60% over four years and disposable household income per head (despite higher average household size in Northern Ireland) averaged 86% of the UK level.

The continuing fall in unemployment can be seen in the table below.




Fig. 19: Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment, Northern Ireland

Overall unemployment fell steadily in each year, and, with the exception of a small rise in female unemployment between 1997 and 1998, the same was true for both men and women. The total number unemployed fell by 35% – 38% for men and 23% for women. At the same time, the proportion of the unemployed who had been out of work for more than a year also declined pointing to a more than proportionate fall in long-term unemployment.




Fig. 20: Long term unemployment, Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, 1990-2001 (Source: Northern Ireland Labour Market Statistics, DETI and NISRA 1997-2001)



In 1997, over half of all unemployed men had been jobless for more than a year. By July 2001, this figure had declined to just over a third. On the latter date, less than one in five unemployed women was regarded as long-term. In this case, it should be recognized that claimant count figures exclude certain women who have been out of work for more than a year since many cease to be eligible for benefits.

The general picture has been of declining unemployment with long-term unemployment falling faster than the overall trend. Thus, the decline in unemployment has corresponded with a trend of substantial employment growth. At the same time, there is no guarantee that the positive trends at regional level have been reproduced in those areas most exposed to unemployment. It is therefore important to disaggregate regional unemployment to look at what is happening in particular areas.

Claimant Count unemployment data is generally presented at the level of Travel To Work areas to enable the calculation of unemployment rates. Travel to Work areas are large and, in the case of Belfast, consists of the entire urban area. ILO unemployment is taken from the *Labour Force Survey*, which is based on a relatively small sample and therefore cannot be disaggregated into areas smaller than district councils. Neither is particularly useful in detecting pockets of concentrated unemployment. However, DETI and NISRA produce a monthly compilation of *Northern Ireland Labour Market Statistics* that provides claimant count unemployment at parliamentary constituency level. Since 1999, unemployment numbers have also been given in terms of the percentage of the workforce for both men and women. This enables a description of where unemployment is particularly concentrated. The next diagram depicts the change in unemployment for each of the current Northern Ireland parliamentary constituencies between 1996 and 2001.




Fig. 21: Long term unemployment, Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, 1990-2001 (Source: Northern Ireland Labour Market Statistics, DETI and NISRA 1997-2001)

Certainly in all the constituencies, the overall trend was down. The most dramatic fall occurred between 1996-97 suggesting that the introduction of Job Seeker's Allowance in October 1996 was associated with a substantial fall in unemployment. Moreover, 15 of the constituencies are closely grouped. Two stand out – Foyle and Belfast West – as having unemployment numbers visibly greater than the rest and both of these two areas saw a high degree of political violence. The pattern of change in these two over the period was somewhat different. Unemployment fell more sharply in Belfast West between 1996-97 and more slowly between 1997-99, thereafter diverging again. Indeed, between 2000-2001, the number unemployed actually rose in Foyle.

Over this period the total number unemployed fell by around 54%. This rate was exceeded in places like Lagan Valley (63%) and Mid Ulster (70%). However, the





overall rate of decline was not matched in Belfast West and West Tyrone (both 46%) or Foyle (38%).

Thus, although unemployment steady fell, the share of the region's unemployed in these three constituencies actually increased – from 8.6% to 10% in Belfast West, from 8.4 to 11.3% in Foyle and from six to 6.9% in West Tyrone. The uneven decline of unemployment among parliamentary constituencies has resulted in a greater concentration of unemployment in a particular few.

However, unemployed numbers are not the same as unemployment rates which express the ratio between the number unemployed and the number in work and training. Even when such numbers are taken as a percent of the workforce, the same three constituencies stand out.

<b>Unemployed Men as a % of the Workforce 1999-2001</b>			
	<b>Jul-99</b>	<b>Jul-00</b>	<b>Jul-01</b>
<b>Belfast West</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>22.7</b>	<b>21.5</b>
Foyle	14.3	12.8	13.1
West Tyrone	12.1	9.8	10.1
<b>Next Highest</b>			
Newry & Armagh	11.2	7.5	7.9
<b>Lowest</b>			
Lagan Valley	4.4	3.4	3.2

Fig 22: Unemployed Men as a % of the Workforce 1999-2001

The table above depicts male unemployment in selected parliamentary constituencies over a three-year period. The three with highest rates are compared to the next highest and the lowest. The rate was particularly high in Belfast West where it was more than half greater than in Foyle and almost seven times greater than in Lagan Valley, the constituency with the lowest male unemployment rate. Nevertheless, three constituencies had higher female unemployment rates than Belfast West (Mid-Ulster, South Down and West Tyrone). Even so, the extraordinarily high male rate in this constituency ensured that it had the highest overall unemployment rate in each of the three years.



Both Belfast West and Foyle have been targeted by the development agencies for substantial investment. Between 1995/96 and 2000/01, IDB assistance to companies in these two constituencies amounted to £60.3 million and £99.9 million respectively.<sup>42</sup> However, this assistance created or helped to sustain only 3,010 jobs in Belfast West compared to 6,637 in Foyle. Over this period, Belfast West saw only 16% of the jobs created or sustained in Belfast despite greater IDB expenditure here than in the other Belfast parliamentary constituencies.

If unemployment has been falling, what happens to the unemployed when they leave the register? In this respect, there are differences by gender, duration of unemployment and age. Between July 1999 and July 2001, a higher proportion of women, compared to men, tended to find jobs (51.6% compared to 45.8% from July 1999 to July 2000 and 49.8% compared to 45% between 2000-2001). Conversely, higher proportions of men moved to other benefits (14.6% and 12% in each yearly period compared to 10.6% and 10.4%). Greater differences were observable with respect to unemployment duration. In each of the yearly periods, the proportion of those unemployed for over five years leaving the register for a job was around half for that of those unemployed less than a year. In contrast, the probability of the five-year plus group being recycled into other forms of benefit was more than four times greater than the short-term group. Over two fifths of the very long-term unemployed left the register for other benefits.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, almost a quarter of over 50 year olds left the register to go onto other benefits compared to around 6% of the under 25s and 13% of those aged 25-49. Finally, between 1999 and 2001, over 40,000 individuals simply failed to sign, thus leaving the register without a known destination. Equally, many of those who leave the register, reappear within a year. This applies to over 40% of those who found work and more than 50% of those leaving to take up educational or training opportunities.

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<sup>42</sup> IDB (2001) *Annual Report*, , Table 3.4

<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that the actual numbers involved are very different – around 70,000 for those less than a year unemployed and less than 5,000 for those more than five years unemployed.



### 4.3 Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

How did development of the Northern Ireland Economy in this period compare with that of the Republic? The next table looks at GDP per head for each economy for the 1990s. The figures for Northern Ireland were originally in Sterling but were converted to Euro (using a multiple of 1.47).

Comparison GDP per Head of Population RoI and NI			
Years	RoI GDP per head	NI GDP per head	NI as % of RoI
1990	9,420	9135	97.0%
1991	9,759	9841	100.8%
1992	10,197	10386	101.9%
1993	11,067	11035	99.7%
1994	11,685	11765	100.7%
1995	13,141	12548	95.5%
1996	14,468	12998	89.8%
1997	16,446	13785	83.8%
1998	18,716	14143	75.6%
1999	21,365	14573	68.2%

Fig. 23: Comparison GDP per Head of Population RoI and NI, 1990-1999<sup>44</sup>

Curiously, it is the period after the cease-fires when Northern Ireland relative performance declined. This, however, was primarily a function of the extraordinarily high growth rate of the Irish Republic in the late 1990s. There was, nevertheless, considerable uneven development within each state as can be seen in the table below.

<sup>44</sup> Government Statistical Service, Republic of Ireland



Gross Value Added per capita in Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland by sub-region, Euro						
Sub-region	1995	1996	1997	1998	1998 Dublin = 100	% Increase 1995-98
Border	10,226	11,412	12,930	14,519	59	42.0%
Midland	9,590	10,739	11,630	12,458	50	29.9%
West	9,826	11,050	11,849	13,645	55	38.9%
Dublin	17,154	18,935	21,565	24,772	100	44.4%
Mid East	11,873	12,427	14,340	14,161	57	19.3%
Mid West	12,361	13,730	14,781	16,956	68	37.2%
South East	11,255	12,685	13,474	14,879	60	32.2%
South West	13,778	14,669	18,168	21,575	87	56.6%
<b>Belfast</b>	20,598	21,784	23,327	25,224	102	22.5%
<b>Outer Belfast</b>	10,978	11,456	12,017	12,175	49	10.9%
<b>East</b>	11,294	11,612	12,294	12,276	50	8.7%
<b>North</b>	11,194	11,491	12,157	12,498	50	11.6%
<b>West and South</b>	10,538	10,681	11,357	11,557	47	9.7%

Fig 24: Gross Value Added per capita in Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland by sub-region, Euro<sup>45</sup>

The table above describes GVA per head (a measure of GDP) for sub-regions of the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.

In both states, there is considerable variation. If Dublin is represented as one hundred (in 1998), then the Border, Midlands and West regions have figures in the fifties range. The degree of uneven development is even more pronounced in Northern Ireland.

GVA in Belfast is marginally higher than in Dublin, but each of the other Northern Ireland sub-regions has a figure at or below the lowest scores of the Irish Republic. There is a problem of border underdevelopment in each state, although more serious in Northern Ireland.


The different growth pattern is also evident at sub-regional level. The fastest growing sub-region in Northern Ireland (Belfast) had GVA growth just above the

<sup>45</sup> Government Statistical Service, Republic of Ireland



slowest growing sub-region in the Republic (Mid East). Part of the problem lies in the differential sources of regional income. In Northern Ireland, 22% of all regional income is derived from state transfers compared to 16% in the Republic of Ireland.

Corresponding to its faster growth rates, the Republic saw greater falls in unemployment in the latter half of the 1990s. In the next table, the number unemployed in each state is taken as one hundred and the respective lines depict the decline in that number over the five year period.



**Fig. 25: Unemployment fall, ROI and NI 1996-2001**

A similar pattern emerges when the numbers experiencing long-term unemployment are compared within each state as can be seen in the table below.



	Republic of Ireland		Northern Ireland	
	Total L/T Unemployed	As % of All Unemployed	Total L/T Unemployed	As % of All Unemployed
1990	110,000	63.9	46,000	57.9
1991	120,000	60.3	46,000	54
1992	117,000	56.4	50,000	58.3
1993	125,000	57	51,000	58.9
1994	128,000	60.8	47,000	59.1
1995	103,000	58.2	48,000	61.3
1996	103,000	57.7	38,000	55.6
1997	86,000	54.3	31,000	56.4
1998	64,000	50.2	24,000	45.8
1999	42,000	42.9	29,000	53.9
2000	27,000	36.6	20,000	39.8
2001	20,000	31.3	20,000	43.2

Fig. 26: Long term unemployment, Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, 1990-2001

By 2001, each state had the same number of long-term unemployed. However, in 1990, the number of long-term unemployed in the Irish Republic was more than twice as great as in Northern Ireland.

In short while Northern Ireland achieved impressive economic growth in the late 1990s, this was more than matched by the Irish Republic. At the same time, neither growth nor its benefits were equally shared within each state. Both have extensive patterns of uneven development exacerbated along their shared border.



#### 4.4 Chapter Summary

- While there are good reasons to believe that the Troubles had a severe negative impact on the Northern Ireland economy, it is difficult to find data that point to specific effects. In part, this is because economic development has been influenced by many variables - the international environment including particular events like the oil shocks, specific policy measures and the long-term decline of Northern Ireland's traditional industrial base. In part, it is because the British government increased public spending after Direct Rule thus creating many thousands of public sector jobs and helping to drive GDP growth. The economic trajectory of Northern Ireland was thus like that of weak UK regions (in particular, the North East);
- Yet the regional economy, on a range of economic indicators, saw rapid improvement in the second half of the 1990s, coinciding with the period after the cease-fires. Unemployment fell rapidly, manufacturing production and productivity increased and employed increased by over 100,000. There may thus be some evidence of a "peace effect". It should be acknowledged that the PEACE Programmes have injected substantial resources into a very small region that simultaneously benefited from Labour's expansionary budget plans after 1999;
- There remains evidence, however, that economic growth has not been distributed evenly, never mind areas of greatest need – a development feature that needs to be addressed;
- At the same time, comparison with the Republic of Ireland demonstrated that Northern Ireland's growth fell far behind its island neighbour and that patterns of uneven development may be even more pronounced in Northern Ireland compared to the Republic.



## 5. PEACE 1

### 5.1 Introduction

In the autumn of 1994, shortly after the IRA cease-fire, the European Commission created a special Task Force to look into further ways of giving practical assistance to Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of the Republic of Ireland in consultation with the national authorities. The creation of this Task Force was a practical expression of the European Union's commitment to the peace and reconciliation process which was underlined by a statement from then President Jacques Delors welcoming the cessation of hostilities.

In its deliberations, the Task Force considered the new opportunities and special needs arising out of the cease-fires and the embryonic peace process. It came to the conclusion that the European Union had a clear interest and a vital role to play in maintaining the momentum for peace and reconciliation, not only for the benefit of the region most affected, but also for the benefit of the wider European Union as a whole. On the basis of this conclusion, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, to be implemented in the form of a Community Initiative under Structural Funds. It was proposed that the initiative would run for five years, from 1995 to 1999, equivalent to the remaining period of the application of the then current structural funding programme. Community Initiative funding amounting to €300 million was to be provided initially for a three year period, from 1995 to 1997, with a further two years' funding dependent on the outcome of a mid-term review. The principle of a special support programme and the allocation of financial resources for the period 1995 to 1997 were subsequently endorsed by the European Council of Heads of Government.





The rationale behind the programme is instructive to note at this point. The Outline Document stated:

*“...there is a forceful argument that the single most important constraint on Northern Ireland’s economic and social development has been the existence of the community conflict in the region.”<sup>46</sup>*

The Outline Document went further:

*“The importance of the socio-economic difficulties in the context of the PEACE Initiative is that disadvantage often feeds and sustains the conflict: it is frequently the most deprived areas which have suffered most and been most involved in the conflict. It is axiomatic, therefore, that socio-economic difficulties must be tackled if the peace process is to be embedded.”<sup>47</sup>*

The overall direction of the programme therefore was to underpin the drive towards peace by addressing underlying socio-economic conditions in the context of the conflict, rather than to focus exclusively on the most immediate outcomes of the conflict itself.

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<sup>46</sup> Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, 1995-1999, p.13

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*



## 5.2 Consultation

Much attention has rightly been paid to the extensive nature of the consultation process as a distinctive feature which contributed to the development of the programme. This is particularly relevant given the democratic deficit to which Northern Ireland was subject prior to the devolution of powers embodied in the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

The consultation took the following forms:

- Departmental consultations with those groups which might potentially be reached by the programme;
- Public advertisements in the local press; and
- Conferences held in Newcastle, Belfast, Ballyconnell and Letterkenny.

The Task Force published guidelines to the programme in February 1995, received a total of 194 submissions prior to publication, and a further 150 submissions post-publication resulting in a final publication of the programme in June 1995. This consultation process is credited with having been influential in setting the priority given to grass roots development and a decentralised delivery structure<sup>48</sup>. Another, perhaps unforeseen, outcome of the high profile consultation, was the strong sense of ownership that many, particularly within the community and voluntary sector, felt towards the programme. The Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) and the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (NIVT) played an influential role in Northern Ireland as did the Community Workers' Co-operative and the Combat Poverty Agency in the Republic.

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<sup>48</sup> Brian Harvey, *Report on Programme for Peace and Reconciliation*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1997.



### 5.3 Aims and Objectives of PEACE 1

The overall strategic aim of PEACE 1 was set in the Outline Document as follows:

*“To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation and extending social inclusion.”<sup>49</sup>*

This strategic aim was supported through two high level objectives:

1. To promote the social inclusion of those at the margins of economic and social life.
2. To exploit the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and stimulate social and economic regeneration.

These two strategic objectives were to be delivered through six strategic themes as follows:

- Employment
- Urban Regeneration
- Rural Regeneration
- Social Inclusion
- Cross-border Development
- Productive Investment and Industrial Development

This hierarchy of objectives is represented in the diagram below:

<sup>49</sup> Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, 1995-1999, p.9




Fig. 27: PEACE 1 Hierarchy of Objectives



The influences brought effectively to bear on the consultation process were borne out through the relative financial allocations to the Sub-Programmes.

<b>Sub-Programme</b>	<b>Allocations NI MECU</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Allocations RoI MECU</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total MECU</b>	<b>%</b>
Employment	37.39	16%	4.38	7%	41.77	14%
Urban Regeneration	18.95	8%	12	20%	30.95	10%
Rural Regeneration	18.95	8%			18.95	6%
Cross-border	22.5	9%	22.5	38%	45	15%
Social Inclusion	57.33	24%	13.13	22%	70.46	23%
Productive Investment	36.89	15%	7.06	12%	43.95	15%
Partnerships	44.2	18%			44.2	15%
Technical Assistance	3.79	2%	0.93	2%	4.72	2%
	<b>240</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100%</b>

Fig. 28: PEACE 1 Allocation by Sub-Programme



## 5.4 Delivery Structure

The delivery structure for PEACE 1 broke new ground on both sides of the border in terms of the complexity of its hierarchy. Overall, forty-two separate agencies were involved in the delivery of funding Measures under the Sub-Programme headings. Measures themselves were divided between funders and shared, in some cases by up to nine agencies<sup>50</sup> – a situation which was inevitably the cause of much confusion for applicants. More positively, the structure itself was a major development in terms of the level of devolved responsibility which it created

In addition to Central Government Departments, PEACE 1 was characterised by the engagement of two new mechanisms:

- Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs)
- District Partnerships

### Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs)

The programme pioneered the use of Intermediary Funding Bodies on a large scale on both sides of the border. These were:

- Area Development Management/Combat Poverty Agency
- The Childhood Fund (administered by NIPPA and Playboard)
- Community Relations Council
- Co-operation Ireland
- Educational Guidance Service for Adults
- Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (now Community Foundation for Northern Ireland)

<sup>50</sup> IFB Secretariat (September 1999) *Building the Future: The Experience of the Intermediary Funding Agencies*.



- PROTEUS
- Rural Community Network
- Rural Development Council
- Training for Women Network
- Youthnet

There are a number of distinctive features of the IFBs. In the first instance, they were all bodies which were independent of the state and, more importantly, perceived as being so. This allowed IFBs collectively to enjoy good levels of access to all communities affected by conflict. Secondly, all IFBs had possessed a strong thematic base, often developed over many years; Co-operation Ireland for example had been promoting North-South links since 1979 and Youthnet had been representing the voluntary youth sector since the 1940s. This allowed them to begin the programme with extensive networks of contacts in each sector. Thirdly, they were seen within the programme as bringing an element of “bottom-up” development and were characterised by an inclusive approach and the involvement of beneficiaries through project selection panels and advisory committees such as those developed during the programme by ADM/CPA in the Border Counties.

### **District Partnerships**

Sub-programme 6 of PEACE 1 created new partnership structures entitled District Partnerships in each of the twenty-six District Council areas of Northern Ireland. The make up of each partnership was as follows:

- one-third elected members of the Council (nominated by political parties);
- one-third community/voluntary sector representatives (nominated through the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action); and
- one-third business representatives (nominated by local Chambers of Commerce), trade union representatives (nominated by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and representatives of statutory agencies).



Funding was allocated to each District Partnership on the basis of population (1991 Census) and relative deprivation (Robson Index). Each was responsible for developing an action plan reflective of the context and identified need in their local area. This was submitted to the Northern Ireland Partnership Board, an independent umbrella (the make-up of which mirrored that of Partnerships at District Council level), which was given responsibility for oversight of the Sub-programme as well as providing support and guidance to District Partnerships on the ground.

Partnerships were charged with developing a reconciliation strategy for their local areas and funding projects that contributed to the accomplishment of that strategy. Clear parameters for their operations were established. Each partnership was to prioritise four themes;

- social inclusion,
- urban and rural regeneration,
- productive investment and
- employment.

Almost half of their efforts were to be directed at social inclusion. The themes were to be drawn together to represent a co-ordinated strategic approach. Thus, the focus of their work was territorial, they adopted integrated approaches and all local stakeholders were represented in institutional form.

Partnerships were a high risk initiative. They were geographically rather than thematically focussed and therefore enjoyed an unrivalled level of local knowledge. They brought together, in a structured way, key sectors where inter-relationships were characterised by long histories of mutual suspicion and rivalry for power and resources, and expected them to work together for a commonly agreed goal. Crucially, as new organisations, they entered PEACE 1 with no





previous experience and a steep learning curve would be required to meet commitments.<sup>51</sup>

The overall distribution of funding by delivery mechanism was as follows:

<b>Sub-Programme</b>	<b>Central Government</b>	<b>IFBs</b>	<b>District Partnerships</b>	<b>Total</b>
Employment	8.8%	5.1%	2.7%	16.6%
Urban/Rural Regeneration	13.5%	3.1%	2.8%	19.4%
Cross-border Development	7.6%	7.4%		15.0%
Social Inclusion	7.0%	16.5%	6.5%	30.0%
Productive Investment	3.4%	11.2%	2.7%	17.4%
Technical Assistance	1.6%			1.6%
	<b>41.9%</b>	<b>43.3%</b>	<b>14.8%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Fig. 29: PEACE 1 Allocation by Delivery Mechanism

<sup>51</sup> See case studies presented below on Belfast European Partnership Partnerships and Limavady Local Strategy Partnership (formerly District Partnership)



## 5.5 Monitoring

The Programme was the responsibility of the Department of Finance and Personnel in Northern Ireland and the Department of Finance in the Republic. Both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland were obliged to produce an annual report on the operation of the programme and to support the workings of a Programme Monitoring Committee. This Committee comprised forty-five members, the majority of whom were from Government Departments (twenty-two members) and the European Commission (nine members). It was required to meet at least twice annually.

The overall monitoring framework for the Programme was established through the Outline Document as follows:<sup>52</sup>

- Changes in community perceptions and tensions;
- A cohort study of participants in assisted projects to measure changes in their lives, attitudes and prospects;
- Employment created; and
- The numbers of people involved from areas of disadvantage and most directly affected by the conflict

Whilst individual Measures had their own sets of indicators according to the priorities concerned, typically these included indicators such as number entering employment, new businesses created and location of projects. The first serious attempt at providing an overall monitoring system for the Programme as a whole however, was not operationalised until late 1997 with the introduction of the Optimum Monitoring Questionnaire (OMQ) which was to be fed into a Central Database. The OMQ, designed through the Central Community Relations Unit, focussed mainly on quantitative and management information in terms of:

<sup>52</sup> Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, 1995-1999



- Who applied;
- What they applied for;
- Who and where is targeted;
- Amount applied for;
- Amount awarded; and
- Impacts resulting.

Whilst the necessity of this type of information cannot be questioned, from the point of view of project promoters, the OMQ ran to twenty-seven pages which felt excessive given that it needed to be completed on a quarterly basis in addition to monitoring forms issued by individual IFBs, Partnerships and Government Departments. From the perspective of the implementing bodies themselves, the primary utility of the OMQ was to provide information on potentially fraudulent double funding of activities. Analysis of returns from the Central Database lies beyond the scope of this research but will form part of the Ex-post Evaluation of the Programme presently in progress. It seems unlikely however on the basis of the questionnaire itself that significant conclusions are likely to be drawn in terms of PEACE 1's impact on peace and reconciliation.



## 5.6 Impact of Delivery

The update undertaken in 2000 of the Mid-term Evaluation of SSPPR outlined the impacts under three main areas, as follows:<sup>53</sup>

### **Economic growth**

70% of promoters stated that their project had had an identifiable economic impact. This included training projects representing 24% of the value of total approvals which had enabled participants to progress into employment or further education / training. In total, 37% of participants in training projects had received accreditation. By the end of 1999, it was estimated that the SSPPR had created 3,800 new jobs, mainly as a result of Sub-programme 5 (Productive Investment). Sub-programmes 5 and 6 were estimated to have produced 185 viable new businesses.

### **Social Inclusion**

Of the projects surveyed for the purpose of the Mid-term Evaluation Update, 99% claimed that their project would make a positive contribution to social inclusion. Over 90% of respondents claimed that the project was either “very” or “quite successful” in promoting social inclusion. The qualitative impacts of social inclusion projects included confidence building, assisting disadvantaged groups, widening community links and community development. The main quantitative indicator was the participation rate by target groups and areas. However, this proved difficult to measure and, by the end of 1999, it could be stated only that there seemed to be a genuinely high level of input from these groups. It was estimated that 65% of jobs were created in TSN (Targeting Social Need) areas.

<sup>53</sup> Coopers and Lybrand (1997) Mid-Term Evaluation Draft Report. Belfast: Coopers and Lybrand.



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78% of projects surveyed claimed that their project was cross-community. Over two fifths of these had either not worked on a cross-community basis before or had increased the scale of their cross-community dimension. Almost 30% of projects identified “empowering communities” as their main contribution to peace and reconciliation, whilst one in eight projects believed that their main contribution was creating jobs and wealth. *The Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey* showed a small improvement in community relations between 1997 and 2000 (although this is challenged by the findings of the 2001 *Life and Times Survey* discussed at Section 3.5 above). There are, it should be noted significant shortcomings in the use of attitudinal surveys to measure the impact of PEACE programming.



## 5.7 PEACE 1 Case Study 1: The Belfast European Partnership Board

For almost 30 years, Belfast has been at the centre of Northern Ireland's political conflict. The City Council area has about a fifth of the region's population, but over two fifths of all political deaths occurred there and in addition it has been the site of almost 60% of sectarian assassinations (the killing of individuals because of their religion). In response to the violence, the respective Catholic and Protestant populations have withdrawn progressively into enclaves. Of the fifty-one wards in the city, only seven are neither predominantly Catholic or Protestant.<sup>54</sup> To keep warring communities apart, "peace lines", six-metre high walls that stretch for miles, intersect the city, particularly in the north and west. The Catholic population of the city is increasing while the Protestant population declines and this has resulted in the movement of Catholics into areas which had previously been considered as Protestant, creating terrains of contested space. The cycle of tension is driven by the fluctuating state of the peace process and by the annual parades' season that highlights the conflict over space.

As the biggest District Council area in Northern Ireland, the Belfast Partnership attracted the largest share of the initial allocation of funds – just less than 30% of the total allocation. It thus had substantial funds with which to pursue peace and reconciliation - £10 million in Tranche 1 of PEACE 1 with the balance of its £23 million allocation in Tranche 2. From the onset, the Partnership saw its strategic responsibilities as:

- translating the formal partnership arrangements into a functioning set of relationships amongst the various sectors;
- understanding the dynamics of conflict and division in Belfast so as to develop a strategy that meet the specific conditions of the city;

<sup>54</sup> Figures drawn from the Northern Ireland Census 2001



- presenting this strategy to the people of the city so as to attract proposals that would implement it; and
- monitoring and evaluating its efforts in a continuous process so as to inform the developing practice of the Partnership.

### **Building the Partnership**

The key to building real partnership relationships lay in developing a shared understanding of the problems of Belfast; specifically the nature of the conflict within the city and the costs inflicted on the local population. There was a further requirement to look at the distribution of social need within Belfast and to establish the priorities for a programme centrally concerned with social inclusion. The key question for the Partnership was how to derive a consensus around a peace and reconciliation strategy. The path chosen was to address the differences within itself, since these were a microcosm of the differences within the city at large.

In recognition of these difficulties, the Board conducted a series of workshops, drawing on outside expertise where required, to focus honestly on the problems facing Belfast. This process was neither quick nor easy. It simultaneously commissioned a socio-economic audit of the city to prioritise the needs it wished to address. The conclusion was the development of a set of values that would underpin its work:

- The acceptance of diversity – different perspectives and interests were real and could not be subsumed. This was true of the various sectors represented on the board and of the city population as a whole. Diversity could be a source of synergy rather than a barrier to development if the appropriate mechanism could be found to creatively exploit it;
- A key to the creative development of diversity was the principle of equity – that all activities would be transparent, fair and accountable. This meant that



rather than assert a false consensus, agreed mechanisms would be developed to acknowledge and work with diversity;

However, the previous two had to be complemented by the recognition of the interdependence of all the sectors within the Board and, in the final analysis, of the people of the city. At the bottom line, the people of Belfast are interdependent whether they acknowledge it or not – neighbourhoods working against the odds in terms of decline and neglect cannot be at odds with each other.

At the end of this process, the Partnership Board had a set of values that all sectors could buy into, there was a greater awareness of the different perspectives and interests of each sector, and it had a framework with which to develop a strategy for Belfast.

### **Developing a Strategy**

From its series of workshops and the Belfast audit, the Partnership Board identified a series of strategic priorities:

- The first was to promote debate and dialogue on key issues pertaining to the city through seminars, conferences and workshops. The key themes were: to engage with community division through addressing the implications of the new political structures; to seek ways to ensure the sustainability of actions initiated through the PEACE Programme; and training and support for the development of partnership and community consortia;
- The second was to promote a strategic and focused approach to the problems of the city. Focus was on *Reconciliation for a Shared City, Capacity Building, Economic Development* and the *Needs of Young People*.

The idea of the shared city was a central concern of the Partnership. Its analysis showed a segregated city with a conjunction of political violence and deprivation





– a place of interfaces between warring communities and a domain of contested spaces. It therefore sought to bring co-ordination and coherence to the variety of small interface-based reconciliation projects that already existed by way of an *Interfaces and Contested Spaces Programme*. It also sought to develop a *Breaking the Silence Programme* dealing with those most affected by the conflict and a programme to promote *Political and Cultural Diversity*.

Secondly, it recognised that in many parts of the city community infrastructure was undeveloped while the skills and capacities of individual community actors were often weak. The purpose of the *Capacity Building Programme* was to address these deficits, particularly since community sustainability is crucially dependent on the quality of human resources.

Thirdly, economic development was prioritised because of the need for a competitive city in the face of economic change. Risk analysis identified children as the most vulnerable social group within the city and projects were encouraged that would meet their needs in innovative ways.

Finally, the Partnership Board launched a *Small Grants Programme* designed to achieve a city-wide reach and promote visibility of the PEACE Programme.

The key to the strategy lay in offering Belfast's citizens the opportunity and calling on them to accept the responsibility of remaking a city scarred by a quarter of a century of bitter antagonisms and the many costs of economic change. The Partnership saw its role as adding value to other efforts for social regeneration and reconciliation by working along side other agencies while still being faithful to its special mission under the Peace and Reconciliation Programme.

Thus, it committed itself to a programme that attempted to be distinctive in grappling with the particular problems of Belfast and complemented other efforts



to renew the city and tackle disadvantage. In this way, it hoped to make its specific contribution to creating something better for the next generation.

In the selection of animators to delivering the programmes throughout Belfast, Belfast European Partnership Board challenged organisations to be innovative and risk-taking in creating consortia. As envisaged, the consortia and their approved action plans are either to deliver programmes city-wide within a distinctive part or parts of the city – North, South, East and West Belfast. In addition, a model of providing development support to the consortia was being developed through a twin track approach. Firstly, recruitment of coaching support and secondly, a modular action-learning course to be delivered and accredited through a third level educational institute. This approach has incorporated the outcomes of a consultation undertaken with the consortia.

### **Monitoring the Progress of Allocations**

As a first step in monitoring its allocations, the partnership developed an allocation template to reflect its partnership mission. The template was designed to demonstrate an “ideal” allocation to each city ward if certain targeting criteria were fully met. These criteria related to:

- demography (the percentage of the city population and the percentage of the city’s dependent population in the ward);
- deprivation (deprivation as measured by the ward’s share of the city’s most deprived enumeration districts plus the ward’s share of city’s long-term unemployment), and;
- experience of political violence (measured by the ward’s share of Troubles-associated deaths within the city).

These criteria each contributed 40%, 40% and 20% respectively to the overall allocation template. The Board therefore published the target allocations it sought to achieve. In addition, following an in-depth analysis of Tranche 1, a number of shortfalls were identified at both local government electoral ward level



and at quadrant level. These funding deficiencies occurred in both communities and can be accounted for in terms of a lower level of community mobilisation, and persistent areas of high deprivation. The Board decided to compensate for these deficiencies by ring-fencing additional resources to target the building of community capacity and mobilisation. As a result, the Partnership was able to set target allocations for Tranche 2 which were agreed in advance with key stakeholders on the Board.

**Project-Example:** Capacity Building Programme

**Project name:** New Belfast Community Arts Initiative

BEPB awarded this programme £196,982 as part of its capacity building initiative. These funds supported the employment of a programme co-ordinator, administrator, carnival artist, public artist, community drama worker and a creative writer, backed up by 24 shadow placements and programme costs over 18 months. The promoter proposed a programme of capacity building using community arts as a medium and was based around four major artwork projects as follows:

- Belfast Wheel: a mosaic celebrating cultural diversity;
- Hall of Fame: a celebration of Belfast heroes and heroines;
- Strangers Next Door: attitudes and images on the peace-line; and
- Football Mad: a large-scale community play about football loyalties in Belfast.

By creating opportunities for participation in these artworks through the member organisations of the consortium and associated training courses, workshops and shadow scheme, the promoter projects the following outcomes:

- to challenge traditional divisions and rivalries between communities through collaborative artwork;
- initiate and deliver high quality training built around practical arts projects to harness, develop and direct local skills;
- address social, political and economic problems at community level; and



- build on good work done to date and develop structures for the sharing of skills, resources and ideas across the city.

Arts organisations from north, south east and west Belfast came together on a cross-community basis under this initiative.





## 5.8 PEACE 1 Case Study 2: ADM/CPA

Prior to PEACE 1 Area Development Management Ltd. (ADM) had experience in the delivery of Global Grants on behalf of the European Union through the Local Development Programme whilst the Combat Poverty Agency (CPA) had developed a track record over many years in the prevention and elimination of poverty and other forms of social exclusion. Both organisations were approached to jointly implement twelve Measures of the PEACE 1 Programme.

A fifteen member Joint Management Committee (JMC) was established to oversee the implementation of the Programme in Autumn 1995. Members were nominated by both organisations and included five representatives respectively from the Border Counties and Northern Ireland. Applications were considered by a General Appraisal Committee drawn from the JMC and latterly from the Advisory Committees (see below). This Committee, and its constituent sub-committees, made recommendations to the JMC in a system which ensured that the broadest possible spectrum of opinion and expertise was harnessed in decision-making.

Prior to actual project assessments however, the JMC entered into a period of consultation with a broad section of interests across the region involving seminars with the social partners, statutory agencies and the voluntary/community sector. These discussions covered implementation, the types of projects to be funded, who needed to be consulted and how to ensure that named beneficiaries of the Programme were the main beneficiaries of funding. In addition to the practical benefits of this consultation for the implementation of the Programme, perhaps more importantly it marked the development of strong working relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders.

Given that neither ADM or CPA were “indigenous” to the area, the “naturalisation” of the Programme in the Southern Border Counties was a key



early task. To this end, premises were acquired in Monaghan to house the Programme by February 1996 and the infrastructure was further developed in the following year by the acquisition of additional premises in Sligo and Letterkenny. ADM/CPA's local profile was greatly strengthened by employing a team of development staff from the region; ensuring that key personnel had first-hand experience of the issues which the Programme was seeking to address and a familiarity with local systems, structures and cultures.

The key feature of the programming has been pro-active enablement and support of project promoters; the Joint Management Committee developed a strong focus at an early stage on local delivery and local development and where larger authorities have been involved, key structures have been put in place to ensure local involvement. Identifying both geographic and issue based gaps, a variety of strategies were put in place to support the work of less developed organisations and the flexible approach adopted led to a strong finish after a slow start to the delivery of funds.

The low capacity of project promoters was compounded by weak infrastructural support in the Border counties. Remedial measures were undertaken to recruit and train a body of locally resident community facilitators in Cavan, Monaghan and Louth who were to play a key role in resourcing not only PEACE 1, but also other agencies such as the International Fund for Ireland and FAS as well as other EU programmes including LEADER. These facilitators were important in assisting in the development of applications which were slow to emerge from the community, particularly in key target communities such as victims and ex-prisoners. The cadre of facilitators were backed up by outreach activities undertaken by the Development Team who undertook a programme of "guidance days", one to one consultations and a series of events held in conjunction with other agencies such as County Enterprise Boards and County Councils.



Another key element to the successful delivery of programming in the Southern Border Counties has been the development of the role of Local Advisory Committees, one dealing with Economic Development issues, the other with Community Development/Human Resource issues. Membership was drawn from local community groups, statutory agencies and local authorities. These Committees significantly strengthened the work of the Joint Management Committee by identifying gaps, considering models of good practice and informing the approaches to the work.

Between July 1996 and November 1997, 774 projects were funded, totalling nearly IR£20 million. These included 302 community projects, 102 youth projects and 74 women's projects. A large proportion of grants (approximately 40%) made in Phase 1 of PEACE 1 were project development grants of IR£3,000. ADM/CPA considered these to be an essential part of developing a momentum for further project development in an area of acknowledged low capacity. In Phase 2, there was a continued facility for small and localised projects but the emphasis changed towards a more strategic approach.

One clear example of this change in emphasis was in the area of tourism. As a strategic support to localised initiatives already funded, the JMC supported an a marketing infrastructure project. This put in place marketing executives operating in each county to promote the entire range of tourism destinations, activities and facilities and to put in place at county level, an appropriate marketing strategy in consultation with the relevant public, private and voluntary interests. The initiative also supported marketing materials and allowed the counties to establish a regular presence at trade shows.

Likewise a revolving loan fund was set up in each county to provide credit services to marginalised people who would not be eligible for business funding from mainstream financial institutions. A package of support was designed to



back up the loans including business mentors and management teams which were drawn from a variety of backgrounds

The success and popularity of the ADM/CPA's programming can be seen in the level of subscription towards the end of the Programme with over twenty applications continuing to arrive daily in the first quarter of 1999 and over 330 applications during April 1999 alone. This allowed the JMC to bid successfully for slippage funding and in the event received an additional IR£3.7 million from under-spend elsewhere in the Programme.







## 5.9 Chapter Summary

- PEACE 1 represented a substantial additional investment from the EU (€300 million in the first instance) with two strategic objectives: to promote the social inclusion of those at the margins of economic and social life, and; to exploit the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and stimulate social and economic regeneration.
- The strategic objectives were to be realised via six strategic themes: employment; urban regeneration; rural regeneration; social inclusion; cross-border development, and; productive investment and industrial development. In an additional measure, 26 district partnerships were created to develop area strategies for peace-building and reconciliation;
- Over 50 per cent of total funding was taken up by social inclusion, productive investment and partnership activity and a further 30 per cent by employment and urban and rural regeneration;
- PEACE 1 created new and innovative delivery bodies in both the district partnerships and the intermediary funding bodies;
- Over 70 per cent of project promoters claimed measurable economic impact from their activities, estimated by 1999 at 3,800 jobs and 185 new businesses. All claimed to have had a social inclusion effect. Three quarters claimed to operate as cross-community projects although the evidence of the impact on community relations is unclear.



## 6. PEACE 2

### 6.1 Introduction

At the Berlin Council in March 1999 the Heads of State and Government agreed a political package (known as "Agenda 2000") on the financial allocation of €260,000 million to structural interventions in favour of European Union regions for the period 2000-2006. In June 1999, the Council of the European Union adopted a series of EC Regulations which formalised this political agreement into European law. To mark the European Union's continuing support to the Belfast Agreement, the Berlin Council meeting decided that the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation would be continued for a further five years (2000-2004) with an amount of €500 million, of which €100 million would be allocated to the Southern Border Counties. The new PEACE Programme, to be known as PEACE 2 was "promoted" within European structures to the status of a mainstream programme. While PEACE 1, had been in the form of a Community Initiative, PEACE 2 was to be integrated as an Objective 1 Programme within the Community Support Frameworks (CSF) of both Northern Ireland and Ireland and to take its place as one of the two Operational Programmes for Northern Ireland (the other being the Building Sustainable Prosperity Programme) and one of the seven Operational Programmes in the Republic.

Regions within Member States are categorised into one of three Objectives. Objective 1 receives the highest priority, as it is targeted on the poorest regions in the Union. To qualify as Objective 1, a region must have had a per-capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of less than 75% of the EU average for the three years prior to the Berlin Council. Northern Ireland exceeded this 75% threshold for the period in question but was able to avail of newly introduced transitional arrangements that provides former Objective 1 regions, such as Northern Ireland,



with access to Objective 1 funding but on a gradually reducing basis over the period to 2006.

As a result Northern Ireland secured €890.5 million for its Transitional Objective 1 Programme. In the South, the Border, Midland and Western (BMW) Regions qualified for Objective 1 status for the full period to 2006, while the Southern and Eastern Region will be in a transitional regime for Objective 1 up to 2005. It attracts support from all four Structural Funds (European Social Fund, European Regional Development Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance) and around 70% of the total EU Structural Funds is allocated to Objective 1 Programmes. Ireland will thus receive €3,200 million under seven Operational Programmes (one being PEACE 2). In addition to the mainstream Structural Funds Programmes, the new EC Regulations provide for four Community Initiatives to be set up in the European regions:

- INTERREG (ERDF) : cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation ;
- URBAN (ERDF) : regeneration of urban areas in crisis ;
- EQUAL (ESF) : fighting against discrimination and inequality in access to work;
- LEADER (EAGGF-Guidance): rural development.

These four Community Initiatives are present in the form of Programmes amounting to approximately €113 million in Northern Ireland, and €176 million in the Republic.



## 6.2 Consultation Process

Fundamental to the development of the CSF and the Operational Programmes was the consultation process which was undertaken in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland.

### Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, a consultation exercise was launched in August 1998 inviting views from interested organisations and individuals on the priorities which should be addressed by the Plan and the types of activities which should be funded. Written responses to this consultation process provided an important input into the development of the Structural Funds Plan.

Following the conclusions of the Berlin Summit, in March 1999, and the announcement of the overall package for Northern Ireland, a more substantive and carefully targeted consultation was undertaken with local partners to identify detailed proposals on how best to use the resources to maximise the impact on the economy and society. This included two Consultation Conferences in May and September 1999 which brought together over 300 delegates from a wide range of local interests and also included participants from Southern Ireland.

A critical element of the consultation process for PEACE 2 was the input from the new Northern Ireland Assembly (which did not exist during the development of PEACE 1). Two briefing seminars were organised for Members of the Assembly in May and September 1999. Consultations with the Assembly Parties were also continued by a series of meetings. A Core Consultative Group of key economic and social partner bodies was established to facilitate ongoing consultation. The views of the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate) were also represented on the Group by the participation of their advisers. The work of the Core Group was complemented by a series of bilateral discussions, with social partner organisations and with Local Government representatives. In



November 1999, the Core Group was replaced by the EU Programmes Development Committee which brought together Assembly Parties, representatives of local authorities, key economic and social partners into one forum. A further round of written consultation was undertaken in February 2000 on the consensus position reached on the Structural Funds Plan.

The EU Programmes Development Committee was subsequently replaced by the “Interim Community Support Framework Monitoring Committee (ICSFMC) which enabled regional and local interests to be kept informed of the negotiations with the European Commission on the CSF and the Operational Programmes. The Committee included Departments involved in spending proposals, the Northern Ireland Assembly parties, District Councils, social and economic partners and other relevant local interests as well as representatives from the European Commission in an advisory capacity. This ICSFMC was replaced by the Community Support Framework Monitoring Committee following formal adoption of the CSF. The CSF Monitoring Committee continued to take a broad interpretation of the Operational Programmes.

### **Republic of Ireland**

The consultation on the PEACE 2 in Northern Ireland was complemented by a similar process in the Border Counties of Ireland. The process was led by the Department of Finance under the aegis of consultation in relation to the preparation of the National Development Plan for Ireland. Submissions on the contents of the OP were invited from a wide range of players involved in PEACE 1 at project promotion, implementation, sectoral, social partnership, local and central Government levels. With the agreement of the authorities in Northern Ireland, the consultation process included participation from a wide range of interests in the Border Region and at central and local Government level.

The contents of the submissions received formed the basis for a conference and a series of workshops held in Monaghan in September 1999. Just under 300



people participated in this Conference and all sectors were represented. This included elected representatives North and South, social partners, community and voluntary groups, representation from groups active in PEACE 1, cross-border networks, and representatives of local and central Government. The Irish Government adopted the priorities agreed at this Conference which outlined funding and delivery mechanisms in March 2000.





### 6.3 Aims and Objectives of PEACE 2

The outcome of the consultation process was an overall strategic aim:

*“... to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation”.*

This had already been the overall strategic aim of PEACE 1, but PEACE 2 was to develop the focus in terms of peace-building by developing specific objectives which sought to create a strategic linkage between the necessity of promoting peace and the desirability of addressing economic and social under-development and distortion. The strategic objectives of the PEACE 2 Programme are

1. Addressing the Legacy of the Conflict, i.e. the Programme will address specific problems generated by the conflict in order to assist the return to a normal peaceful and stable society.
2. Taking Opportunities Arising from Peace, i.e. to encourage actions which have a stake in peace and which actively help promote a stable and normal society where opportunities for development can be grasped.

In light of the above specific objectives, the Programme Priorities were set as:

- Economic Renewal;
- Social Integration, Inclusion and Reconciliation;
- Locally-based Regeneration and Development Strategies;
- Outward and Forward Looking Region; and
- Cross-border Co-operation.

The relative importance placed on each of these Priority themes is shown in the table below:



<b>Priority</b>	<b>Government Departments</b>	<b>Locally Based Delivery</b>	<b>IFBs</b>	<b>SEUPB</b>	<b>Total</b>
Economic Renewal	24.4%		7.7%		32.1%
Social Integration, Inclusion and Reconciliation	7.7%		17.0%		24.7%
Locally based Regeneration and Development Strategies		19.4%			19.4%
Outward and Forward Looking Region	4.7%	0.4%		0.1%	5.2%
Cross Border Co-operation	2.4%		9.3%	3.4%	15.1%
Technical Assistance				3.5%	3.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>39.2%</b>	<b>19.8%</b>	<b>34.0%</b>	<b>7.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Fig. 30: PEACE 2 Allocation by Delivery Mechanism<sup>55</sup>

The hierarchy of objectives shown in the diagram overleaf.

<sup>55</sup> *Operational Programme*, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation In Northern Ireland And The Border Counties Of Ireland 2000-2004, n.d.






Fig. 31: PEACE 2 Hierarchy of Objectives



The Operational Programme states that the overall aim of the Programme can be achieved by two complementary approaches:

- by supporting the creation of inclusive, bottom-up and cross-border structures for the PEACE Programme itself; and
- through the actions and projects supported by the Programme.

The Operational Programme shows a clear development of thinking based on the lessons of PEACE 1 and states:

*“Irrespective of whether they are region-wide or locally based, originating from grass root or higher levels, cross-community or single identity, projects financed under the PEACE Programme should facilitate in one way or another co-operation or joint action between different communities and parts of the community or build cohesion and confidence within a community with the perspective that this is a first step in breaking down community divisions.”<sup>56</sup>*

All applicants to the programme are required to show how their projects address the two strategic objectives, or Distinctiveness Criteria, in terms of:

- Areas most affected by the conflict (e.g. high levels of deprivation, significant community division, high levels of conflict related violence)
- Sectors which have suffered delayed development or distortion as a result of the conflict (e.g., business development, ICT, entrepreneurship, business development, promotion to attract visitors and/or inward investment etc.)

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<sup>56</sup> Programme for Peace and Reconciliation In Northern Ireland And The Border Counties Of Ireland 2000-2004, *Op. cit.*



- Groups or communities most affected by the conflict (victims/survivors, ex-prisoners, displaced persons, former members of security services, Young people, women, older workers and others).

In addition to the overall aim, the Distinctiveness Criteria and the Measure-based Priorities, applicants must show a clear linkage between their project and the Horizontal Principles established for the Community Support Framework overall.

These principles are:

- Accountability
- Balanced Intervention/Equal OpportunitiesNew Targeting Social NeedEconomic and Social sustainabilityPartnershipLocally based decision makingTransparency/PublicityCo-ordinationEnvironmental sustainability



## 6.4 Delivery Structure

A number of changes were made to the delivery structures of PEACE 1 for PEACE 2, some of which are related to the “promotion” of the Programme from Community Initiative to Transitional Objective 1 Programme and others related to the lessons emerging from PEACE 1.

Whilst the number of delivery mechanisms has actually increased from forty-two in PEACE 1 to fifty-six in PEACE 2, the creation of the Special European Programmes Body is the most obvious change to the delivery structures resulting in an increased degree of centralisation at the top end of the Programme.

### Special EU Programmes Body

The Special EU Programmes Body, as Managing Authority is responsible for “the efficiency and correctness of management and implementation of the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (2000-2004) <sup>57</sup>”.

The SEUPB liaises with the European Commission and the Monitoring Committee for the Programme and seeks the advice of the Monitoring Committee on the nature of the management arrangements to be used in managing and implementing the Programme. As Managing Authority, SEUPB is required to:

- set up a system to gather and monitor financial and statistical information;
- commission from an independent assessor the mid-term and ex-post evaluations;
- negotiate the Programme Complement for approval by the Monitoring Committee for submission to the European Commission;
- hold monitoring information on the progress of each Measure and collate the Annual Implementation Report for approval by the Monitoring Committee;

<sup>57</sup> *Draft Operating Manual*, Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 2000-2004, SEUPB, May 2003



- co-ordinate and examine expenditure reports from Implementing Bodies; and
- submit certified expenditure declarations to the Paying Authority.

The SEUPB has established a Central Payment Unit (CPU). Through its administration of the CPU, the SEUPB:

- processes approved claims from Implementing Bodies;
- requests grant from Accountable Departments to pay projects; and
- provides an EU expenditure declaration (via Monitoring Database) to the Paying Authority who certifies the payment claim to the EU Commission for drawdown.

The SEUPB remains responsible at all times for the management of the Programme and also chairs the Monitoring Committee which supervises the Programme. The role of the SEUPB has brought clear benefits for the Programme overall, particularly in terms of:

- Co-ordination of action between Implementing Bodies;
- Consistency of approach between Local Strategy Partnerships, County-based Task Forces, IFBs and Government Departments; and
- Transparency of operation with a far greater availability of indicators on progress than was the case during PEACE 1.

### **Monitoring Committee**

In addition to SEUPB, the Monitoring Committee also includes representation from Departments of Finance, the Paying Authorities, business, trade unions, the agriculture, rural development, fisheries sector, the community and voluntary sector.

The membership of the Monitoring Committee is made up of equal representation from both jurisdictions and has permanent advisors from the European Commission. The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the



Department of Trade and Industry (UK) (DTI UK) and the Implementing Bodies has observer status on the Committee.

The Monitoring Committee meets a minimum of twice annually and must satisfy itself as to the effectiveness and quality of the implementation of assistance for all Structural Funds. To that end, it is required to:

- confirm or adjust the Programme Complement, including the physical and financial indicators to be used to monitor the assistance;
- periodically review progress made towards achieving the specific objective of the Programme;
- examine the results of implementation, particularly the achievement of the targets set for the different Measures and the mid-term evaluation;
- consider and approve the Annual and Final Implementation Reports before they are sent to the European Commission;
- propose to the Managing Authority adjustments or review of the Programme and Programme Complement.
- ensure that computer systems are set up to gather reliable financial and statistical information on implementation. The systems hold records and provide common agenda items.

The Monitoring Committee is assisted by a number of working groups, to cover such topics as Human Resource Development, Communication, the Environment, the Information Society, Horizontal Principals, Monitoring and Evaluation, PEACE Distinctiveness and Equality and Social Need.

### **Government Departments**

In common with other European Structural Funds Programme, Government Departments in both Northern Ireland and the Republic were given a key role in implementing parts of the PEACE 2 Programme. In addition, the enhanced



levels of local control through the Assembly in Northern Ireland were noted in the Operational Programme which also spoke in exalted terms regarding the capacity of Government Departments regarding the effective and efficient use of substantial public resources.

### **Intermediary Funding Bodies**

With the success of the role of IFBs in PEACE 1 widely acknowledged, the implementation of PEACE 2 continued to involve Intermediary Funding Bodies as a key delivery mechanism. However, developing on from the experience of PEACE 1 where IFBs were simply allocated a global grant according to their responsibilities under each Measure, in PEACE 2 IFBs seeking to deliver elements of the Programme were required to undergo an open tendering procedure on both sides of the Border to deliver their preferred Measure.

### **Locally-based Delivery Mechanisms**

These are mainly responsible for overseeing the delivery of projects and actions under Priority 3 of the Programme “Locally Based Regeneration and Development Strategies”. Separate structures operate on either side of the border as follows:

#### ***Local Strategy Partnerships (Northern Ireland)***

In Northern Ireland the working of District Partnerships under PEACE 1 was acknowledged as having been a valuable experience both for those involved and the local communities concerned, with many individuals, organisations and sectors contributing to local participation in decision making.

However, two influences on policy were to change the framework for District Partnerships in PEACE 2. The first was a desire on the part of the Assembly and local authorities to enhance the role of District Councils within the Partnership structures, which had been lessened by the high levels of participation from community voluntary sector representatives. In addition, there was an impetus to



further develop the social partnership model and to use the Partnership structure within PEACE programming as a vehicle to develop a more integrated and sustainable approach to planning and managing the use of resources generally within District Council areas.

Reflective of these two factors, the relative representation of sectors within the partnerships was changed, and an equal bi-partite rather than a tri-partite structure evolved as follows:

- Local Government and the main statutory agencies operating at a local level; and
- Social Partners: private sector; trade unions; community and voluntary sectors; agriculture and rural development sector.

The new Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) have enjoyed greater autonomy in their decision making and the role played by the Northern Ireland Partnership Board in approving action plans in advance of the Managing Authority has been subsumed into SEUPB directly. LSPs, in common with the other groups of Implementing Bodies, are now overseen directly by the Managing Authority and the Monitoring Committee without an intermediary and the support role is played likewise by SEUPB. Each sector is responsible for the nomination process for its membership.

Each LSP has been required to develop an Interim Integrated Strategy for its own area to cover the disbursement of Priority 3 funding and to develop this further into an Integrated Local Strategy encompassing wider issues.

### ***County Council-led Task Forces (Border Region):***

In the Border Region, the same type of local delivery mechanism is used as was the case under PEACE 1, namely County Council-led Task Forces (CCTF). Each Task Force is a sub-committee of the County Development Board and is





structured in a similar quadripartite fashion with the participation of state agencies, local development bodies, social partners and local government.

Therefore, the Task Forces consist of elected representatives, social partners, local development agencies engaged in the delivery of similar type operations, ADM/CPA, and council officials. Functions are largely similar to those executed under PEACE 1. Each Task Force is required to develop operational procedures in line with the Programme and the Programme Complement.





## 6.5 Application Process

A final major change in the delivery structure for PEACE 2 has been the centralisation and computerisation of the application process.

In contrast to PEACE 1 where each Implementing Body was responsible for the design of its own application form based on an agreed Measure-based template, the application process to PEACE 2 has been designed to allow the SEUPB to deliver its central monitoring function for the programme as a whole.

The system has been based around a two-part form. All applicants have been required to submit a Part A form on-line through the [www.eu-grants.org](http://www.eu-grants.org) website administered directly through the SEUPB. The Part A form allows the collection of basic information on the application, its broad aims and how it impacts on the Horizontal Principles of the Programme.

A more substantive Part B form which covers the contribution of the project to the Distinctiveness Criteria, detailed aims, objectives and monitoring indices, as well as budget requested, etc., is submitted directly to the Implementing Body of the Measure concerned. The Part B form is Measure-based, but holds a number of common sections.

Implementing Bodies are required to create and administer Selection Panels which score projects against a centrally established scoring mechanism.



## 6.6 Progress to-date

At the time of writing, by April 2003, all Measures are fully operational and the Programme continues to receive a large number of applications. To-date, there have been 4,721 applications overall. Nearly 1,440 projects have been approved for funding with a value of €300 million or 42% of the total value of the Programme<sup>58</sup>. The table below shows the overall picture in terms of allocation, commitment of funds and spend to date.

€					
Priority	1	2	3	4	5
<b>Total Budget</b>	217,736,059	158,908,160	124,424,550	33,461,750	105,920,000
<b>C'tted to date</b>	99,782,895	71,745,567	21,524,419	9,892,005	39,914,351
<b>% Committed</b>	46	45	17	30,	38
<b>Spend to date</b>	15,776,797	21,502,666	1,377,385	1,859,229	3,729,296
<b>% Spend</b>	7	14	1	6	4

Fig. 32: Progress summary by Priority, April 2003

Recent developments in the management of the Programme have included the following:

- Shortening of the application form: A number of amendments have been made recently to shorten the application form;
- Introduction of a Small Grants form: This will be used to process applications under a £10,000 threshold;
- ESF Audit minimisation: The requirements have been changed to ensure that only a small number of projects will now require full ESF audit;
- ESF beneficiary monitoring: This is currently being reviewed with a view to simplification;

<sup>58</sup> Special EU Programmes Body (April 2003) *Peace II Progress Report to Programme Management Committee*



- Monitoring of processing applications: This currently stands at seventy nine days on average;
- Monitoring of claims by the CPU: 99% of the 1,521 claims made to date have been made within the target ten working days; and
- Processing of claims by implementing bodies: All Implementing Bodies have been asked to submit monitoring returns on the time taken to process claims.





## 6.7 PEACE 2 Case Study 1: County Monaghan PEACE 2 Task Force

As stated above, the County Council-led Task Forces in the Border Region, are largely the same type of local delivery mechanism will be used as under PEACE 1, and functions are also largely similar. Under PEACE 2, each Task Force is a sub-committee of its local County Development Board (CDB). Created as part of the local government reforms of 1999/2000, the County Development Board seeks to integrate services at a local level.

The structure of the Task Force follows the structure laid out by the Department of the Environment and Local Government. Membership of Monaghan Task Force mirrors the four sectors represented on the County Development Board. The County Manager acts as the Cathaoirleach (Chair), and the Director of Community and Enterprise acts as Secretary to the Task Force. ADM/CPA, the Implementing Body responsible for much of the rest of the PEACE Programme in Co Monaghan, is also represented on the Task Force to ensure complementarity between the two Implementing Bodies.

Each CDB sector was asked to nominate representatives onto the Task Force. It was agreed by the Board that organisations could send a delegate to the Task Force other than their CDB delegate. In the State Agency Pillar, interest was high and more organisations were keen to participating on the Task Force than there were places available. The organisations involved agreed to rotate membership between them, with each organisation serving for two years on the Task Force, and the remainder of the time on the Assessment Committee.

The Task Force met for the first time on 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2002 and set for itself the following objectives:

- 100% spend on supported projects within the life of the PEACE 2 Programme;



- Equitable distribution of funds around the county;
- Targeting areas of the county with high populations of minority communities, displaced people; and
- Targeting areas bearing physical reminders of the county's proximity to the Border and of the Troubles.

Likewise, the Task Force has defined for itself the following roles:

- The Task Force will receive applications, process and take decisions on the provision of funds to projects and other actions on the basis of well defined criteria related to the project selection criteria for the Programme;
- As an active project sponsor, the Task Force will help to shape policy and develop and support delivery, including actions in association with other Implementing Bodies;
- The Task Force will be responsible for collecting, on a regular basis, the information on project necessary for monitoring and evaluation purposes; and
- Finally, the Task Force will offer help to promoters of single identity projects in achieving the adequate level of cross-community engagements.

Building on the role and experience generated through County Based Task Forces under PEACE 1, the role of the PEACE 2 Task Forces in the southern Border Counties is to deliver the following Measures within the programme:

### **Measure 3.3: Building Better Communities**

This Measure focuses on community regeneration, particularly in urban housing estates where the majority of displaced people live. The Measure seeks to encourage revitalisation in areas with displaced communities and other areas targeted by the Operational Programme by encouraging the adoption of integrated approaches that provide partnership-based strategic solutions.



### **Measure 3.4: Improving our Rural Communities**

The Measure supports local communities to take effective action to harness economic opportunities and overcome isolation. This Measure supports, maintains and reinforces a viable social fabric in rural areas. It supports village and rural regeneration initiatives that integrate social, economic and environmental strategies. In addition, by tackling local environmental issues and promoting tourism-related initiatives, opportunities for economic, social and physical regeneration will be realised. By improving the attractiveness of the built environment and communities, rural areas will be made better places to live. Support is also provided for locally based tourist and related activities that provide sustainable development in the Border Region.

### **Measure 4.2: Marketing the Region as a Tourism Destination**

The above Measure, originally a separate Measure falling under Task Force responsibility, has been incorporated into the two Priority 3 measures. The funding under 4.2, which equates to 20% of the total budget under the three Task Force-led measures, has been re-allocated under 3.3 and 3.4 and 20% of funding allocated under 3.3 and 3.4 has been set aside for tourism projects.

In summary therefore, the Task Force elements of the PEACE 2 Programme are concerned mainly with the physical improvement of the towns and villages which have suffered most as a result of the conflict, the rationale being to attract businesses and residents back to the communities along the border.

The breakdown of funds per Measure for 2002 was as follows:

3.3	Building Better Communities	€405,000
3.4	Improving our Rural Communities	€495,000



In the cases of both these Measures, the EU funding component is drawn from ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) and therefore the regulations laid down in the ERDF Manual apply.

In line with its obligations under the Operational Programme, the Monaghan Task Force has drawn up a detailed Implementation Plan providing structural linkage between the aims of the PEACE 2 Programme and the strategy of the County Development Board. In this regard, the Task Force has been aided by the audit of baseline data which has been prepared for the County under the County development strategy reform process. In all Southern Border Counties, aspects of the baseline audit have served as indicators for the allocation of resources by Task Forces. Similarly, the Task Forces are quick to acknowledge the body of work undertaken through both the Area Partnership and the LEADER Programmes in recent years which have done much to prepare the ground for the injection of PEACE funding.

Monaghan County Council undertook to provide the administrative staff to the Task Force. However, in order to obtain full benefit of the PEACE 2 Programme to the County and to ensure that marginalised groups were not at a disadvantage in applying under the PEACE 2 Measures, the Task Force saw a clear role for a Development Officer. A strategic problem for the County is the low level of capacity in an area with 25% illiteracy and where 40% of the population would have difficulty completing basic forms. On this basis, the Task Force appointed a Development Officer in March 2003 with a remit to bring forward applications from the community.

Perhaps the most significant area of difficulty faced by the Task Force has been the area of finance and draw-down of its allocation. An allocation of €900,000 for 2002 was made to County Monaghan. This equates to 20% of the total funding allocated to the six Task Forces, and was allocated on the basis of the criteria used for PEACE 1, which included levels of unemployment and deprivation, and





length of border. The Department of the Environment and Local Government, which is responsible for providing the 25% of tax revenues to match the 75% of ERDF, allocates its budgets on an annual basis. In 2002, the Task Force did not receive its €900,000 funding allocation for the year until 22<sup>nd</sup> March and was required to spend this allocation by the end of the year. For 2003, the projected allocation of €2,000,000 failed to materialise due to budgetary cutbacks and the Task Force was advised in late April that an allocation of only €700,000 would be made.

This situation has made it very difficult for the Task Force to effectively plan its operations and to allocate resources. Likewise, the Task Force is likely to face difficulties in meeting its obligations under the EU Commission's N+2 Rule which requires that all monies must be allocated to projects before December 31<sup>st</sup> 2004, and all monies must be spent and drawn down within two further years. For project promoters, who by the nature of the Measures are usually delivering capital projects, these problems with allocation and drawdown are inevitably compounded by the usual vagaries of capital project development such as planning permission, cost over-runs and inflationary pressures on building projects. This situation for promoters is only mitigated by the ability of the Task Force to fund projects 100% up to a maximum of €200,000.

In spite of the difficulties faced, Task Force staff remain enthusiastic about what can be achieved with the strategic application of limited amounts of capital funding in rural areas and villages. A selection of funded projects to date can be seen in the table below.



Applicant	Project	Measure	Amount €
Monaghan County Council	Paving at Fermanagh St, Clones	3.3	115,000
Monaghan County Council	Footway at Clontibret	3.4	108,000
Monaghan Tourism	Salary & associated costs for Marketing Officer to end 2005	3.3	173,275
Monaghan Tourism	Marketing budget for 3 year programme	3.4	206,351
Castleblayney Arts & Community Centre	Provision of a restaurant area in the proposed new complex	3.3	150,000
Corduff/ Raferagh Development Assoc.	Extension to Community Centre	3.4	205,000
Ardaghey Development Assoc.	Extension to Community Centre	3.4	115,159

Fig 33: Project selection, Monaghan County Council-led Task Force

The direct impact of such work in terms of peace and reconciliation is harder to quantify. There is the expectation that capital refurbishments and promotional activity will encourage tourism from the North and thereby encourage contact and exchange. Likewise it has been suggested that such projects will bring benefits in terms of opening up the communities of Monaghan to their neighbours on the other side of the border.



## 6.8 PEACE 2 Case Study 2: Limavady Area Partnership

The establishment of Limavady Area Partnership (LAP) was overseen by a transition team drawn from a variety of local organisations including Limavady Borough Council, Limavady District Partnership, representatives of women's and youth groups in the area and the Roe Valley Leader group. After a stringent selection process undertaken with advice and guidance from Concordia, the LAP was formed comprising:

- 6 Elected Members of Limavady Borough Council
- 1 Officer of Limavady Borough Council
- 7 Statutory Sector representatives
- 6 Community/Voluntary Sector representatives
- 3 Agricultural and Rural development Sector representatives
- 2 Trade Union sector representatives
- 3 Business Sector representatives

All members have made a formal undertaking as part of their development to abide by the partnership ethos and a voluntary code conduct. Its mission was defined as follows:

*Limavady Area Partnership seeks to enable the citizens of the Borough to participate more actively in their own social, economic and cultural development and in that of their communities, especially the most excluded:*

- *By building trust*
- *By respecting diversity*
- *By overcoming barriers*
- *By developing partnerships*



Broad aims of the Partnership are defined as follows:

- To reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and promote reconciliation;
- To be proactive in reaching areas and communities of lower capacity;
- To influence and lobby the statutory sector in relation to identified local needs;
- To build upon local expertise, knowledge and experience of existing groups in the area, including those established and developed through the work done during PEACE 1; and
- To leave a legacy of real and lasting partnership among the stakeholders involved in the LSP.

The key instrument in the fulfilment of its role under PEACE 2 and beyond is the Integrated Local Strategy (ILS). Whilst the ILS has been drawn together as a result of the intervention of EU structural funding through PEACE 2, its remit extends well beyond the delivery of PEACE 2 funding. Unlike their counterparts in the Southern Border Counties, LSPs have not benefited from the developed role of the equivalent to a County Development Board-type structure at District Council level, and therefore the process of drawing together an integrated and cross-sectoral vision beyond PEACE funding breaks new ground. Specifically, this process cuts across the cross-sectoral fissures existing in every Council area across Northern Ireland between Councils and the community sector, between the community sector and statutory agencies, between statutory and Council and so on. Whilst such the formulation of such a document may not exceed the sum of its parts, the positive development represented in the process outputs should not be underestimated.

A key feature of the operation of LAP is its close working relationship with the Borough Council's Economic Development Department. Whilst established as an independent entity, LAP remains housed in Council offices in Limavady, draws on the finance department and administrative support of Council and the



Partnership Manager is line managed by the Economic Development Officer. In this respect, LAP is unusual since most of the Partnerships in other districts have established operations which are independent from Council with the aim of ensuring a greater degree of autonomy. This close working relationship is reflected in the £200,000 committed through the Council's Economic Development Department to the ILS for a programme of small grants aimed at stimulating rural development. The close structure benefits the two-way flow of information, and care has been taken to ensure complementarity between the LAP's strategy and the Local Economic Development Plan which focuses on business start-up, business mentoring and support services, the promotion of inward investment and town centres management and modernisation.

Likewise, LAP has also benefited from the experience of the LEADER+ programme operating through its own partnership - Roe Valley Rural Development - based in the Borough. Elected Members of Council and staff are represented on both partnerships and a joint Council-based secretariat services both partnerships thereby reducing the likelihood of duplication. The LEADER+ strategy focuses on support for the development of SMEs in rural areas

In the delivery of the ILS, LAP faces a number of challenges, largely as a result of the socio-economic make-up of the Borough.

Low capacity exists to the extent that project promoters frequently cannot complete PEACE 2 application forms without significant support and overall the quality of applications (rather than projects) has been very low. The Council has countered this by building in assistance to applicants through a newly-created staff position of Community Development and Funding Support Officer. Without this post being available, LAP would have had difficulty in implementing SEUPB guidance on the separation of the development and appraisal role within staff teams. The lack of development support leads to an apathy compounded in



some parts of the Borough by a perception that funding has been ring-fenced by vested interests.

The isolation of the Borough and its rural areas, inhibits the cross-fertilisation of ideas between groups and the exchange of good practice which can more readily be found in urban areas. Likewise, there exists social division between the urban areas of the Borough, Limavady town and Dungiven, and the rural districts.

The momentum towards development and reconciliation is hard to sustain when the bulk of the work falls upon very few shoulders. The view was expressed that the Borough had “run out of people to put on committees” with the result that key individuals were finding it hard to sustain their commitment and were in danger of “burnout”.



## 6.9 Chapter Summary

- In 1999, the Council of Ministers' meeting Berlin committed to a further Northern Ireland Peace Programme to run from 2000 to 2004 with resources of €500 million;
- Following extensive consultation both in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and with input from the new Northern Ireland Assembly, the following strategic objectives were set out: economic renewal; social integration, inclusion and reconciliation; locally-based regeneration and development strategies; outward and forward looking region, and; cross-border co-operation. These represented different emphases from the PEACE 1 programme with a clear strategic focus on economic development and greater integration amongst both parts of Ireland and the broader world;
- Economic renewal and local regeneration/development accounted for more than half the budget, social integration, inclusion and reconciliation less than a quarter. Arguably, such priorities reflected less attention to the process of peace-building. At the same time however, all projects were expected to operate with a set of cross-cutting themes – cross-community engagement, a focus on areas of disadvantage and support for those most affected by the Troubles;
- Innovation in delivery continued with the creation of the Special European Programmes Body and the transformation of district partnerships in local strategic partnerships;
- The applications process was centralised and computerised;
- By April 2003, almost 1,500 applications had been approved accounting for €300 million.



## 7. The Learning So Far

### 7.1 Reconciliation Policy

An examination of the programme documentation<sup>59</sup> shows evidence of a lack of clear thinking in terms of peace-building policy.

The intent of the Programme was to reinforce peace and promote reconciliation and by that token, the social inclusion and economic prosperity which it sought to produce can only be seen as intermediate objectives or more plainly, a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Social inclusion and economic growth are intended to impact upon peace and reconciliation because they are targeted in a particular fashion (for example in areas which have suffered most as a result of the conflict) or because they are delivered in a particular way (for example through inclusive or participatory mechanisms).

In their Mid-term Review of PEACE 1, the only “official” summation of PEACE programming to date presently in the public domain, Coopers and Lybrand represent the relationship between social inclusion, economic development and peace as follows:

<sup>59</sup> Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland, 1995-1999, p.13






Fig 34: Coopers and Lybrand Peace and Reconciliation Programme Evaluation Model<sup>60</sup>

Whilst the Outline makes reference to “forceful arguments that ... social and economic problems have contributed to and sustained the violence”<sup>61</sup> of the Troubles, very little objective evidence is presented to suggest the extent of the connection between socio-economic conditions and the conflict. Indeed, the relationship between poverty and conflict remains a hotly debated issue amongst social scientists and it is noteworthy that presently, at the mid-point of PEACE 2, the Combat Poverty Agency is currently seeking to commission research into the existence of a causal linkage between the two.

In his forceful critique of PEACE 1, commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Brian Harvey suggests that the emphasis on social inclusion and job

<sup>60</sup> Coopers and Lybrand (May 1997), *Mid-Term Evaluation Draft Report*, A46, Coopers and Lybrand.

<sup>61</sup> *Special Support Programme 1995-1999 Op Cit*



creation within the programme is more reflective of a “colonisation of interests” and the relative strengths of the lobbies on the ground rather than an objective appraisal of the factors contributing to the conflict.<sup>62</sup> This is a view which has been expressed by stakeholders at all levels of the Programme during this research. Arguably, this is the price which both Programmes paid to ensure political support.

This lack of clear policy drive as regards peace and reconciliation is highlighted in the Mid-term Review of the Programme, undertaken in 1997 by Coopers and Lybrand. The report states:

*“It is apparent from our consultations with the responsible bodies, as well as the case studies undertaken, that there is no consensus on the precise means by which to ensure positive reconciliation impacts. A common theme in our workshops ... is that there are considerable difficulties in defining peace and reconciliation impacts. ... Most groups surveyed (76%) claimed that their activities will have a direct impact on reconciliation. How this occurs is not something on which groups can be especially specific.”<sup>63</sup>*

Whilst the direct impact on peace and reconciliation did not form a major consideration for the Review (which devoted two pages out of a seventy eight page report to the subject), the Mid-term Review noted other findings on the subject including:

- A divergence of views on the relative importance of single identity work within communities and the need for groups to reach a certain stage of development before they have the capacity to engage in cross-community work.

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<sup>62</sup> Harvey, *Op Cit*, p.20.

<sup>63</sup> Coopers and Lybrand, *Op Cit*.



- That reconciliation impacts were claimed for work in a variety of different ways which created difficulties for the Review in assessing the overall impact of different activity;
- An overwhelming majority of promoters (82%) felt that the aim of reconciliation is better served by projects with a cross-community component; and
- A clear majority (74%) felt that the importance of cross-community work should be enhanced in the future.

The Review concluded that:

*“The Programme ... is strongest on process benefits (primarily partnership and bottom-up approach) and good structures have been put in place. At project level, ... the Programme is strongest also on quantitative benefits ... (capacity building, training and development, counselling, day care places, etc.).”<sup>64</sup>*

At the mid-point of PEACE 2, it is too early to make an assessment of the reconciliation impact of the Programme. The Coopers and Lybrand model referred to above, still has application for PEACE 2. There may be less social inclusion and more economic development, but the premise of their combined contribution to peace and reconciliation continues to underpin the Programme.

What is clear within PEACE 2 however, is that the emphasis on peace and reconciliation is more firmly embedded into the policies of the Programme through the Distinctiveness Criteria.

The theory of requiring applicants to state up front the impact of their project on the legacy of the conflict and/or the opportunities arising from peace, as well as

<sup>64</sup> Coopers and Lybrand, *Op Cit.*, A53.



the project's contribution to reconciliation and its potential for cross-community involvement, is sound.

Furthermore this commitment is followed through into the scoring mechanisms for each application. The Distinctiveness section is used as part of an initial sift of projects and therefore projects which are weak in terms of their distinctive contribution are unlikely to proceed further without reworking. Secondly, the weighting of this section is high; the Distinctiveness Criteria and the reconciliation together make up 30% of the marks awarded for the whole application.

The majority opinion within funding circles is that groups have responded positively to this development and projects with a much tighter reconciliation focus have emerged as a result, although the more cynical view has been voiced that project promoters have simply “learned” what to put down on paper, i.e. what aspects of their area, sector or community can be related to the conflict. In these sections of the application form, success was felt to be closely related to the capacity of the applicant and their ability to make the linkages between their proposed activities and the conflict. Commitment to reconciliation, like any other aspect of any other form, can be fudged and experienced funders understand the need to approach the application form as a window through which to view the project rather than as an end to itself.

The opinion of applicants canvassed for this research was divided on this issue<sup>65</sup>. Most took the view that in order to access peace and reconciliation funding, it was right and proper that the contribution to peace and reconciliation represented in the application should be assessed and given due prominence within scoring systems. Many admitted to finding the section challenging, particularly applicants in the Southern Border Counties where the effects of the conflict are

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<sup>65</sup> Note that views of wholly unsuccessful applicants were not specifically solicited during this research, although all focus groups conducted did include promoters who had made unsuccessful applications in addition to successful bids.



often less visible and less a matter of public discourse. Additionally, many who approached funders for advice, particularly during the early stages, were left with the feeling that IFBs themselves were not sure what they were looking for under these sections or had a well developed and somewhat individualised view on what “reconciliation” meant. For those projects with a strong track record in reconciliation work, this issue of policy linkage was less problematic, although under certain measures such applicants would have been under pressure to provide economically based targets which may not be appropriate for particular types of groups.

A number of promoters voiced concerns that there was an excessive focus through the Distinctiveness and Reconciliation criteria on Unionist and Nationalist community division and that more policy development was needed in terms of broadening out categories, particularly the need to specifically mention ethnic minority communities.

Finally, it was noted that the focus on the six counties of Northern Ireland and the six border counties of the Republic has made it difficult under PEACE 2 to develop linkages with organisations based in Great Britain. Some felt that Programme policy was pushing a Republic of Ireland dimension without similarly recognising that there was also a British dimension, both in terms of historic responsibility and also in terms of people who have suffered as a direct result of the conflict, e.g. victims of Warrington and Manchester bombings, ex-servicemen’s groups as well as the many people living in Britain from both Unionist and Nationalist communities who left Ireland as a direct result of the conflict.

The acid test for PEACE 2’s commitment to reconciliation will come to life through the monitoring process, since projects will be asked to monitor progress against the reconciliation goals provided at application stage. Again for funders to represent the richness of this work in aggregate will be the real challenge.



Otherwise the charge that PEACE 2 is merely another development programme with a “peace” component bolted onto the top will be difficult to refute.





## 7.2 Reconciliation Impacts

In spite of the lack of policy direction at the top level of the Programme, a number of key achievements in terms of reconciliation can be identified from PEACE programming to date. Of these, the most important is the extent to which both Programmes have contributed to participation.

This can be viewed from two angles:

### Participation in Governance

Whilst PEACE 1 as a programme involved a greater degree of devolution of power than PEACE 2, (which sees a greater degree of centralisation through the development of the role of SEUPB), both programmes have pioneered new forms of participatory governance and have also made significant moves towards addressing the democratic deficit.

Pre-PEACE 1 in Northern Ireland, the notion of significant programmes of public expenditure being undertaken by organisations entirely independent from Central Government was unheard of. The role of IFBs as sectoral specialists with their own Boards of Directors and advisory panels drawn from the communities designated as beneficiaries of the Programmes, can only be seen as a radical departure.

In terms of delivery, this decentralisation has costs as well as benefits. Measured in cost per £1.00 of funds available during PEACE 1, delivery costs ranged from an estimated £0.17 for District Partnerships to £0.11 for IFBs and £0.06 for Government Departments.<sup>66</sup> Additionally, these decentralised delivery mechanisms took longer than expected to implement the Programme but did have certain advantages:

<sup>66</sup> Special EU Programmes Body, (2003) *Draft Closure Report EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I) 1994 – 1999*.



- Decentralised delivery mechanisms increased the accessibility of the Programme. Local communities were encouraged to participate. This may have contributed to the large volume of applications (almost 25,000 applications in Northern Ireland alone) between 1995 and early 1999.
- Funding bodies developed their sectoral expertise and local knowledge.
- Government and voluntary/community sector relations were enhanced starting from a very low base.
- The “bottom-up” approach enabled specific targeting of disadvantaged groups and ensured that a broad range of supports were put in place to facilitate applicants and project promoters.
- Popular awareness of the Programme was enhanced.

Although more costly, the decentralised approach brought major dividends in terms of community empowerment, targeting disadvantaged groups and promoting social inclusion, all of which are consistent with the objectives of the PEACE Programme.

The inclusive approach common to most of the decentralised bodies was a distinctive feature but regrettably in the experience of many applicants, not one often shared by Government Departments.

Unlike in the Southern Border Counties where partnerships were a recently established feature, the creation of District Partnerships in Northern Ireland can also be seen as somewhat radical. District Partnerships combined elements of representative democracy through the participation of elected members of District Councils with participatory democracy through the role of community sector representatives whose contribution and capacity was acknowledged in this way for the first time. In addition, participation of the statutory, trade union and private sectors added both depth and weight to the mix. Whilst established as delivery mechanisms for disbursement of funds, their potential was clearly recognised during PEACE 1 and their remit was considerably broadened and





strengthened during PEACE 2 in their transition to Local Strategy Partnerships. Beyond PEACE, LSPs look set to develop into a longer-term mechanism for the integration of services at local level.

Such new relationships and structures of governance were strongly signalled in the Northern Ireland Programme for Government with its emphasis on working with the community and in partnership. Moreover, Northern Ireland has already embarked on an experiment in governance unlike that in the other devolved administrations of the UK – the incorporation of opposing parties in government, the existence of the Civic Forum and even the existence of parties like the Women's Coalition. Northern Ireland cannot be insulated from the debate about reshaping governance because the over-riding imperative is to find the means to resolve its long-term political conflict. PEACE Programming is merely a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for regional regeneration. The opportunity exists to test innovation in government's relationship with civil society and in healing the divisions of a fragmented civil society via new forms of partnership. Given the scale of the problems facing the region, it has become increasingly recognised that only innovative approaches will create the possibility for change. New initiatives have tended to emphasise three dimensions:

- the necessity to integrate existing effort;
- the need for “vertical governance” mechanisms (mainly partnerships between the private, public and community sectors); and
- the desirability of creating stake-holding, whereby the intended beneficiaries participate in the development and implementation of policy.

Sustaining all three dimensions simultaneously has seen the emergence of new programme approaches, i.e., focusing on a total set of problems, developing integrated, partnership-managed strategies to tackle them and seeking the involvement of those affected in the solutions.



Partnership in Northern Ireland has been one of the rare “dialogic spaces” where cross-community collaboration can be nurtured and the challenges of reconciliation and regeneration linked.

### **Participation in activity**

PEACE funding, particularly in PEACE 1 did much to stimulate activity at a community level. Launched at a time of significant optimism at local level, PEACE funding provided a great stimulus to community based activity and did much to develop community infrastructure. This was particularly relevant in the Southern Border Counties where levels of activity prior to PEACE 1 had been at a very low level, a situation about which IFBs were aware, due to non-PEACE related work.

Overall, opportunities have been created for people to participate in many projects which were grounded in the reality of their immediate areas, addressing real issues and real problems for local communities. The sense of control, ownership and community confidence created by this impetus can readily be linked as a contribution to reconciliation.

Within this approach, there were many opportunities for structured contact between segregated communities. For some Northern Unionist groups, the route to structured engagement with their neighbours lay through the establishment of contacts and joint project work with organisations in the Southern Border Counties in order to promote cultural exchange and learning at a distance from their own doorstep in a less immediate and less threatening way. Such initiatives coincided with a developing understanding in the Southern Border Counties of reconciliation issues where levels of understanding, unsupported by the relatively developed community relations infrastructure existing in Northern Ireland, were at a low level of capacity. Stimulation of cross-border activity and the development



of lasting relationships between neighbouring towns and villages divided by the Border can also be seen within this frame.

The central difficulty however with funding a rich diversity of activity through many small projects, is that impacts may be difficult to see. Viewed from the macro level, such programmes are open to criticism for “a lack of focus” or for being “insufficiently strategic” in the face of those who prefer to see, for example, larger sums of money being spent through a consortia approach working over a broader geographical area. The impact of such diffuse programming can be very difficult to establish under ideal circumstances, but generally inadequate monitoring at many levels of the Programme during PEACE 1 left advocates of the participatory model in a poor position to argue their corner.

Whilst evidence is limited to support the assertion, the strong impression has been gained that PEACE 2 has seen a sharp fall in the levels of participation. This has particular impact in Northern Ireland which does not have the equivalent to the Regional Operational Programme which in the Southern Border Counties ensures that funding remains available for the type of social inclusion work which has been developed by many groups at community level. With a stronger economic focus which is less accessible to many community groups than the social inclusion impetus of PEACE 1, and compounded by a step change in the requirements of the application process, many of the smaller groups that were successful applicants under PEACE 1 were either discouraged from applying under PEACE 2 or made unsuccessful applications. Designed to build on PEACE 1 by raising the quality threshold and moving groups on from an exclusively social inclusion focus, PEACE 2, in the majority view of both funders and applicants, closed the door to too many at a time when mainstream funding for social inclusion activity has been reduced on both sides of the Border. This is not to say that PEACE 1's gains have been lost entirely; activity through key sectors such as arts, youth and childcare has lasted.



Sometimes significant barriers to participation exist.

Whilst reconciliation cannot be bought as a commodity, there is a recognition that funding has allowed important work to be done in allowing people to take risks for peace.

All funders have been involved in such work during PEACE programming although the work done under PEACE 1 to break new ground on issues which lie close to the heart of the conflict is particularly relevant. NIVT's work with ex-prisoners is discussed as an example below but work undertaken with victims could have formed an equally pertinent case study. Prior to PEACE 1, only a handful of urban based projects such as WAVE and Shankill Stress were in existence. The sector has now proliferated and a clear impact can be seen of work pioneered under PEACE being mainstreamed through the Victims and Survivors' Groups Core Funding Programme presently being managed by the Community Relations Council.. Similarly important was the initiative taken through the Belfast European Partnership (District Partnership) to take up the challenge thrown down by the Belfast Interface Project's work on contested space and devote relatively substantial funding into an Interface Programme was important. Now the term "interface" is no longer the preserve of community conflict specialists and there is clear understanding at the highest level of the particular needs of such areas. Indeed echoes of this early initiative can be seen in Measure 2.11a under PEACE 2 which focuses exclusively on urban interface communities.

Finally, and arguably most importantly, programming in both PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 has allowed work on peace and reconciliation to continue at Lederach's mass and local leadership level over the past eight years even when the "official" peace process has been in difficulties at the top level. There has been an important acknowledgement that whilst neither PEACE Programme has offered a panacea for the conflict, without such programming, the entire



responsibility for peace and reconciliation would “be confined exclusively to politicians and civil servants with no involvement of civil society, no interaction with the wider community with political parties alone holding an active stake in the peace process.”<sup>67</sup>



<sup>67</sup> ADM/CPA (Paddy Logue) (May 2003) *Cross-border Reconciliation and Development* p.3.



### 7.3 Types of work

Given the lack of focus or conclusive evidence on reconciliation impacts at the macro level, it is necessary to focus on the evidence gathered at intermediary funding body level within the Programme.

In this respect, good examples of what was able to be achieved within the Programme are provided by the work done by NIVT with ex-prisoners, programmes administered jointly by Area Development Management, Combat Poverty Agency and NIVT focusing on cross-border work and the cross-border and micro projects in East Belfast funded through Co-operation Ireland.

#### **NIVT's Work with Politically Motivated Ex-prisoners**

The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of 1998 following the Belfast Agreement in April of that year, secured the early release of over three-hundred prisoners serving sentences for scheduled (politically motivated) offences by December 1999. Whilst the prison population had been in decline since the early 1980s, this exponential increase in the number of prisoners being reintroduced into the community was to put great pressure on the groups which had formed to assist in the re-integration of prisoners and to provide assistance and support for their families. These organisations were seen as key and additional to statutory services because:

- politically motivated ex-prisoners had a long history of differentiating themselves from other categories of offenders;
- concerns existed with regard to the good intentions of state-related bodies and their staff found it difficult to empathise with ex-prisoners; and
- ex-prisoner groups had a strong self-help ethos.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>68</sup> NIVT (June 2001) *A Level Playing Field; Peacebuilding through the Reintegration of Politically Motivated Ex-Prisoners*, p.3.



These organisations were poorly equipped to deal with the large increase in beneficiary volumes and to provide adequate support to relatively large numbers of prisoners, many of whom faced great personal difficulties in reintegrating themselves back into civil life once the initial celebrations had died down. These personal difficulties were exacerbated by both societal and legal obstacles to finding work and accessing training.

For groups themselves, a number of challenges were evident:

- accurate and objective needs assessments were hard to undertake as ex-prisoners were often unwilling to articulate need;
- groups had little experience of developing strategic responses to identified need leading to a proliferation of drop-ins, welfare advice programmes and other social services; and
- a tendency to over-reach their own capacity.<sup>69</sup>

Measure 4.4 in PEACE 1, was aimed specifically at politically motivated ex-prisoners and in developing a programme to meet these challenges. NIVT began a process of consultation in 1995 which culminated in the formation in January 1996 of an Advisory Committee made up of representatives of ex-prisoner groups, including both those aligned to the various paramilitary organisations and non-aligned groupings. This element of beneficiary involvement in the grant making process can be credited with being a key element in NIVT's success in gaining the trust of the ex-prisoner community as a whole.

Through Measure 4.4, NIVT allocated £5,120,141 to sixty-one groups working with ex-prisoners and their families<sup>70</sup> resulting in:

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p.4

<sup>70</sup> *Peacebuilding: the Challenge Behind the Doves*, A Kilmurray, NIVT 2003



- a comprehensive support structure for ex-prisoners and their families, led by ex-prisoners on a self-help basis;
- linkages established across divides both between and within communities
- a developed awareness among ex-prisoners of their own distinctive contribution; and
- increased contact and networking between statutory bodies and the ex-prisoner community.<sup>71</sup>

What distinguishes the work of the Trust with respect to ex-prisoners however, is the range of added value supports which were put in place in terms of conferences and other networking opportunities, international study tours and the leveraging in of support from other agencies, both in kind and financial assistance from an independent donor.

The Mentor Evaluation, one of three evaluations which the Trust commissioned covering the PEACE 1 funding period concluded that the NIVT programme had:

- supported the healing process which is particularly essential amongst ex-combatants who had been engaged in violence as part of the overall peace process;
- secured a wide level of community involvement, both in the establishment of ex-prisoner groups and in the on-going contacts which these groups have with the wider community;
- provided significant levels of training to many ex-prisoners thereby enhancing the skills base of ex-prisoners and their communities; and
- clearly involved user groups in the design and implementation of projects in keeping with the best practice in community development.

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<sup>71</sup> *A Level Playing Field* *ibid*, p.8





## **Cross-border Work undertaken by ADM/CPA, Co-operation Ireland and NIVT**

The Southern Border Counties comprise Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth. They are differentiated from the Northern Ireland counties of Derry/Londonderry, Tyrone, Antrim, Fermanagh, Armagh and Down and also to the remainder of the Republic with respect to the conflict. For those living in these counties, the detachment from the conflict felt by many people who lived further south, was not an option. This region was very much part of the conflict and many of its communities experienced levels of violence, displacement of population and disruption to social and economic life which was greater than that experienced in parts of Northern Ireland. In these counties, North and South, the dislocation caused by the conflict was heightened by their distance from the urban centres of economic activity and the discredited process known as “back to back development” whereby London developed the region up to the border on one side and Dublin developed up to the line on the other side.<sup>72</sup>

In 1995, Area Development Management and the Combat Poverty Agency were allocated approximately half of the €80 million ring-fenced for the Border counties with the balance being disbursed by a number of government departments, six local authorities and Co-operation Ireland. ADM/CPA established a Joint Management Committee and subsequently entered into a consultation process with the local community, statutory agencies and local authorities in early 1995. This was further developed with cross-border consultations in association with NIVT who shared the cross-border reconciliation Measure 3.4 with ADM/CPA. A Cross Border Advisory Committee was formed, comprising representatives of the Joint Management Committee and NIVT and also including representation from Co-operation Ireland, the Community Relations Council, International Fund for Ireland and the Rural Community Network. This Committee considered applications in the same way as other Appraisal Committees reporting to the

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<sup>72</sup> ADM/CPA (Paddy Logue) *Op. Cit.* p.3



Joint Management Committee and its recommendations also had to be considered by the Board of NIVT.

The establishment of an office base in Monaghan and the appointment of a development team with good local knowledge and a community development background and a willingness to engage in genuine local consultation, signalled a new era in Border region development.<sup>73</sup>

In evaluating the work undertaken under PEACE 1 cross-border Measures 3.1 and 3.4, a number of additional barriers were identified in relation to cross-border work:

- the lack of time available to properly implement the project given that cross-border work is often additional to core activities being undertaken within limited resources;
- lack of project management skills resulting in the following operational barriers concerning:
  - lack of ability to design innovative and workable cross-border initiatives;
  - lack of confidence to deal with resistance to the work at a local level;
  - lack of ability to manage the relationship with the cross-border partner;
  - difficulties with the mechanics of cross-border funding such as working across currencies etc.; and
  - difficulties in sourcing a relevant partner on a cross-border basis.<sup>74</sup>

In spite of these obstacles, the combined funding bodies who are responsible for the delivery of Measures 3.1 and 3.4 were able to demonstrate the following key successes:

- the high level of interest at grass roots level in forming cross-border/community networks and over 2,000 applications were received;

<sup>73</sup> NIVT (1998) *Taking Risks for Peace*, p.88.

<sup>74</sup> ADM/CPA, NIVT and Co-operation Ireland (October 1999) *Border Crossings: Lessons from the Peace Programme*, p.viii



- funding was allocated to assist 834 groups to form cross-border/community linkages and when their partners are taken into account, the number of actual project linkages supported under these Measures stands at just under 2,000; and
- consultations undertaken as part of the evaluation of the Measures' impact, found that 95% of groups funded for cross-border work under PEACE 1 would definitely be interested in doing so again in the future and that 88% of groups which had never participated in a cross-border project have considered doing so.<sup>75</sup>

With specific reference to Co-operation Ireland, their delivery of Measure 3.1 was able to target the business community on a cross-border basis, thereby reaching a section of society otherwise not engaged within IFB or District Partnership-led programming.

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p.vi



## **Co-operation Ireland's East Belfast Community Focus Programme**

In direct response to the low uptake of funding promoting cross-border exchanges amongst community groups in East Belfast, Co-operation Ireland devised and implemented the East Belfast Community Focus Programme with the following aims:

- To stimulate cross-border interaction between both communities in the Greater East Belfast area and communities within the Border Counties of the Republic;
- To engender greater understanding and cooperation between these communities;
- To facilitate activity based programmes between the two communities via the mediums of sport, music, the arts and avenues of common social interaction and exchange;

Funded by Co-operation Ireland under Sub-programme 1 Measure 3 of PEACE 1, a modest grant of £147,209 was allocated to the programme with the target of promoting 100 exchanges. This grant represented 90% of the budget with the balance being provided by the Programme Managers.

Clearly with the aim of being pro-active in encouraging applicants, the Programme was not top-heavy with administration. Two local managers of standing within the community were appointed and this was clearly instrumental in allaying fears of prospective participants, a success borne out by the number of grass-roots organisations which received assistance and initiated projects. Groups were expected to be constituted in order to apply but in cases where groups had not reached this level of development, umbrella groups were used as intermediaries to transfer grant aid. These umbrella groups, along with the Programme Managers played an important role in providing support to applicants, many applying within the PEACE Programme for the first time. In the Border Counties, intermediaries were appointed to assist Northern groups in selecting appropriate partners for exchange according to their interests and



capacities. Again in order to facilitate applicants, up-front cash transfers of up to 25% of the total grant were made and this unquestionably helped groups cope with their cashflow. To the same end, facilities were established to pay suppliers directly rather than through project promoters. All of these steps to facilitate groups allowed project promoters to concentrate their energies on the actual exchanges themselves unburdened by the requirements of audit.

All six Border Counties were visited through the exchange programme with Carlingford, Drogheda and Dundalk being the most popular locations. In the twelve months the programme ran, 2,544 participants on both sides of the border took part and for many this was their first cross-border experience – testament in itself to the success of the programme in engaging with new audiences. A high percentage of groups engaged in reciprocal visits, indicative of the desire on the ground to further explore cultural differences and break down existing barriers. Rooted in a situation where it was hard to get groups from East Belfast to apply for cross-border funding, the programme led to the funding of a further fifty exchange visits;

- Dungoyne Boys Football Club (Belfast) who met with Dundalk Rangers FC to compete in a friendly football tournament involving 600 children and parents;
- Dundonald Credit Union established an on-going relationship with Monaghan Credit Union with a view to sharing best practice and exploring issues of mutual concern; and
- Newtownards Ex-Servicemen visited the Boyne Valley and Drogheda to view the site of the Battle of the Boyne to discuss cultural differences and how these have changed over the years.



## 7.4 Learning About Delivery

Many lessons have been learned through the delivery of the Programmes at every level of the structure. The structure itself can be categorised into three levels:

- Programme Management
- Delivery Mechanism
- Project Promoter

The examples of learning presented at each level are not meant to be exhaustive, but illustrative of those most directly relevant to the peace and reconciliation aspects of the Programmes.

### **Programme Management Level**

While the diversity of the implementation mechanisms is one of the reasons why PEACE 1 was so enthusiastically received, this diversity created a degree of overlap and confusion in Northern Ireland both within the Programme and with other forms of EU assistance available at the time, e.g. the Community Initiatives and the International Fund for Ireland. This caused some funding bodies to be unclear about their respective areas of responsibility and their lines of accountability. The Programme was also exposed to the risk of competition with other Structural Funds Programmes as no formal co-ordination relationship was established to avoid duplication and to promote complementary actions.

The absence of a clearly co-ordinated publicity campaign together with the initial confusion among some of the funding bodies, inevitably caused further confusion on the ground. In particular, project promoters were often unsure if their potential projects would be eligible for funding. In some cases they experienced difficulty in obtaining information as to where applications or enquiries for funding, should be directed. To some extent, this initial confusion was exacerbated by the



introduction of the unique District Partnership concept as part of the Programme in Northern Ireland. On the one hand it provided local groups with the opportunity to generate and implement a plan to meet local needs, but it caused confusion in that District Partnership's calls for project applications were similar to those within other Programme Measures that were being administered on a wider regional thematic basis. Initially a considerable amount of time had to be spent setting up contracts and other important administrative procedures for the new implementation bodies. In addition, many of the implementing bodies were dealing with the allocation and administration of European funding for the first time, and in some cases there was a tendency to underestimate the complexities attached to the allocation of funding and the subsequent monitoring and verification procedures that were required. The lack of experience and other problems normally associated with the start-up of a new Programme, meant that progress was much slower than was originally expected.

While it has been generally acknowledged that the original expectations were perhaps overly optimistic given the new and experimental nature of the Programme, it has also generally been accepted that a strategic training programme to meet the various needs at the outset of the Programme would have accelerated progress at a much earlier stage.

Some evidence would suggest that funding bodies did not have a clear understanding of the strategic aim of the Programme and the monitoring and evaluation requirements at the outset of the Programme. This together with the absence of tightly drawn selection criteria for projects, caused funding bodies to experience some difficulty in deciding which particular groups they should target, and how potential projects should be assessed and selected for funding.

In this way, the facility to share, discuss and resolve common operational problems through regular co-ordinated meetings such as the Programme



Management Committee and the bi-laterals between the Finance Departments and Sub-programme leaders have also proved beneficial.

Finally, the need to determine the informational requirements to ensure adequate monitoring from the perspectives of the variety of stakeholders in advance of delivery has been acknowledged. Experience of the overall monitoring systems under PEACE 1, the Optimum Monitoring Questionnaire and the Central Database, was hardly positive. Whilst the Central Database clearly met the informational needs at some level for project promoters and delivery mechanisms, little was gained from the time and effort invested in their participation. The proof of the difficulties with much of the monitoring of PEACE 1 can be seen clearly in the length of time it has taken to close the Programme.

Many of these lessons learned at Programme Management level in PEACE 1 have been operationalised through the role of the Special European Programmes Body in PEACE 2.

### **Delivery Mechanism Level**

Arguably, the role of intermediary which all delivery mechanisms play (whether they are classified as Intermediary Funding Bodies or not), is the most difficult role in the delivery process. The series of inter-relationships at and between the different levels of Programme delivery are very much about power: those who have it and who are nervous about devolving it (with good reason) and those who seek it but find themselves bound hand and foot by administrative constraints and impositions (for no good reason). Throughout delivery, the intermediary must therefore negotiate a tangled web of antagonistic relations between top and bottom whilst protecting its own interests and fulfilling its own responsibilities in the process. This dilemma was succinctly summarised by one IFB-based respondent as “minimising the bureaucracy whilst maximising accountability” and negotiating this dilemma has been central to the learning at delivery mechanism level.





In addition to the initial organisational and planning problems, delivery mechanisms were also faced with the significant task of seeking to engage groups from socially excluded communities who would not have had previous access to EU funding.

As many of the target community groups required time to develop their projects, the majority of funding bodies found themselves faced with the additional task of having to provide a capacity building and project development service to these groups.

The absence of a suitable training process to equip the requisite number of development workers with the skills to meet this need meant that some projects were slow to materialise. This can be related to practical matters but also to issues that go to the heart of the Programming.

For instance, the lack of community relations infrastructure in the Southern Border Counties has led funders to play a role in assisting promoters to “break the silence” around the conflict.

Delivery mechanisms have all learned to provide adequate systems of support to project promoters throughout the delivery process and systems of support from most funders within the Programme, particularly IFBs, LSPs and Task Forces, although less so Government Departments can be evidenced at all points of the interface between promoters and funders. At the pre-application stage many delivery mechanisms found that they had to re-write the guidance materials supplied in the Operational Programme and then develop structured opportunities to delivering the training. Many funders found it necessary to juggle staff in order to ensure the separation of development and assessment, and to assist those promoters with a good ideas and experience but a limited capacity to commit the proposal to an application form. Post-assessment, support has been



provided to assist with understanding Letters of Offer and either direct support has been given, or structures put in place with the use of third parties to ensure that monitoring takes place in a structured way. Most project promoters contacted during this research<sup>76</sup> were very appreciative of the role played by delivery mechanisms in this regard.

### **Project Promoter Level**

It is arguably at the level of project promoters that the biggest leaps in delivery capacity through PEACE programming can be seen and both Programmes have encouraged major developments at this level. Whilst gaps and areas of weak infrastructure remain, it is unquestionable that funding accessed through PEACE programming has significantly raised the overall level of capacity and professionalism. Whilst the level of activity may have risen, fallen and risen again, the learning gained from the delivery is likely to be sustainable.

This can be seen most clearly in areas directly related to their interactions with funders. The quality of applications has improved significantly over the lifetime of both Programmes showing step changes in the level of planning skills displayed by applicants. Project promoters are, for example, much more aware of the need to manage and monitor their activities, to plan for contingencies and to develop responses in advance. Financial skills too have improved exponentially with the majority of funded groups now able to cope with the highly sophisticated requirements of audit and financial accountability demanded by Structural funds. Overall, there have been major developments in the professionalisation of the community sector, partly because PEACE programming has created a professional cadre of project managers and development workers, but partly also in the more general sense of a growing awareness of promoters at Board level of the need to develop services which meet professional quality standards.

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<sup>76</sup> Contacts from promoters contacted during the research were supplied by ADM/CPA, the Community Foundation and Co-operation Ireland.



In terms of the contract which governs the relationship between the project promoter and the delivery mechanism, promoters have learned to become more comfortable with this level of structure. In terms of focus group respondents for this research, there was general agreement that overall, the additional emphasis on contracting developed through PEACE 2 was a good thing and clarified roles and responsibilities within the funding process. This it was felt, was an important step on the road towards a more mature and negotiated relationship between project promoters and funders. This could be improved by a more collaborative approach to letter of offer writing. The contract has potential to be a powerful tool for developing a more mature relationship between funders and promoters, but this opportunity is lost if the letter of offer is simply mailed to the promoter without discussion. One group of ex-prisoners cited the example of a stipulation on their letter of offer that representatives of statutory organisations be invited onto their project committee. As a suggestion, this would have been welcomed as a potentially helpful piece of advice; in black and white on a contract, it felt like an imposition.

Finally, there are aspects of learning from the delivery of PEACE programming which cut across all levels of delivery. In their discussion paper, *Building Peace and Reconciliation*, ADM/CPA, CFNI and Co-operation Ireland identify a range of points of good practice which have been learned through their work in programming to date. These are:

- Addressing mutual need and engaging in collective action to meet that need;
- Learning from international experience;
- Cross-community and/or cross-border interaction;
- Inclusion of all relevant sectors and stakeholders;
- A practical tangible focus;
- Understanding, respecting and ultimately celebrating cultural diversity;
- Identifying and creating win-win situations;
- Being realistic about what can be achieved; and



- Breaking the silence and addressing the issues<sup>77</sup>



<sup>77</sup>ADM/CPA, CFNI and Co-operation Ireland *Building Peace and Reconciliation*, n.d.



## 7.5 What still has to be learned

A range of outstanding issues related to delivery were identified during the consultation for this research. These were as follows:

- The need to do further work on defining what constitutes peace-building and reconciliation work in this context. Many promoters admitted to finding much of the community relations materials quite impenetrable and there is a need to develop a practically focussed guide for project promoters to help them develop this area of their work.
  - It was noted that in spite of the requirement for project promoters to specify actions relating to publicity for the funded project, little in the way of results had been seen at a regional or the national level.
  - Few respondents could recall seeing any media coverage relating to the peace-building aspects of the Programme and the legitimate concern was addressed that if positive stories do not receive coverage then there will be nothing to counter-balance the inevitable publicity which surrounds cases where things go wrong.
  - For the remaining period, funding should be made available to assist groups in developing a strategic approach to planning. It is one of the ironies of the changes from PEACE 1 to PEACE 2 that whilst the levels of planning required have increased considerably, the resources available to assist in the development of that planning have disappeared.
  - There remains a lack of clarity around the monitoring of peace and reconciliation.
  - Delivery mechanisms consulted admitted to very little work in recent years in examining their own pre-conceptions and prejudices with regard to the conflict despite their role in encouraging others to undertake such exercises.
- Reconciliation and anti-sectarian training should be undertaken on a regular



basis by organisations delivering PEACE funding, at least involving those staff working directly on the Programme.

- The level of audit required for PEACE 2 appears to be causing difficulties at every level of delivery. The potential to reduce the requirements should be explored between SEUPB, Department of Finance and Personnel (NI), Department of Finance and the Audit Office.
- All delivery mechanisms should be encouraged to publish the results of their experience. At present, the body of literature around the Programme and its predecessor is dominated by a range of publications from a minority of IFBs mostly concerned with social exclusion issues. Whilst much of this material is of good quality, the absence of output from other bodies creates an imbalance within the body of literature as a whole. Those mechanisms which focus more strongly on economic aspects of the Programmes appear to publish considerably less, and very little of any consequence has been found from Government Departments at all. SEUPB could potentially play an interesting role in relation to sharing and disseminating good practice from its unique vantage point across the PEACE 2 Programme.



## 7.6 Chapter Summary

- Engagement with project promoters and reflection on the PEACE Programmes indicates some disagreement about both peace-building and reconciliation. The Mid-term review commented that while nearly everyone was positive about their contribution to both, few were able to specify the actual mechanisms or the identifiable effects. There was, however, agreement on the need for a stronger emphasis on cross-community work;
- The PEACE Programmes created new structures for local governance in the shape of its delivery mechanisms and thus contributed to the overall debate about the appropriate governance mechanisms for Northern Ireland. One dimension of the debate has focused on the “over-governing” of the regions small population – the excess of district councils, health boards and trusts and education and library boards. This dimension has focused on the diseconomies of small-scale governance mechanisms and the need for rationalisation both on cost and effectiveness criteria. While undoubtedly important, this dimension should be complemented by another about the contribution of active citizenship to effective local governance. The PEACE Programmes established institutions that realised partnership, brought civil society organisations into the delivery process and catalysed a much higher level of participation by ordinary citizens. These are important ingredients in the overall debate about how the region should be governed;
- Importantly, the PEACE Programmes put cross-border co-operation at the heart of the policy debate. Indeed, rather than an abstract discourse, it focused on the practical ways to achieve greater co-operation in a series of demonstration projects. Both states in Ireland can benefit from cross-border synergies and the cross-border projects showed the potential and the problems of this challenge;
- The diversity of work undertaken as a result of the PEACE Programmes can generate important learning on how to contribute to peace-building and



reconciliation, how to involve citizens, how to create delivery mechanisms, perhaps more effective than mainstream complements.







## 8. A New Peace Programme?

*So hope for a great sea-change  
On the far side of revenge.  
Believe that a farther shore  
Is reachable from here.  
Believe in miracles  
And cures and healing wells.  
(Seamus Heaney "The Cure at Troy")*

### 8.1 Introduction

The preceding material suggests that the PEACE programmes have delivered substantial benefits to Northern Ireland despite the difficulties of operating in an environment with unstable political institutions, continuing community violence and evidence of growing alienation between the two communities.

If nothing else, they have provided a substantial injection of funds at a key point in the transition from war to peace. These funds were expressly targeted at the dominant requirements: increasing regional competitiveness; tackling social exclusion; and effecting reconciliation. At the same time, we have argued that the complexities of the macro environment has created difficulties for all three – particularly the tortuous negotiations around the maintenance of the political institutions (currently in abeyance) and the emergence of new forms of post-agreement conflict. Curiously, at the macro level, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence of peace programme impact, although conflict resolution theorists like Lederach do argue that peace processes are long and difficult and take place at the macro, meso and micro levels. Progress at all three levels is required in order to properly drive the process forward. Accordingly, it would be unrealistic to expect that a five-year process would completely turn the situation around.



Nevertheless, there have been tangible benefits above and beyond the outputs of the diverse range of funded projects. Notably these have been:

- **A new mobilisation of many thousands of ordinary citizens who became involved in projects.** Even if the data on volunteering from the Central Database are much exaggerated, the numbers participating in new projects (that had no other source of funding) are impressive. The downside is, of course, that the majority of such projects vanished (or will vanish) with the cessation of funds. Nevertheless, their contribution to developing the social assets of communities should not be ignored. Other than the actual purposes for which they were funded, such organisations contributed to the development of civic society in Northern Ireland and, importantly, added to its stock of social capital. A key element of peace-building is the development of civic, as opposed to ethnic, institutions. The creation of a set of entirely new projects and the imperative that existing organisations focus more directly on reconciliation and peace-building are important elements of a transition to peace;
- **A series of experiments in new forms of governance including the creation of new types of partnership at District Council level.** PEACE 2 saw the development of Local Strategic Partnerships with the ultimate intention that these would “merge” with local councils to create a permanent, new form of district governance. Some of the problems associated with partnership building cannot be ignored – inter-sector disputes, disagreements over the distribution of funding etc. However, the importance of debating such issues cannot be underestimated in what was previously a culture of silence. Equally, IFBs created alternative kinds of partnership that were functionally focused and, within the restraints of ESF and ERDF, fostered a range of innovative projects – new methods of tackling social exclusion and experiments in community development and peace-building to name but two. Many of these were conducted with those who had substantial histories of



political violence and for whom the transition to the politics of persuasion (from the politics of coercion) was a steep learning curve;

- **The animation of a debate about the conduct of the peace process.**

Perhaps the least acknowledged impact of the peace programmes was their catalysing impact on the debate about how Northern Ireland could make its difficult transition from war to peace. Certainly, the usual suspects continued to repeat their “accepted wisdoms”, but many others were forced to think outside the box about how to bring change to this community, including the development of its relationship with its neighbour the Irish Republic. Moreover, this debate was supported by substantial research that might otherwise never have taken place. Why is this important? Because there was never a single Northern Ireland conflict – events were interpreted via the values and cultures of the participants, hence, for example, the debates about who were “genuine” victims. As Lederach argues:

*“...social conflict emerges and develops on the basis of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to action and events...From this starting point, conflict is connected to meaning, meaning to knowledge, and knowledge is rooted in culture.”<sup>78</sup>*

We all “know” what caused the conflict and what it would take to end it. The problem is that we cannot appreciate what the “other side” knows. Neither the polite silence of civilised company nor the violence of those who pursue what they “know” by force can bridge that gap. Even when discussion is difficult and painful, it has to happen. The peace programmes forced us to engage in those discussions. Even if the solutions are not yet evident, there is better, and better sharing of, understanding.

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<sup>78</sup> Lederach, J.P (1995), *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* Syracuse University Press, New York pp 3-23.



In relation to both peace programmes, there was a strong desire to reinforce peace-building strategies in order to aid wider instruments of social inclusion and economic development. Unfortunately, these developments were set against heightened inter-community based tensions and several suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

However, it is not the case that PEACE 1 and 2 failed to deliver a more reasoned climate within which inter-community relationships could flourish. Instead it could be contended that these programmes ensured that the climate of suspicion and mistrust that has come about in recent years was tempered by such initiatives.

There is no doubt that funding has encouraged the development of inter-community linkages and has aided the development of pluralist ideas and notions. Yet, there is an enduring problem that reconciliation, and the instruments required to promote it, are contested and at times ambiguous. It should be stressed that PEACE Programming has gone some way towards making the realities of division more relevant and obvious than is the case within mainstream practices.

A central argument within PEACE 1 and 2 was that reconciliation could be established via prosperity building - the oft-mentioned “peace through prosperity” paradigm. There is no denying that deprived areas are those, which have borne and continue to bear the brunt of conflict. Yet there are other arguments, which allege that the Northern Irish economy benefited from the conflict in that public expenditure upheld an economic structure that was more affected by global factors than it was by violent acts.

There are few who have engaged in conflict because they were socially deprived. This does not mean that deprivation was not an important factor in stimulating unrest but it should be reasoned that violence was conditioned more by societal deterioration, the collapse of the Northern Ireland State and the undeniable



power of ethno-sectarian relationships. It should be stressed that issues such as policing, access to housing and segregation are key factors in the reproduction of ethno-sectarian discord.

If we are to examine the present nature of inter-community rivalry in Northern Ireland it is clear that more affluent sections of society are just as likely as their low-income counterparts to be influenced by either Nationalist or Unionist politics. If anything each of the main political parties in Northern Ireland now draws support from within middle class constituencies. Inter-communal discord is more visible in deprived areas but this does not mean that distrust and animosity does not exist in more affluent communities. There has been a failure to recognise that atavistic ethno-sectarian attitudes are present outside of highly segregated and deprived places.

The work of Brian Harvey has already signalled that the emphasis on social inclusion and job creation within PEACE 1 was more reflective of a “colonisation of interests” and the relative strengths of the lobbies on the ground rather than an objective appraisal of the factors contributing to the conflict.<sup>79</sup>

These criticisms should be couched in the reality that most funders feel that funded groups have responded positively to developing a tighter reconciliation focus within their work. This supposition is challenged by a more sceptical view that projects have simply “learned” what to put down on paper, i.e. what aspects of their area, sector or community can be related to the “Troubles”.

The Belfast Agreement has created the capacity for political re-negotiation in that it makes clear that the constitutional future of Northern Ireland can only be altered via democratic means. There is a now recognition by all of the main political parties that only a majority vote in both Northern Ireland and the

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<sup>79</sup> Brian Harvey (1997), *Report on Programme for Peace and Reconciliation*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. p.20.



Republic of Ireland can alter Northern Ireland's constitutional status. Although that capacity has been created for constitutional accommodation, antagonisms remain over the extent to which the Belfast Agreement delivers equality and equity.

Unfortunately, the Belfast Agreement has not created a shared vision or set of responsibilities. Instead it has become a site of conflict within itself.

In overall terms political representation and the Belfast Agreement has not formed a process of inter-community healing that is required to address conflictual issues. One only has to look at the decline of "centre ground" political parties to see that this has been the case. In a way, the Belfast Agreement has created a politics of competitive antagonism. Evidently a more violent conflict has been succeeded by proxy conflicts and wider cultural antagonisms.

Despite evident difficulties the following must be noted: Northern Ireland is in a "pre-post"-conflict situation. Despite, and even because of, the Belfast Agreement, sectarian divisions remain, as do tensions surrounding issues such as housing, employment, equality, decommissioning and policing.

It is obvious that cross-community dialogue between certain political opponents has grown. The establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the preceding paramilitary cease-fires have each created some potential for positive political change.

The following changes are needed to encourage political stability:

- There is a need to encourage a popular understanding that the conflict evident between the late 1960s and 1994 will not return;
- Reinforce popular understanding that the Belfast Agreement has clearly stated that constitutional change can only come via democratic means;



- Public and statutory agency staff should be trained in reconciliation techniques;
- The political elite should work toward promoting a shift towards pluralist and less culturally subjective categorisations of belonging;
- Equality agendas must be articulated as shared between communities;
- Political parties should champion the recognition of citizenship above the politics of traditions;
- Political parties should broaden the debate on shared histories. The recent attendance of Republicans at commemorations for the dead of both world wars and other conflicts testifies to how this can be achieved. Similarly unionists have engaged in public debates with republicans and nationalists;
- Political parties, in particular, should define the positive nature of change since 1994 and 1998;
- Political parties should make clear the burdens of ethno-sectarianism; and
- Political parties should aim to promote a shared sense of victimhood between traditions.



## 8.2 Europe and a New Peace Programme?

Whilst much of the discussion around European programmes inevitably is centred on the economic and social framework that it sets for its programmes, it is easy to forget that the European Union's own primary *raison d'être* is the commitment to peace within its borders. In the immediate post war period of the 1940s and 1950s it was the urgent need to avoid further conflict and reconcile the combatants of the Second World War which inspired the European Union's founding fathers, Schumann and Monnet, to design the basic architecture which has evolved so considerably in the thirty years since Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973. Before examining the potential future contribution of Europe in support of reconciliation in Ireland, it is useful to consider the following.

Firstly, a central policy of the European Union has long been the promotion of economic and social cohesion. In particular, the EU has been concerned with creating greater cohesion between different Member States and different EU regions by reducing the economic and social disparities between them. Further, it recognises that some of its economic policies have potential to reinforce existing disparities. For example, the Single Market could, potentially focus economic activity around the geographical centre of the Union at the expense of the periphery. Secondly, there is a developing body of regional policy driven by the creation of a Committee of the Regions under the Maastricht Treaty. Thirdly, there has been a developing policy, again underlined at Maastricht, of subsidiarity or making decisions at the most appropriate level whether this is at EU, national, regional or local level. This principle can be seen clearly in action through the development of partnerships to deliver structural funds in the Republic of Ireland from 1993. Finally, the EU has been a strong advocate of partnership and has been actively promoting the concept of social partnership, which can be seen clearly in the Poverty Programmes and the development of District Partnerships through PEACE 1, which were modelled closely on European approaches to social partnership. Indeed, the EU has shown a strong





trend towards the involvement of non-governmental sectors such as the community and voluntary sector, farming, business and trade unions in consultation and decision-making.<sup>80</sup>

These four principles have made a major impact on the design and delivery of European programmes to date. For example, since the reform of EU Structural Funds in 1988, substantial support has been channelled through regionally targeted programmes across the EU aimed at reducing the economic gaps between the richer and poorer regions of the Union such as the 1989-1993 Community Support Framework and the 1994-1999 Single Programming Document. Between 1989 and 1999, Northern Ireland gained €2,767 million from these programmes. The Transitional Objective 1 Programme (Building Sustainable Prosperity 2002-2006) was awarded £575 million and PEACE 2 received £274 million. In total, the region has received about £2.5 billion from the European Union since 1989.

In addition to the targeting of poorer regions, the EU has addressed Europe wide problems through its Community Initiatives either at an issue-based level (e.g. ADAPT, Employment and EQUAL which sought to increase local competitiveness and address inequalities in access to employment) or a sectoral level (such as PESCA which focused on the needs of the fishing industry). The focus of such initiatives has been to promote the exchange of ideas between regions on best practice and pilot new approaches to structural problems across the European Union. In Northern Ireland the best-known Community Initiative was, of course, PEACE 1 itself.

Had PEACE 1 been seen in its context as a Community Initiative to promote exchange and new approaches rather than solve the underlying problem,

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<sup>80</sup> Geoff Nuttall, *The Future Funding Landscape*, in NIVT, 1997 *Proceedings of Cheques and Balances Conference*.



perhaps its sternest critics would have been more generous in their assessments.

Ironically for a Community Initiative, the extent of promotion of international and inter-regional exchange in PEACE 1 was one of its weakest features with only one Measure (4.5) making provision for reflection on international experiences.<sup>81</sup>

In addition to these key policy drives within the European Union, thinking around a third programme must take account of wider European developments.



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<sup>81</sup> Harvey, *ibid.*, p.73



### 8.3 Factors Impacting on EU Policy Development Post 2006

Clearly the major pressure on EU regionally based funding will be the impact of enlargement. Significant additional resources will be required to promote the integration of the ten new members into the EU from 2004 but more importantly for Ireland, North and South, the new entrants will significantly alter the balance between rich and poor regions across the Union. The eligibility for Objective 1 structural funding requires regions to show less than 75% of the average EU GDP in the three years preceding the next round of structural funding decision making due to take place in 2004. Yet EU enlargement will increase its population by 29%, but its GDP by only 6%. To take one example, the Lubelskie region of Poland had GDP per head at 23% of the EU average in 1998 – at that time Northern Ireland's GDP per head was 77% of the EU average.

As the EU average GDP falls through the introduction of poorer regions, the island of Ireland (which is already on a transitional Objective 1 status) seems unlikely to be eligible to make strong arguments for additional structural funding. Nor is this simply a question of financial resources; the EU's attention and focus for the foreseeable future is likely to be set firmly towards the east rather than the northwest.

Moreover, as a peripheral region on the northwest of the EU, Northern Ireland will still face substantial transactional costs. In particular, its traditional industries, like textiles, clothing and agriculture, will face greater competition from countries with a substantial comparative advantage in terms of cheap labour. The simultaneous withdrawal of what has been very substantial European subsidy could generate significant negative impact.

In addition, the reduction of subsidy will also entail the collapse of the partnership structures generated by previous EU funding.



Enlargement may impact in other ways. On a potentially positive note, the ethnic and national conflicts as well as the social displacement, which exists in a number of the countries in line to join the EU, such as Cyprus may raise interest in the area of conflict resolution within the EU. More pessimistically, the influx of new Member States may lessen the capacity of a small region such as Northern Ireland to lobby effectively for special treatment.

Increasing concern about the impact of migration from Southern and Eastern countries into the EU is likely to remain high of the agenda for the foreseeable future and the debates around appropriate responses to this issue are set to continue. There is the potential for a rerun of the EU INTEGRA Community Initiative which was designed to integrate vulnerable groups into employment and training and was directed towards immigrants and asylum seekers.

Social exclusion and particularly long-term unemployment are likely to remain a feature for the coming period, particularly given the difficulties, which many states are presently facing in response to the world wide down turn in markets. This is reinforced by the longer-term trend in all developed economies of an ageing population profile and consequently declining capacity to support economically inactive citizens.

Ongoing reform of the Common Agricultural Policy will also impact on the spending priorities of the EU. As the pressures increase to reduce dependence on agricultural subsidies leading to high surpluses of production, further policy development will be required in order to redefine aid to rural areas.

By the same token, EU policy is under constant review. The UK Government's consultation document, *"A Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom"*, suggests that the developed member states of the EU with appropriate financial and institutional capacity should develop and pursue their own regional policies. This implies that when net contributor states receive regional development



assistance from the EU, the process is necessarily inefficient – transferring resources to Brussels and then receiving them back in the form of structural funds. Moreover, regional policies developed within advanced EU states would not, of necessity, be constrained by the parameters of ESF and ERDF. There might thus be greater scope for creativity and innovation. However, many suspect that the UK's consultation document is simply designed to keep down UK contributions within an enlarged EU. Bachtler et al characterise the UK position as:

*“...the renationalisation of EU regional policy which - at its most extreme – would involve a complete cessation of Structural Funds in the richer EU Member States or would involve a simple budget transfer of EU resources to part-fund policies and priorities determined by the Member States.”<sup>82</sup>*

This argument might appeal to the richer states worried that a 25 member state would have an out-of-control budget.

In short, it is difficult to speculate about the EU's intentions when it comes to a third Northern Ireland PEACE Programme.

The Northern Ireland conflict has deep and long-lasting impact. It is difficult to imagine that even a relatively well-funded programme over a ten year period would radically shift the political, social and economic trajectories of Ireland. There is thus an argument for continuity.

Moreover, the transactional costs of enlargement for this small northwest region are likely to be high, including the implications of a reformed CAP, and there will be a need for some form of compensation. Against such arguments is the fact

<sup>82</sup> Bachtler, J. Josserand, F and Michie, R. (December 2002), *EU Enlargement and the Reform of the Structural Funds: the implications for Scotland*, Scotecon.net



that Northern Ireland has also substantially benefited from EU subsidy – roughly £100 per year per person over a fifteen-year period – while many of the new entrants have substantially lower GDP per head and some have their own problems of division and conflict (Cyprus). The symbolic status of Northern Ireland within the EU might thus be diminished, particularly as the political institutions of the Peace Process flounder. Such difficulties are compounded by the position of the British government that seeks the reform of the structural funds to the point where states like the UK would operate independently from Brussels. In that scenario, the continuing application of the Barnett principle to Northern Ireland’s funding levels might squeeze any opportunity for a “PEACE 3”.



## 8.4 The Continuity of Peace Building

Of necessity, proposals about the shape of a new Peace Programme are speculative. PEACE 1 and PEACE 2 originated in Europe. The European Union is in a process of transition to a 25-member super state. This has implications for all of its social policies and for the priorities placed on a small part of an existing member state. Moreover, the near future will be one of intense debates about the completion of Economic and Monetary Union, an EU Constitution, the reform of the CAP and the reform of the structural funds. It is difficult to believe that the attempts to find political accommodations within Ireland will retain the same status as the 1990s, particularly where many member states find the inability of Northern Ireland's politicians to resolve political difference incomprehensible and others look enviously at the growth and GDP per head of the Irish Republic, once a recipient of Cohesion Funds.

In any case, there are arguments against the rerun of an EU Programme that is focused on building peace, but is shaped by the form of the structural funds – ESF and ERDF.

Both were constructed to assist lagging regions to raise competitiveness and employment towards EU averages and, by definition, are economically oriented. Not only do they imply a wholly economic definition of social exclusion (worklessness), but also they may set parameters that limit the innovative character of peace-building activity. Moreover, EU programmes are necessarily indicative. They provide, even in Objective 1 regions, relatively small scale funding (compared to mainstream budgets) to pilot activities that can be mainstreamed if successful. They are thus about transforming policy rather than being an additional policy arm. Admittedly, in states that are net beneficiaries of EU funding, they represent an important redistributive mechanism. Both receiving and giving states benefit: the former gains an important catalyst towards development, the latter gain from the new markets developed.



In this context, is there an argument for a new peace programme?

Peace building and reconciliation are undeniably long-term processes.

However, supported, there will have to be a focus on peace-building and reconciliation across both states in Ireland. Moreover, as the Harvey report on PEACE 2<sup>83</sup> indicates, a set of issues were frequently raised around the operation of the programme which included: excessive administrative requirements, the distortion of projects by ESF requirements, the inability of the programme to provide small grants or fund short term activities, the rigid application of distinctiveness and reconciliation criteria and a lack of transparency.

These might be summarised as being inflexible and being insufficiently creative or innovative. If there is no recipe for peace-building and reconciliation, there will have to be a whole range of experiments, some of which are bound to fail. Since fear of failure is seen as a key inhibitor to enterprise in Northern Ireland's industrial culture, an analogous point might be made about peace-building – people should be encouraged to take risks. Jumping through the same hoops is unlikely to unpick the consequences of a deeply embedded thirty year violent conflict.

Moreover, to the list of Harvey “issues” we would add:

- An internal focus, despite the outward and forward looking region measure – given the number of other factors now crowding the European policy agenda, support for a new peace initiative will only be mobilized if it contributes to the solution of problems that affect more than the insignificant percentage of the EU population living in Ireland. Further, despite a clear cross-border focus, many saw the PEACE Programmes as being exclusive to Northern Ireland;

<sup>83</sup> B. Harvey, (2003), *Review of the PEACE 2 Programme*, The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, York.





- A substitute for mainstream agencies taking peace-building and reconciliation seriously. The scale of EU programmes and their duration make it impossible to “solve” conflicts like the Ireland conflict. Just as with other EU initiatives, their role should be to pioneer practices that can be adapted to the mainstream policy arena.

For these, and other reasons discussed above, the proposals set out below are not about a unified programme, but rather a set of initiatives designed to do different things and with different sources of funding but with a single purpose – embedding peace-building and reconciliation in a wider policy environment.

In particular, the following proposals are designed to:

- To further develop the best practices of PEACE 1 and 2;
- To embed them in the mainstream policy environment;
- To export their learning to areas afflicted by conflict;
- To create the space and opportunity for new creativity in peace-building, and;
- To develop further the links between both states in Ireland.

We recommend further that the whole process be subject to careful formative evaluation.

These proposals could be carried out at five levels:



## 8.5 A New EU Programme:

### 1. Healing Socio-Ethnic Divisions

The PEACE Programme was unique for the EU, but the kind of problems it was designed to address are not. Society across Europe is subject to new frictions and tensions that are not amenable to conventional Structural Fund programmes. Some of these are:

- The impact of economic migrants and asylum seekers - While these problems are frequently exaggerated in the right wing populist press across the member states, there have been considerable social tensions and stresses generated by the growing presence of economic migrants and asylum seekers within the member states. The political impact can be seen in the votes gained by political parties highlighting immigration as a key electoral issue in Austria, France, Denmark, Holland and the UK. In some states, Germany, Britain and France, asylum seekers and migrants have been subject to violence and abuse. Many argue that racism is a growing phenomenon in Europe;
- Nearer to home, the British Home Office has been struggling with the concept of community cohesion following the disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in the summer of 2001. An independent review team set up to examine causes commented:

*“Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These*



*lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges.”<sup>84</sup>*

Such comments could easily apply to many communities in Northern Ireland and the border counties, although it has been recognised earlier in this report that these are only part of the issues here. Yet, there is in Northern Ireland a vast experience of projects designed to promote engagement between political institutions and communities, build social capital, enhance community relations and resolve conflict. Some of that experience could be exported to assist the community cohesion programme in Britain.

- In addition, there are long-standing conflicts over sovereignty and independence – the struggle for Basque independence in Spain, the territorial division of Cyprus. Such conflicts have implications for the ways these states are governed and affect their capacity for integration at the European level;
- Moreover, Europe’s most vicious civil war was fought in the Balkans on the fringes of the EU for most of the 1990s. The EU has a responsibility, and an interest, in helping to deal with the long-term effects of this conflict;
- Finally, there are the new global fissures typified by the conflict between Islam and the West. It is difficult to predict whether these will become even more serious than is currently the case. That is partly dependent on progress in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, the anarchy to which Iraq has descended and the possible new frictions between the US and Iran suggest that these problems are a long way from solution. While outside the remit of EU responsibility, they have important implications for Muslim communities in EU states – how they will live, work and relate to other citizens.

Europe is thus no stranger to tensions amongst different ethnic groups, territorial contests and conflict over sovereignty. If the Northern Ireland PEACE Programmes did anything, it was to build a core of expertise in thinking about, researching and tackling exactly these kinds of problem.

<sup>84</sup> Report of the Independent Review Team *Community Cohesion*, 2.1



The EU needs to recognise its responsibility in healing socio-ethnic divisions and the experience of Northern Ireland, not just as a specific example of socio-ethnic conflict, but as an arena where a variety of mainstream and EU strategies have been implemented, could make an important contribution to this EU effort.

It is impossible to prescribe for policies at the EU level, but there are strong arguments for a new EU initiative covering the whole of the territory and the areas that adjoin it and focused on socio-ethnic divisions.

It might do a number of things:

- Raise the visibility of this growing problem and ensure that it is addressed in EU policy making, possibly by assigning responsibility to a particular EU directorate;
- Create transnational learning networks to look at various aspects of the problem – inward migration, sovereignty contests, racism etc. – in order to generate a better understanding of its dynamics and how to engage it. Such networks might best be organised by partnerships of communities and institutions of further and higher education. Interestingly, such partnerships are commonplace in the US, many promoted through Housing and Urban Development. There, they focus on how the knowledge resources of educational institutions could be harnessed to tackle community disadvantage. There is every reason to believe that a similar engagement in Europe could generate new ideas about building civil society and addressing conflict in regions with intractable problems;
- Fund innovative initiatives (perhaps utilising the Poverty 3 model) that could operate outside structural fund frameworks (like EQUAL) to experiment with new ways to address the problem;
- Create an archive of literature and other material (accessible on the web) relevant to those working in this area;
- Fund training for those working in the area;



- Encourage the exchange of activists to cross-fertilise the learning from different situations.

The resources required for this initiative would not be enormous, around €200 million. A first step would be to lobby members of the European Parliament from Ireland, Britain and elsewhere to set up a working group to consider the idea. Simultaneously, contact could be made with members of the European Commission. The idea would be sold as providing Europe with the analytical tools to help intervention in an increasingly violent world.

## **2. Mainstreaming Peace and Reconciliation**

The strength of EU programmes has been their additionality (a contested concept in Northern Ireland) and innovative character, not their scale. In general, they are dwarfed by the scale and funding of mainstream programmes. Since fostering peace and reconciliation has to be long-term in Northern Ireland, it should be embedded in the mainstream.

In short, this proposal looks to put peace and reconciliation at the heart of the mainstream agenda, like New Targeting Social Need or the Equality agenda.

Arguably this is already in place in the shape of the Community Relations Council (CRC), the Community Relations Unit of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the District Council community relations' initiatives. However, there are doubts about the efficacy of these structures. When a separate body, like the CRC, is established with a relatively small funding base, there are definite limitations on what it can achieve. Indeed, its function may be to legitimate the main departments ignoring the issue. At the same time, it could perform a crucial function in acting as a think tank and a commissioner of research on what does work and what needs to be done. Similarly CCRU has carried out a specialist function within one part of government.



The idea here is to rationalise all that existing effort, by demanding that all statutory bodies have a clearly defined obligation to encourage peace-building and reconciliation.

The models for doing so are already in place. The first is Targeting Social Need (TSN). TSN responsibilities ensure that each statutory body has to publish a TSN strategy for how their programmes will be directed in favour of recognised areas of deprivation. Why then not a Peace and Reconciliation strategy? The Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment (DETI) might argue that this detracts from its central mission (regional competitiveness), but there is substantial literature to suggest that peace and reconciliation problems generate barriers to regional competitiveness, if only in the form of segmented housing and labour markets. The work of DETI would substantially benefit from an improved P&R environment. The same is true of Health and Education. As regards these, research has demonstrated the diseconomies of delivering health and education in a divided society, particularly one where the two communities have differing demographic characteristics. The gains from economies of scale and scope are potentially enormous. There is thus good reason to suggest that departments put peace-building and reconciliation at the heart of their agendas.

The other model is Making Belfast Work/Belfast Regeneration Office. In this, specific amounts are identified for particular purposes and departments and the community/voluntary sector make bids for projects that would deliver them. The existence of Executive Funds in the Northern Ireland expenditure bloc provides an ideal mechanism to carry forward this agenda. Indeed, existing categories have considerable P&R potential. Moreover the opportunity for partnerships of statutory and community organisations to make bids would further development the governance innovations introduced in the PEACE Programmes.

The responsibility for mainstreaming these processes should not rest with Northern Ireland alone.



The Republic of Ireland would also gain – e.g. in relative terms, the increase to its security budget necessitated by the conflict in Northern Ireland has been greater than the UK's. The barriers to cross-border synergies and development have affected both states. The Irish government should therefore consider how best to address these issues.

The starting point might be to put the matter on the agenda of the North-South Ministerial Council. Moreover, just as there are models within Northern Ireland of how this might be done, so the National Anti-Poverty Strategy in the Republic should be considered as relevant, particularly in the setting of progress targets.

The key idea is to make reconciliation everybody's business and everybody's responsibility. The difficulties of engaging in this arena are not an excuse to avoid engaging. Everybody wants to do social inclusion work, particularly when it is a pseudonym for community development. PEACE 2 demanded that reconciliation and peace-building should be cross-cutting themes in every form of activity. The same demand should be made on every form of social intervention.

### **3. Strengthening North-South Co-operation**

The Belfast Agreement made much of cross-border relationships and cross-border bodies. However, aside from the political and cultural benefits of cross-border relations, there is significant development potential as signalled in the work of John Bradley.<sup>85</sup> Clearly there are political implications here since the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict is about sovereignty.

Yet, development continues to be concentrated around Dublin and Belfast producing underdevelopment in other sub-regions and increasing congestion and

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<sup>85</sup> Bradley, J (1996), *An Island Economy: exploring the long-term economic and social consequences of peace and reconciliation in the island of Ireland*, Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, Dublin



other costs in these two urban areas. A more balanced development perspective would focus on all-Ireland development.

While there are important initiatives in this respect (see, for example, the work of InterTradelreland), there is at least a doubt that this potential is sufficiently recognised by the two governments. A number of ideas are around: an all-Ireland spatial development plan including transport and telecommunications infrastructure; an all Ireland Community Support Framework negotiated with the European Commission; a scoping study on the most effective use of major physical amenities such as hospitals and colleges that are close to the border; what would a social inclusion strategy for the whole island look like? None of these involve challenges to sovereignty, but instead are about maximising the synergies of common occupation of the same island and sharing a land border.

The basic idea would be to encourage the engagement of all institutions on the island to seek ways to improve their own mission effort by seeking collaborative advantage with other cross-border institutions

To resource such initiatives, an important idea would be a minimal top-slice from the two expenditure blocs to fund all-Ireland and cross-border initiatives designed to give long-term continuity to important projects. If such projects had ten years to develop and deliver tangible results like the east coast or north-west economic corridors or the all-island “virtual” corridor, an improved pace of development might well result. Models for such top slicing already exist, for example in Northern Ireland’s Department of Education to fund TSN initiatives. A report looking at the additional costs of the delivery of health care in a violently divided society made a similar recommendation.<sup>86</sup> The advantage of this approach is that it clearly identifies long-term resources dedicated to this specific purpose.

<sup>86</sup> Smyth M. et al (2001) *Caring Through the Troubles*, Eastern Health & Social Services Board and North and West Belfast Health & Social Services Trust, Belfast.





The disadvantage might be that the amounts agreed would be too small to make a difference.

#### **4. An Innovation Programme for P&R**

One of the key problems of time-bound funding programmes is the possibility that the lessons of real innovation can be lost when the funding regime stops. While new thinking and innovative practices are much needed, there is no guarantee that these can be mainstreamed.

Accordingly, in the aftermath of PEACE 2, it would make sense to gather and analyse all the evaluation undertaken to identify what were the distinctive progress that broke new ground and delivered new results. It may be that these were a minority of all funded projects, but it is important that their lessons are not lost.

For this reason, we propose a small innovation fund designed to secure the learning from such projects, the continuity of the most promising and the transfer of others to different locations to test their generic viability. Our estimate is that this programme would require £60 million over three years to produce demonstrable impact.

Importantly, it should be in place to run at the end of PEACE 2. The learning and the lessons should not be dissipated with the bureaucratic procedures for adopting a new programme are run through.

#### **5. Knowing What Works**

Whatever develops after PEACE 2, whether a new programme or a set of mainstream policy initiatives, we recommend that adequate attention be paid to evaluating and testing what works.



This is different from the ritualistic evaluations that frequently shed little light on the complexities of the problem. There is no point in throwing money at failed practices.

### ***Project Level***

At the level of the project, the basic approach is to record what actually happened and to record what people have learned. Such a process of measurement is very labour intensive and therefore very expensive and we acknowledge that systems have to be related to the scale of the investment made. That projects suffer sometimes from a lack of honesty in this area, which is clearly difficult for many people to confront must be understood and this puts much emphasis on Project Officer visits and the development of relationships of trust between funders and promoters. Where external evaluators are used in PEACE 2, efforts must be made to ensure that an enhanced level of capacity is left behind on the ground.

### ***Macro level***

Attitudinal and behavioural survey should be at baseline and repeated at 18 month intervals through to the end of the programme.

Indicators could include:

- mobility;
- membership of public bodies (i.e. engagement with government);
- sustained behaviours post programme; and
- incidence of media attention on “peace-building”.

### ***Multi Level***

The utility of the concept of social capital is likely also to have application here, particularly since the EU has launched its own Social Capital Programme. The matrix below sets out indicators which could be used to determine the outcome of a third programme at a number of levels:



Individual and Household Level	Organisational Level	Neighbourhood and Community Level	Regional and National Level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interpersonal trust</li> <li>• Number of group memberships</li> <li>• Engagement in volunteering</li> <li>• Trust in statutory service</li> <li>• Membership of networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development (longevity/ sustainability)</li> <li>• Quality of membership (inclusivity)</li> <li>• Institutional Capacity and capability</li> <li>• Institutional linkage (partnership)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation in different social organisations</li> <li>• Collective efficacy</li> <li>• Female participation in and quality of leadership of voluntary organisations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Associational density</li> <li>• Newspaper readership</li> <li>• Membership of voluntary organisations</li> <li>• Volunteering</li> <li>• Sociability</li> <li>• Political efficacy</li> <li>• Trust in government</li> <li>• Optimism</li> </ul>

Fig 35: Social Capital Indicators

These proposals are congruent with Brian Harvey's call for a smaller, more flexible PEACE 3 programme.<sup>87</sup> However, they are also designed to internationalise the learning from this form of engagement, to create synergies between mainstream practices and special initiatives and to offer a consistently all-Ireland focus.

There are two core assumptions: there remains a long-road ahead whatever progress has already been made and this should be recognised in the policy environment, and; whatever one's politics strengthening relationships across the island can only have beneficial consequences.

<sup>87</sup> B. Harvey, (2003), p.11



## Summary

In framing recommendations for a new Peace Programme, we have been mindful of the following considerations:

- The limitations of a single large programme framed within the requirements of ESF and ERDF. As the Harvey report indicates, these put fixed parameters on what could be done by projects and how flexibly they could operate. If there is no given recipe for peace and reconciliation, there is a clear imperative to foster creativity and innovation;
- Associated with the first, the requirement for distributed, decentralised processes so as to involve the maximum number of citizens in decisions about how Northern Ireland could move beyond its conflict;
- The recognition that Northern Ireland's is not a unique conflict and that division and sovereignty disputes exist within the EU and on its borders – a feature that may well increase with enlargement. Accordingly, there is a need to ensure that the learning of the PEACE Programmes is exported beyond the borders of a small island on the western European periphery.

The imperative that peace-building, as well as reconciliation, permeates the mainstream in both Irish states. If nothing else, the time scales involved suggest that problems cannot be fully resolved by a series of time-bound special programmes. This is entirely in keeping with the primary purpose of EU initiatives – to demonstrate what is possible and to influence the policy of the nation state.



## 9. Appendices

### Appendix 1: Bibliography

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**The Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB)**, as Managing Authority is responsible for the efficiency and correctness of management and implementation of the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (2000-2004). The SEUPB liaises with the European Commission and the Monitoring Committee for the Programme and also chairs the Monitoring Committee. The SEUPB is one of the cross-border implementation bodies established under the Good Friday Agreement and is responsible to the North South Ministerial Council.

**Area Development Management (ADM)** is a company established in 1992 by the Irish Government in agreement with the European Commission. ADM's mission is to support integrated local economic and social development through managing Programmes targeted at countering disadvantage and exclusion, and promoting reconciliation and equality.

The aim of **Combat Poverty (CPA)** is to promote a just and inclusive society by working for the prevention and elimination of poverty and social exclusion. Combat Poverty is a statutory agency established under the Combat Poverty Agency Act 1986, which sets out the Agency's four general functions: policy advice, project support and innovation, research, and public education.

The **Community Foundation for Northern Ireland** works to support people, strengthen communities and build peace in the divided communities of Northern Ireland. Specifically its functions include: funding and supporting community-based action; raising funds from a wide range of donors who wish to support and be associated with this work; policy and publications drawing on collective experience, research, and evaluation, to influence policy development.

**Co-operation Ireland (CI)** is a peace-building charity that aims to advance mutual understanding and respect by promoting practical co-operation between the different communities in Northern Ireland and between the people of Northern



Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Co-operation Ireland has worked for over twenty years to promote peace on the island of Ireland and it works with young people, community groups, those involved in business, tourism and agriculture, as well as local government and the media.

